

Service Contract IFS/2014/353-303

**Critical Maritime Routes  
Programme Monitoring, Support  
and Evaluation Mechanism  
(CRIMSON)**

**EU Maritime Security  
Programming:**

**A mapping and technical  
review of past and present EU  
initiatives**



A European Union Project  
implemented by the Royal  
United Services Institute



**Critical Maritime Routes  
Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism  
CRIMSON II**



EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
EuropeAid Co-operation Office  
Instrument for Stability/ Contract no. No. IFS/2014/ 353-303

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Contract No. IFS/2014/ 353-303



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## Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AIMS	Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMSSA	Africa Maritime Safety and Security Agency
ARSTM	Académie Régionale des Sciences et Techniques de la Mer
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CA	Contracting Authority
CGPCS	Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
CMR	Critical Maritime Routes
CoC	Code of Conduct
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRIMARIO	Critical Maritime Routes - Indian Ocean
CRIMGO	Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea
CRIMLEA	Critical Maritime Routes Law Enforcement Agency
CRIMSON	Critical Maritime Routes Programme Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism
CRES	Centre Régional de la Sécurité
CRESMAC	Centre Régional de la Sécurité Maritime de l’Afrique Centrale
CRESMAO	Centre Régional de la Sécurité Maritime de l’Afrique Occidentale
CRP	Cocaine Route Programme
DCoC	Djibouti Code of Conduct
CRT	Crisis Response Training
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DG DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DRTC	Djibouti Regional Training Centre
EAC	East Africa Community
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIMS	ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy
ESA-IO	Eastern and Southern African /Indian Ocean
EU	European Union
EU-ACT	EU Transregional Responses to Drug Traffic and Organised Crime
EUD	European Union Delegation
EUMSS	European Union Maritime Security Strategy
EU NAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
FEI	France Expertise Internationale
FIU	Financial Investigation Unit
GGC	Gulf of Guinea Commission
GMCP	Global Maritime Crime Programme



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GOA	Gulf of Aden
GOG	Gulf of Guinea
GOGIN	Gulf of Guinea Information Network
HDP	Hostage Debrief Programme
HLD	High Level Dialogue
HNS	Hazardous and Noxious Substances
HOA	Horn of Africa
HRP	Heroin Route Programme
ICC	Inter-regional Coordination Centre
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IFC	Information Fusion Centre
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
IMS	IGAD Integrated Maritime Strategy
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organisation
IO	Indian Ocean
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
IORIS	Indian Ocean Regional Information Sharing
IRFS	Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO
OVI	Objective Verifiable Indicators
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
ISC	Information Sharing Centre
ISPS	International Ship and Port Security (Code)
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
IUU	Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MARSIC	Enhancing maritime security and safety through information sharing and capacity building
MASE	Maritime Security Programme
MAST	Maritime Security Project to Counter Terrorism
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MLED	Maritime Law Enforcement Dialogues
MOWCA	Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MRCC	Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres
MSI	Maritime Security Initiative
MS	Member States
MSA	Maritime Situational Awareness
MTC	Maritime Transport Charter
NAVAF	Naval Force
NCB	National Central Bureau
NFP	National Focal Points
PAEA	Practical Action Eastern Africa
PASSMAR	Support Programme to the Maritime Security Strategy in Central Africa
PESCAO	Improved Regional Fisheries Governance in Western Africa



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PMAR-MASE	Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risks – Maritime Security
PP	Project Purpose
PRC	Piracy Reporting Centre
RCOC	Regional Centre for Operation Coordination
REC	Regional Economic Community
REFLECS3	Regional Fusion Law and Enforcement Centre for Safety and Security at Sea
REMISC	Regional Maritime Information Sharing Centre
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
RMU	Regional Maritime University
ROEA	Regional Office for Eastern Africa (UNODC)
ROM	Results Oriented Monitoring
SADC	South African Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SEACOP	Seaport Cooperation Project
SGI	Security Governance Initiative
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound
SNA	Somali National Army
SWAIMS	Support to West Africa Maritime Integrated Security
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law on the Sea
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WFP	World Food Programme
WIO	Wider Indian Ocean
YCoC	Yaoundé Code of Conduct





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### Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities conducted in 2018 by the CRIMSON II project in relation to the CMR Programme. It is the first study of its kind to assess the performance of CMR projects to date, and to evaluate these projects' complementarity with wider maritime security initiatives. The projects evaluated include ongoing and concluded CMR projects in the Gulf of Guinea and Western Indian Ocean region.

The report has a number of key objectives. First, it aims to provide an overview of EU and other stakeholders' involvement in three key regions (the Gulf of Guinea, Indian Ocean and South-East Asia), by mapping past, present and planned maritime security initiatives across them. Second, the report presents the results of M&E activities conducted in 2018 across CMR projects. Finally, it provides recommendations to the Contracting Authority on strengthening coordination and coherence among maritime security initiatives at a regional and trans-regional level, and on the design of future projects.

Research and M&E activities for this report took place in two phases. The first phase involved the mapping of past, present and future EU and non-EU maritime security initiatives across the focus regions. In a second phase, semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders in the Gulf of Guinea (Cameroon, Nigeria and Ghana), Western Indian Ocean (Madagascar, Djibouti and Kenya) and South-East Asia (Singapore).<sup>1</sup> The interview protocol for these semi-structured interviews was designed according to the Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) framework and the baseline indicators presented in the CRIMSON II M&E Framework.

The results are analysed according to seven key criteria. These include relevance, quality of design, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, coherence and synergies, and EU project visibility. A brief summary of the findings in relation to each of these criteria is as follows.

The interviews conducted for this report suggest that the CMR programme remains relevant and purposeful. However, stakeholders noted that the programme may require modification in some areas if individual projects are to achieve the programme's overall strategic aims in the future. For example, to remain relevant, some projects may require tighter alignment with the priorities set out in regional maritime strategies, and may need to place greater focus on other maritime issues beyond piracy. These include maritime governance and the blue economy as a driver of sustainable maritime security and safety.

Where possible, interviewees also noted that opportunities to better align with other, relevant projects should be explored. A successful example of this is the crossover between MASE and CRIMARIO, which has seen CRIMARIO's technical expertise drive forward MASE's information sharing objectives. Opportunities also exist for CMR projects to engage with other EU maritime security initiatives, as well

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<sup>1</sup> These six countries were selected on 25 January 2018, following consultation with a Reference Group, established to oversee and discuss the conceptualisation and content of the report. The Reference Group includes representatives from a range of desks at DG DEVCO, DG MARE and EEAS.



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as initiatives by other international partners in the maritime domain. Embracing such opportunities would only bolster the relevance of the CMR projects themselves.

Each of the CMR projects reviewed for this report has utilised log-frames<sup>2</sup> that were believed to be too rigid, often resulting in delays where project adaptation was required. Many stakeholders saw this as a flaw in the overarching project design process, noting that changes in project needs can occur quickly and projects need to be able to adapt rapidly. For example, the rigidity of the log-frame for CRIMARIO caused delays in the implementation of the project when problems arose in relation to the dialogue between the EU and UAE on establishing an information fusion centre in Abu Dhabi.<sup>3</sup>

As a result, it is suggested that more flexible log-frames are required to allow projects greater flexibility to adopt organisational and structural changes. To achieve this, project changes should be driven by an evolving analysis cycle, drawing on input from regional stakeholders, with project risk matrices discussed at regular steering group meetings with these regional actors to help identify any required changes in direction. It was argued further that regional stakeholders and beneficiaries should be more fully involved during project design, especially where projects aim to support a regional body or strategy.

Many of the projects reviewed in this report were judged to have proceeded efficiently. However, this does not necessarily add up to broader efficiency across the CMR programme as a whole. Greater alignment at project design phase might help to overcome a number of inefficiencies caused, at the programme level, by lack of cohesion between different projects. There is also scope to further enhance the overall efficiency of projects by developing a more efficient means to centrally monitor the situation where projects overlap, and to propose adjustments to project design to create a more efficient EU centric output. Meanwhile, disparities identified between CMR and EDF funded projects suggest that more robust in-house (EU) Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms are required, coupled with stronger oversight and coordination mechanisms.

The report demonstrates the effectiveness of individual CMR projects. Indeed, in general terms, CMR projects were judged to have proved effective in achieving the objectives defined in their log-frames. However, it was also noted that effectiveness could be enhanced by ensuring that projects work to more

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<sup>2</sup> According to the Europeaid Project Cycle Management Guidelines, a logframe is a matrix in which a project's Intervention Logic, Assumptions, Objectively Verifiable Indicators and Sources of Verification are presented. See [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/methodology-aid-delivery-methods-project-cycle-management-200403\\_en\\_2.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/methodology-aid-delivery-methods-project-cycle-management-200403_en_2.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> The UAE were in talks with the EU (the CRIMARIO team) for the establishment of an information fusion centre in Abu Dhabi. Although the dialogues were proceeding effectively, the process suddenly came to an end as a result of two main factors: (1) disagreements over the ownership and some other aspects of the governance of the proposed Fusion Centre; (2) the fact that the UAE requested this step to be clarified before their agreement to host the centre; the CRIMARIO team, by contrast, wanted to clarify these issues after the UAE had agreed to host the centre. These disagreements led to the end of the dialogue with the UAE and to the need to reformulate CRIMARIO, which took approximately 8 months.



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effectively articulate mechanisms through which partner countries can build interagency relations, within and beyond the framework of the project

As such, to be effective in the long term, greater emphasis needs to be placed on building inter-agency cooperation and buy in. At the same time, it is vital that projects are integrated with the goals articulated by national and regional maritime strategies. If such strategies are not considered, this leaves a gap at the strategic level, for example, between the political strategies of RECs and the political will of member states to cooperate with individual projects and the CMR programme overall.

Overall, it is evident that CMR programming has had a positive impact in relation to project beneficiaries. In particular, capacity building in the form of expert training has been highly rated; many stakeholders noted that current projects would have a sustainable impact into the future, as long train-the-trainer activities continued as a key part of project activities. The development of new infrastructure, such as the Djibouti Regional Training Centre (DRTC) in Djibouti and the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) in Yaoundé, also provides evidence of tangible impacts in the maritime security domain.

However, it was noted that beneficiary states may find it difficult to sustain the benefits of regional projects such as the CMR projects. This was seen by stakeholders as a key threat to the sustainability of the CMR programme as a whole. To address this, there is a need to prioritise the establishment of inter-agency mechanisms to address maritime security and ensure ownership of project activities. Once this inter-agency mechanism is established, it will be easier for individual state to commit to sustaining and building upon the CMR legacy.

The report notes that all projects have maintained positive relationships with each other, and with other external initiatives and institutions. However, these relationships could be enhanced through a greater focus on ensuring coherence, both between CMR projects and with other projects. On the positive side, there is evidence that project managers show clear will to collaborate, deconflict and harmonise projects' activities. However, more work remains to be done to achieve this objective, and CRIMSON II remains well placed to support this.

Synergies must be guaranteed at design stage by ensuring that projects align among themselves and with relevant regional strategies. This will enhance their compatibility with regional objectives during implementation, bolstering trust on the part of regional stakeholders and increasing opportunities for the development of future initiatives.

At the same time, stakeholders emphasised the importance of collaboration both with initiatives funded by other partners and with the private sector. They noted that numerous opportunities exist for projects to engage with private enterprises, in technical terms and through the provision of services. In light of the potential for private entities to financially support a project after its end, such engagement should be considered an integral component of project design and development.

There is a clear lack of visibility across the CMR programme as a whole. Despite the efforts made by CRIMSON II to present the projects as part of a wider programme, and the projects' own individual efforts to this effect, stakeholders in the field continue to appear confused when asked to consider the



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CMR programme as a whole. Many stakeholders are aware of the existence of many of the individual projects, but not of the fact that they sit under an umbrella programme.

As such, greater emphasis should be placed on external communication. Each project faces its own challenges in this regard; however, CRIMARIO has generally performed very positively in terms of external communication, and should be used as template by other projects. CRIMSON II continues to be well placed to encourage and facilitate this work, with recent outputs illustrating the achievements of the projects in these regions. All projects should support these efforts by providing CRIMSON II with regular updates, ensuring project websites and social media channels are well maintained, and displaying CMR banners (rather than implementing agency flags and logos) at public events.

**Recommendations**

A number of recommendations have been made throughout this Executive Summary. For the full list of specific recommendations made in relation to each of these seven areas (relevance, quality of design, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, coherence and synergies, and EU project visibility), please see Sections 2 and 4.



## Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II

### Introduction

Countries in the Gulf of Guinea and Western Indian Ocean, along with those in South East Asia, face many challenges to their border security, including in the maritime domain. The maritime threats faced by these regions endanger economic, environmental and social security at a national, regional and international level. Environmental challenges include the over-exploitation of marine resources, rapid degradation of the marine environment through pollution, coastal erosion, and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. More traditional security threats include the smuggling of narcotics and illicit weapons, human trafficking, illegal migration, piracy and armed robbery at sea. The combination of these threats contributes to a general lack of safety and security in the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca and Gulf of Guinea, increasing the economic and security risk for commercial operators that depend on these critical maritime routes for legal purposes.

Recognising the gravity of these transnational threats and the EU's reliance on stable and predictable maritime trading, in 2009 the European Commission founded the Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme to improve the security and safety of these essential maritime routes. Operating under the framework of the Instrument for Stability and Peace (IcSP)<sup>4</sup> (formerly known as the Instrument for Stability (IfS)), the programme is financed by the EU to an amount of €31.9 million over a period of eleven years. Under Article 5 of the IcSP Regulation, the primary aim of the programme is to address specific global, trans-regional and emerging threats with a potentially destabilising impact on international peace and security.

Within the CMR architecture, the Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism (CRIMSON) is mandated to enhance coordination, coherence and complementarity among CMR projects, as well as other European and international maritime security initiatives. Written by experts commissioned by CRIMSON, this report provides the first comprehensive M&E review of projects under the CMR programme. It is the first study to assess and compare all CMR projects and evaluate their complementarity with wider maritime security initiatives.

The specific purpose of this report is to:

1. Provide an overview of the status of EU involvement in three critical regions, namely the Gulf of Guinea, Indian Ocean and South-East Asia, by mapping EU and non-EU initiatives relating to maritime security;
2. Conduct monitoring and evaluation exercises on all CMR components (GoGIN, CRIMARIO, MARSIC, CRIMGO and CRIMLEA) using the Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) framework, and compare the results to the activities of non-CMR actions;

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<sup>4</sup> The IcSP Regulation - based on both Article 209 'Development Cooperation' and Article 212 'Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Third Countries' (other than developing countries) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, giving a worldwide scope of action to this instrument.



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3. Provide recommendations to strengthen coordination, coherence and complementarity among maritime security initiatives at a regional and trans-regional level, both within the programme (internal coherence) and with respect to other relevant external initiatives (external coherence);
4. Support the Contracting Authority (CA) in the strategic design of future actions, both within the CMR programme, and potentially more broadly under the IcSP. Here, emphasis is placed on

The study also assesses the extent to which strategic cooperation is taking place with other relevant stakeholders and initiatives, including those under the Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Council of the European Union and its working groups, and EU Member States and relevant forums.

The study's methodology is based on both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The M&E framework applied throughout the study is based on the ROM Handbook, using the baseline indicators presented in the CRIMSON II M&E Framework. The evaluation system was designed with reference both to the OECD/DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability and to the related grading system (ROM 2015).

Data were gathered via desk-based research and in-person and telephone interviews. In particular, data gathering activities included:

- Process/activity monitoring to track the use of inputs and resources; the progress of activities; and the delivery of outputs in terms of efficiency in time and resources.
- Results monitoring to determine whether the project or programme is on target to achieve its intended results (outputs, outcomes, impact) and whether any unintended or unforeseen impacts (positive or negative) have arisen as a consequence of the project's activities.
- Organisational monitoring to measure the sustainability of capacity building efforts, and their impact on institutional development among project or programme partners.
- Context/situation monitoring to assess the setting in which the project or programme operates. This includes consideration of the potential impact of the broader political, institutional, funding and policy context on project or programme performance.

The report is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the security context in the three regions under scrutiny (Gulf of Guinea, the Wider Indian Ocean, and South-East Asia), and maps the past, present and planned EU and non-EU initiatives related to maritime security in these regions. Chapter 2 outlines the findings of the evaluation phase, based on the seven pre-identified criteria. Chapter 3 provides a critical analysis of overarching issues, emerged through observation. Finally, chapter 4 proposes key recommendations.

The report also includes a datasheet containing a comprehensive list of past, present and planned maritime security initiatives in the regions under consideration. For each initiative, the datasheet presents information on timeline, budget, funding mechanisms and implementing partners. The datasheet also provides a list of the regional mechanisms, forums and diplomatic actions run by the EU and its main partners in each location.



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### The CMR Programme: Implementing the IcSP to Counter Maritime Threats

This report was produced mindful of the continued global importance of the CMR programme in supporting maritime security across Gulf of Guinea, Indian Ocean and South-East Asia. The CMR programme, as an arm of Article 5 of the IcSP, has significantly transformed what was initially a limited discussion around piracy into a broader dialogue on other security issues in the maritime domain. According to IcSP indicators, since the inception of the CMR programme, there has been a significant reduction in piracy incidents, to the extent that piracy<sup>5</sup> is no longer at the top of regional agendas, although bunkering and hijackings remain significant concerns. National and regional maritime information sharing capacity has also increased, but many initiatives are yet to forge trans-regional links to maximise their impact. The IcSP objectives are and will continue to be backed by the CMR programme with the support of like-minded countries, as this report shows.

The combination of EU programmes and initiatives such as EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, the shipping industry's adherence to Best Management Practices when transiting a High Risk Area, and the increased use of private armed security guards have all contributed significantly to the aforementioned demise of piracy. Nevertheless, securing the maritime domain against piracy remains a priority. Alongside this, however, other threats have become more relevant over the lifecycle of the CMR programme. Fortunately, the IcSP is well-equipped to deal with many of these emergent issues, including a noteworthy increase in presence of organised crime groups (OCGs) operating in the maritime sphere. For example, the IcSP Regulation allows for assistance under this Instrument to address 'organised crime and all forms of illicit trafficking'. As such, the CMR programme could re-define the scope of its assistance and capacity building to encompass more comprehensively this type of broader maritime security issue.

Organised crime is not the only threat to the maritime domain, with further threats encompassing bunkering and hijacking, among other threats. However, there are several vulnerabilities that enable OCGs to operate in the maritime domain, including basic issues of resourcing for national authorities and the challenges inherent in policing ports and territorial waters. For example, ports that have not yet implemented the applicable International Maritime Organisation (IMO) standards, such as the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code, are an easy target for OCGs. The threat posed by OCGs and their level of sophistication has significantly increased in the last few years. As such, this is an area where the CMR programme has much expertise to contribute and the importance of responding to this threat should continue to be considered when developing new projects.

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<sup>5</sup> Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). UNCLOS Art. 101 [http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos\\_e.pdf](http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf)



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In this regard, there is a range of ways in which the IcSP has and can be applied to counter organised crime threats in the maritime sphere. This is demonstrated by the CMR programme's success in involving Financial Investigation Units (FIUs) in the maritime security agenda. Initially focused solely on piracy-related financial flows, many national FIUs now contribute to investigations across a spectrum of maritime criminal cases. The promotion of this approach was underpinned by the involvement of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) under the umbrella of MASE, spearheading the development of FIUs where none existed previously.

Of particular importance in terms of organised crime in the maritime sphere is drug trafficking – a major threat that affects numerous maritime transport routes. In this respect, Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) operations in the Indian Ocean have been highly successful in intercepting vessels moving heroin and cannabis, as well as illegal consignments of natural resources (charcoal). SEACOP and WAPIS have also played an important role in bolstering information sharing about OCGs involved in drug trafficking – a service which is crucial to assisting new CMR projects.<sup>6</sup>

Indeed, there is significant potential for the CMR programme to further help build and refine information sharing systems capable of working across different regional and transregional official bodies to detect suspicious vessels and coordinate their detainment with the relevant Member States. This reflects the existing commitment of the IcSP in this area: the IcSP states in Article 5.3.d that 'with regard to assistance relating to the problem of drugs, due attention shall be given to international cooperation aimed at promoting best practices relating to the reduction of demand, production and harm'.

The added-value that the IcSP can provide in this area links to its capacity to address the trans-regional dimensions of trafficking. It can do so by providing capacity building assistance to the law enforcement, judicial and civil authorities involved in fighting illicit trafficking and other, broader maritime security threats at sea. To date, the CMR programme has contributed significantly both to the development of robust partnerships with key stakeholders in Africa and South-East Asia, and to the development of judicial systems in these regions. Expanding the remit of those established partnerships would serve to complement existing activities and would further increase the value of future CMR programming. This would also fall within the IcSP's Article 5 priorities, which seek to support and enhance maritime situational awareness by addressing maritime crime writ large.

Of relevance to efforts to address all of these crime types and other, broader threats to maritime security are the CMR programme's objectives of fostering trans-regional cooperation, building capacity to share information and best practices, and promoting international standards and codes of conduct in maritime security. This report finds that GoGIN, CRIMARIO, CRIMLEA, CRIMGO and MARSIC have all achieved aspects of the above. For example, CRIMARIO and CRIMLEA have assisted in the development

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<sup>6</sup> SEACOP is a project under the umbrella of the Cocaine Route Programme (CRP). However, whilst the first phase of WAPIS fell under the CRP, the project is now financed under the framework of the European Development Fund (EDF)





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of multilateral responses at a regional level and have provided a platform to engage at the political level to pursue mutual objectives.

A further example concerns the support provided by CRIMARIO to the information-sharing centre for the Indian Ocean in Madagascar. This underlines how a CMR project like CRIMARIO has supported a key coordination element for multilateral maritime security initiatives and has provided a platform for sustained collective action between like-minded countries (the IORIS network). This has considerably improved regional maritime situational awareness and information sharing capabilities, a core focus of the broader programme. Encouragingly, MARSIC and CRIMARIO have also robustly implemented a 'train-the-trainer' approach, which increases the sustainability of the project's results.

If its recommendations are taken into account, the Monitoring & Evaluation activities undertaken for this report suggest that these outputs can provide a template for broader training activities. Future IcSP projects should build on the achievements of the CMR projects and strive to encompass and anticipate future needs in maritime security, including port control and security of port facilities and ships, as well as administrative capacity building. In particular, the IMO should be engaged via the IcSP to support future projects, with extensive guidance in terms of the implementation of international norms and standards, and promotion of maritime good governance. Overall, stakeholders agree that the CMR programme has enabled substantial dialogue between Member States, particularly in Africa, and has supported regional and trans-regional maritime security cooperation.



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**1. Overview of the Regional Areas of Interest and Maritime Security Actions**

This chapter provides an overview of the security context in the three regions under scrutiny (Gulf of Guinea, the Indian Ocean, and South-East Asia). It also maps out past, present and planned EU and non-EU initiatives related to maritime security in these regions. The chapter starts with an overview of the situation in the Gulf of Guinea, before moving onto consider the situation in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia.

1. 1 Gulf of Guinea: Landscape Analysis



Gulf of Guinea Map<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup><http://cameroon-concord.com/headlines/8601-cameroon-19-african-nations-join-hands-to-fight-maritime-insecurity-in-gulf-of-guinea>



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Over the past decade, the outlook of the Gulf of Guinea region has shifted as growing emphasis has been placed on securing key opportunities available to the region, namely energy security and international trade. It is this outlook that has driven a growing appreciation of the need for a regional approach to maritime security. This has also underpinned UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 2018 and 2039.<sup>8</sup> These Resolutions point to the structures and institutional capacity offered by a number of key organisations, highlighting the importance of these for delivering security to the region. These include the Maritime Organisation for West and Central African (MOWCA); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC).

However, evidence gathered for this report shows that, in many cases, there is a divide between state, regional and international objectives that hinders these regional forums from reaching their full potential. At the regional level, in particular, there often appears to be limited awareness of the technical and institutional changes that are required. In this context, enlarging the scope of agencies dealing with maritime security issues to encompass broader goals relating to social and economic development may be challenging.

Against this backdrop, the international community (the UN, EU, etc.) has prioritised the provision of support as a means to support international trade, to enhance peace and stability in the Gulf of Guinea region, and to bolster security beyond the Gulf of Guinea itself. As new issues have emerged across these three areas, a growing number of projects have been established, resulting in a tapestry of well-intentioned interventions, which are often closely aligned but in some cases can be disjointed and can duplicate each other's activities.

Indeed, in some cases, the existence of overlapping initiatives undermines the holistic approach embedded in regional aspirations for maritime (or other) peace, security and safety. The result is that these initiatives can have the opposite effect to their stated intentions and to the goals embodied in regional maritime strategies. An example can be seen in relation to the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS). This strategy focuses on inter-agency collaboration at the national level and particularly on ensuring that activities and responses within the maritime domain are coordinated and harmonized. As such, the strategy aims to bring together a number of different actors to work in closer collaboration, including stakeholders working in political affairs, legal matters, regional security and defence forces, law enforcement (police, gendarmerie, intelligence, and investigation), maritime administration staff, and port authorities. In particular, the strategy identifies a number of key areas for collaboration, including early warning/observation and monitoring and response capacities, agriculture, environment, water resources, customs, industry, fisheries, strategic planning, transport and telecommunication, energy, trade, research and statistics, free movement of people, multilateral surveillance, employment and drug trafficking control. Additionally, the strategy references the need for collaboration in relation

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<sup>8</sup> UNSCR 2039, 2012, Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10562.doc.htm>



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to humanitarian and social affairs, human resources and development, gender, youth and civil society organisations, industry, oceanography, shipping, and aqua-culture.<sup>9</sup>

However, in terms of EU projects in the region, there are clear overlaps between those designed to improve peace and security under the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for West Africa funded by the European Development Fund (EDF) and those designed under the IcSP to secure sea lines of communication. At the same time, there are clear gaps in communication and collaboration between projects working on overlapping, multi-dimensional and complex threat areas such as transnational crime. Distinctions made in project design between ‘land’ and ‘maritime’ projects can also be problematic and limit the effectiveness of EU initiatives. Indeed, issues such as international trade are inherently transnational in nature, and in this context the use of a land/sea distinction is often artificial as the threat to international trade can emanate from both land and sea. Closer liaison, greater strategic coherence and more concerted inter-agency working will be required if the land/maritime border is not to prove a block to project coherence into the future.

Beyond this, however, there is a natural convergence between the aspirations set out in the Gulf of Guinea regional strategies and the projects implemented by international partners in the region. Nevertheless, achieving coherence between initiatives is often challenging when projects are fractured according to ministerial boundaries, financial lines, execution times, and the use of a rigid land/sea definition. The result is the absence of single body charged with overseeing how individual programmes interact to meet regional strategic aspirations.

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<sup>9</sup> ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EMIS), Available at: <http://www.edup.ecowas.int/key-resources/eims/>



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### 1.1.1 Gulf of Guinea Regional Maritime Security Initiatives<sup>10</sup>

A number of key regional maritime security initiatives exist in the Gulf of Guinea. It is worth reviewing these in turn, as follows.

- The ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS): EIMS identifies the key challenges to the ECOWAS region's maritime domain and offers a set of comprehensive priority actions to be implemented at the national and regional level. It sets out five strategic objectives:
  - Strategic Objective 1: Strengthen maritime governance;
  - Strategic Objective 2: Strengthen maritime security and safety;
  - Strategic Objective 3: Strengthen maritime environmental management;
  - Strategic Objective 4: Optimise the ECOWAS maritime economy;
  - Strategic Objective 5: Promote maritime awareness and research.
- The Protocol Relating to the Strategy to Secure ECCAS' Gulf of Guinea Vital Interests in Seas: This protocol and its instruments have been subsumed into the EIMS, which has taken the regional lead (see above).
- The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) among ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC on Maritime Safety and Security in West and Central Africa: This MoU was established to ensure more effective cooperation among the regional ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC maritime centres. It seeks

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<sup>10</sup> Although not a regional action but a continental one, it is important to mention the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (AIM Strategy). The 2050 AIM Strategy provides a broad framework for the protection and sustainable exploitation of the African Maritime Domain (AMD) for wealth creation. In keeping with the African Union's (AU) principles and the deep-rooted values enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU with applicable programmes, the following objectives guide the 2050 AIM Strategy's activities:

- i. Establish a Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA)
- ii. Engage civil society and all other stakeholders to improve awareness on maritime issues
- iii. Enhance political will at community, national, regional and continental levels
- iv. Enhance wealth creation, and regional and international trade performance through maritime-centric capacity and capability building
- v. Ensure security and safety of maritime transportation systems
- vi. Minimize environmental damage and expedite recovery from catastrophic events
- vii. Prevent hostile and criminal acts at sea, and Coordinate/harmonize the prosecution of the offenders
- viii. Protect populations, including AMD heritage, assets and critical infrastructure from maritime pollution and dumping of toxic and nuclear waste
- ix. Improve Integrated Coastal Zone/Area Management in Africa
- x. Promote the ratification, domestication and implementation of international legal instruments
- xi. Ensure synergies and coherence between sectoral policies within and between the RECs/RMs
- xii. Protect the right of access to sea and freedom of transit of goods for landly-connected States.



## Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II

to promote synergies by improving the pooling and interoperability of Regional Community resources. The parties to the MoU agreed to arrange annual meetings between the Chief Executives of ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC to provide guidance on regional cooperation, and to conduct monitoring and evaluation. The MoU also established guidelines for the creation of an Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (ICC) to implement the regional strategy for maritime safety and security.

- Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa (Yaoundé Code of Conduct): In endorsing the Code of Conduct, the Signatories agreed to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of transnational organised crime in the maritime domain, including maritime terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities at sea. It was agreed that this would be achieved through information sharing, the prosecution of OCGs operating at sea, the interdiction of vessels and aircrafts suspected of involvement in these activities, and the repatriation of seafarers and passengers who fall victim to illegal activities at sea.<sup>11</sup>
- Yaoundé Heads of State Declaration: The Yaoundé Declaration saw Heads of State commit to work for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the West and Central African maritime area through the mobilisation of adequate operational resources at the institutional and logistical level. They also agreed to support the African Union initiative to develop and implement a 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy). At the request of ECCAS, ECOWAS and the GGC, the Signatories will also work to promote activities aimed at enhancing cooperation, coordination, pooling and interoperability of resources between Member States. This will be achieved by: a) Establishing an inter-community framework for cooperation in maritime safety and security; b) Monitoring the maritime sector through joint operational procedures; c) Facilitating the harmonisation of Member States' legal and institutional frameworks; d) Establishing a common mechanism for sharing information and intelligence; and e) Institutionalising a conference on development and maritime security.
- African Charter for Maritime Security, Safety, and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter): In October 2016, signatory countries agreed to work together on maritime security initiatives designed to counter transnational and national crime, develop the Blue Economy, address maritime safety and the maritime environment, and adhere to International Maritime Law.
- Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA): The MOCWA involved the development of an MoU through which signatories agreed to establish a sub-regional integrated coast guard network in West and Central Africa. This will involve consideration of legislation, integration and information sharing, and the development of a network of national focal points.

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<sup>11</sup>[http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code\\_of\\_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf](http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf)



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### 1.1.2 EU Regional Actions

A number of EU regional actions have been implemented in the Gulf of Guinea, under the West Africa Regional Indicative Programme (11th EDF), the Central Africa Regional Indicative Programme (11th EDF) and the IcSP, as follows:

#### West Africa Regional Indicative Programme - 11th EDF<sup>12</sup>

- West African Police Information System (WAPIS): WAPIS facilitates the collection, centralisation, management, sharing and analysis of police information at a national level across West Africa. The system aims to increase the volume of police information that can be exchanged between countries in the region.<sup>13</sup>
- Improved Regional Fisheries Governance in Western Africa (PESCAO): PESCAO supports the formulation of a comprehensive ECOWAS Regional Fisheries Policy. This Policy aims to prevent IUU fishing by fostering improved regional co-ordination and improving fish stock resource management at the regional level.
- Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Security (SWAIMS): SWAIMS is not yet operational, but the programme aims to support ECOWAS to strengthen legal, governance and law enforcement frameworks in order to better support maritime security. The programme will also strengthen law enforcement operational capacities and responses through institutional and technical capacity building.<sup>14</sup>
- Support to ECOWAS regional peace, security and stability: This programme entails the improvement of integrated border management practices. It is also designed to support the fight against terrorism, religious radicalisation, maritime crime, drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, human trafficking and the proliferation of small arms, as part of the broader fight against organised crime.

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<sup>12</sup> The Regional Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for West Africa is funded by the EU under the EDF with the overall objective of contributing to reducing poverty through supporting better growth and regional economic integration among countries of the region.

<sup>13</sup> The first phase of WAPIS (2012-2015) was implemented under the framework of the IcSP. The second phase (2015-2017) was implemented under the framework of the Trust Fund. The current phase (2017-2022) is implemented by EDF.

<sup>14</sup> Given the several overlaps with GoGIN, SWAIMS is currently under discussion.



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### Central Africa Regional Indicative Programme - 11th EDF<sup>15</sup>

- Support Programme to the Maritime Security Strategy in Central Africa (PASSMAR): This programme is not yet operational but will work to support maritime safety and security strategy in Central Africa. The main activities will aim to: 1) support maritime cooperation to operationalise collective maritime safety and security; 2) strengthen legal frameworks dedicated to safety and security at the institutional, operational and normative levels; and 3) support the participation and involvement of civil society organisations and the private sector.

### Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

- Gulf of Guinea Information Network (GOGIN): GoGIN aims to improve safety and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea by establishing an effective and technically efficient regional information-sharing network. The project will undertake an analysis of relevant legal frameworks governing maritime information sharing at a national level, international conventions and national frameworks for the investigation and prosecution of crime at sea.<sup>16</sup>
- CMR Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO): CRIMGO aimed to strengthen the operational capabilities of regional and national maritime organisations in the Gulf of Guinea and to support the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC) and its architecture. Its overarching purpose was to reinforce regional and international initiatives against piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. The project was launched in January 2013 and was designed to run for three years, with a budget of €4.5m, but was extended for a further year to the end of 2016.
- Seaport Cooperation Project (SEACOP): SEACOP seeks to build capacities and strengthen cooperation against maritime trafficking in countries on the trans-Atlantic cocaine route. In particular, it seeks to build capacity at seaports by supporting the establishment of Joint Maritime Control Units (JMCUs). SEACOP operates under the umbrella of the Cocaine Route Programme (CRP).
- CRIMJUST: CRIMJUST is designed to facilitate cooperation and exchange of information between criminal justice agencies to encourage effective prosecutions in relation to inter-regional organised crime and drug trafficking cases. It also assists third countries to advance existing responses to organised crime by strengthening integrity, accountability and resilience to corruption. CRIMJUST operates under the umbrella of the CRP.

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<sup>15</sup> The Regional Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for Central Africa was adopted in June 2015. Through this programme the EU will make €350 million available to the region. The programme is focusing on three areas of cooperation: Political integration and cooperation in peace and security matters; economic integration and trade (including infrastructures); sustainable management of natural resources and biodiversity;

<sup>16</sup> Given the extensive overlap with SWAIMS and the debatable role of the ICC in the GoG, GoGIN is under reformulation. An addendum for changes of the DoA will be submitted by the end of 2018.





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### 1.1.3 Non-EU/Multi-Donor Initiatives<sup>17</sup>

A number of non-EU and multi-donor initiatives are operational in the region, as follows:

- The UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme (Atlantic Ocean, GMCP-AO): The GMCP-AO is currently engaged in the training of third country maritime law enforcement forces, in partnership with the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Centre in Crete. This partnership is based on the relationship originally established under the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC). The GMCP-AO has implemented activities to strengthen West African countries' maritime law enforcement capacity since 2012. In 2017, the GMCP-AO supported Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and São Tomé & Príncipe with legal reforms relating to piracy and maritime crime. As part of this programme, UNODC has Maritime Law Enforcement advisors embedded in Liberia (Coastguard), Sierra Leone (Joint Maritime Committee), Côte d'Ivoire (Permanent Secretariat of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for State Action at Sea), Ghana (Ghana Maritime Police), Nigeria (cross agency), Sao Tome and Principe (Coastguard), and Togo (cross agency within Prefecture Maritime).
- NAVAF: NAVAf is funded by the US to conduct a maritime legal and institutional review under the Ghana/US Security Governance Initiative (SGI). Progress is being made on inter-agency cooperation, with a view to developing a national maritime strategy and establishing an annual law-enforcement exercise linking control centres with interdiction forces.
- International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Regional Strategy: The IMO's Regional Strategy covers all states in the Gulf of Guinea. It focuses on the development of national maritime strategies; the creation of national maritime security plans and procedures; the establishment of national maritime security and facilitation committees; and compliance with SOLAS chapters V and X1-2 and the ISPS Code. The project has an expert assigned to the ICC in Yaoundé to steer the development process.
- Project AGWE: Since 2015, INTERPOL has implemented Project AGWE to assist Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo to investigate maritime crime cases. These include cases of maritime piracy, acts of robbery on the high seas, and other maritime organised crimes in the region. The Project provides training, mentorship and equipment to selected law enforcement

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<sup>17</sup> This report does not focus on initiatives promoted by single MS. Nevertheless, for sake of comprehensiveness, it is important to mention: the role of the UK Navy in improving regional maritime security through capability building and training projects for the Nigerian Navy (NN); the contribution of France and UK to the maritime information network for merchant shipping in the Gulf of Guinea by means of a virtual reporting centre, called Marine Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG); the support of Germany and the USA for intelligence gathering and sharing in Zone E; and the French role on capacity building and training specifically through the structural cooperation with Navies by Navy advisors in a large majority of countries and through their permanent ship in the region "Operation Corymbe" and "NEMO exercises". All these initiatives are included in the datasheet complementary to this report.



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agencies to equip them with the expertise and tools to collect and preserve evidence, investigate maritime crime, and subsequently train officials in their home countries in these areas of expertise. The project also provides training to law enforcement and prosecutors, as well as facilitating mock trials, coordination meetings and exchange visits.

### 1.2 Western Indian Ocean: Landscape Analysis



Western Indian Ocean Map<sup>18</sup>

The Western Indian Ocean region encompasses three regional economic communities (RECs). These include the East Africa Community (EAC)<sup>19</sup>, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.explorettheworldmaps.com/westernindianocean.html>

<sup>19</sup> EAC comprises the States of Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Kenya and Tanzania are the only coastal States of the Community; because the EAC is not yet a federation, the maritime domains of Kenya and Tanzania constitute what is within the EAC maritime domain. A number of maritime security threats, including piracy, armed robbery against ships and an ongoing maritime border dispute between Kenya and



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and the Common Market for South and East Africa (COMESA).<sup>21</sup> Parts of the region are also served by a further regional organisation: the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)<sup>22</sup>. These bodies straddle the Western Indian Ocean and East African regions from Sudan to South Africa, with a number of overlaps between countries.

The official document governing enforcement responses in the region's maritime domain is the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), adopted under the IMO in 2009. The DCoC has been instrumental in bringing key stakeholders to the table to work more effectively together on a range of regional issues. These include the rise of piracy and armed robbery against ships operating in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) and the Gulf of Aden (GoA).

However, a number of significant coordination issues have hindered the effective implementation of the DCoC to date. First, RECs cannot be parties to the DCoC, thus creating potential coordination gaps amongst key stakeholders. Second, the participation of Middle Eastern countries and France (given the inclusion of the overseas territory of Reunion in the Code) has proven a barrier to the establishment of comprehensive links to other regional strategies.

A high-level meeting of the signatories to the DCoC was held in Jeddah in January 2017. This led to the adoption of a revised Code of Conduct, the "Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct 2017". The aim of this amendment was to revise and expand the scope of the original Code of Conduct. Notably, the Amendment calls on the signatory States to cooperate further to repress transnational

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Somalia, affect the maritime domain of the East African Community (EAC). The EAC and some of its member States do not have long-term and holistic maritime security policies and thus, individual States deal with maritime security in an ad-hoc, case-by-case manner. The lack of regional maritime security policies, more importantly maritime security strategy, and the absence of a maritime institutional framework at the Community level, appear to be major setbacks to regional maritime security efforts.

<sup>20</sup> The founding leaders of IGAD were motivated by a vision where the people of the region would develop a regional identity, live in peace and enjoy a safe environment alleviating poverty through appropriate and effective sustainable development programmes. The IGAD Secretariat as the executive body of the Authority was given the mandate to achieve this goal. IGAD Member States are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.

<sup>21</sup> COMESA's Vision is to "be a fully integrated, internationally competitive regional economic community with high standards of living for all its people ready to merge into an African Economic Community." The Secretariat was guided to develop its specific Mission Statement as follows "To provide excellent technical services to COMESA in order to facilitate the region's sustained development through economic integration". Overall, COMESA's activities focus on regional integration and the development of trade for East Africa. Its prime concern is not on maritime enforcement as a subject matter but on the problems and solutions required to encourage sustainable trade and economic development.

<sup>22</sup> The Indian Ocean Commission (French: Commission de l'Océan Indien, COI) is an intergovernmental regional organisation that was created in 1982 at Port Louis, Mauritius and institutionalized in 1984 by the Victoria Agreement in Seychelles. The COI is composed of five African Indian Ocean nations: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion (an overseas region of France), and Seychelles



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organised crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities at sea, in line with the principle of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).<sup>23</sup>

The Jeddah Amendment has encouraged signatory States to work together to build national and regional capacity to address wider maritime security issues, as a foundation for sustainable development of the maritime sector. Notably, the Jeddah Amendment recognises the important role of the “blue economy”, including shipping, seafaring, fisheries and tourism in supporting sustainable economic growth, food security, employment, prosperity and stability. The Amendment commits signatories to developing and implementing both national maritime security policies and national legislation to ensure the safe and secure operation of port facilities, as well as the effective protection of the marine environment and sustainable management of marine living resources. For the purposes of the study, it is important to note that EU NAVFOR Atalanta was the only EU representative at a Jeddah follow-on meeting held in May 2018. Given the rising importance of the blue economy for African countries (and many other maritime states) it is advisable that other EU agencies, especially DG MARE and regional EU Delegations, participate in such meetings. This would also help to increase the EU’s broader visibility in the region, as well as building trust among key regional stakeholders.

### *1.2.1 Western Indian Ocean Regional Maritime Security Initiatives<sup>24</sup>*

A number of key regional maritime security initiatives exist in the Western Indian Ocean. It is worth reviewing these in turn, as follows.

- IGAD Integrated Maritime Strategy 2015-2030 (IMS): The IMS incorporates aspirations set out in the African Union’s 2009 Maritime Transport Charter (MTC) and the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS). The IMS provides a coherent framework, supported by a long-term multi-tiered plan of action, to achieve the relevant IGAD objectives, namely those of strengthening the region’s marine and maritime sector and increasing its economic vitality. Specifically, the main aim of the IMS is to ensure a healthy and vibrant marine and maritime sector across the IGAD region, which is free from threat and criminal activity, and provides employment and viable economic prospects for local communities.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> This will include information sharing; interdicting ships and/or aircraft suspected of engaging in such crimes; ensuring that any persons committing or intending to commit such illicit activity are apprehended and prosecuted; and facilitating proper care, treatment, and repatriation for seafarers, fishermen, other shipboard personnel and passengers involved as victims.

<sup>24</sup> Please see note 9

<sup>25</sup> The eight common objectives of the IGAD IMSS strategy are: to promote a safe and secure IGAD maritime domain and contribute to the security of the global maritime domain; To endorse and protect recognised maritime standards; safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic and defend the freedom of navigation of vessels transiting vital maritime transportation corridors within the IGAD maritime domain; to safeguard the IGAD region from maritime threat including illegal and dangerous activities as well as transnational or serious organised crime and terrorism; to develop the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of IGAD Member States, in



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- The Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control: This MoU commits maritime authorities to implement a harmonised system on Port State Control (PSC), inspection procedures, operational procedures for investigations and exchange of information. When vessels are not in compliance with prevailing legislation or related convention requirements, the PSC system works to bring them into compliance.<sup>26</sup>
- The South African Development Community (SADC) Maritime Strategy: SADC cannot be described as a Western Indian Ocean regional organisation; however, SADC includes a number of countries under the geographical scope of this region.<sup>27</sup> The SADC Maritime Strategy was formally adopted by the summit of Heads of State held in Luanda in August 2011. The strategy, which is not yet fully released, cites the eradication of Somali piracy in Southern Africa as its first priority. Its second priority is that of securing the west coast of Southern Africa. Its third priority is that of securing Southern Africa's vast rivers and lakes: from the Congo River to Lake Tanganyika, these are vital to trade and development, across the region. The strategy comprises two main components: military deterrence and intelligence gathering.

### 1.2.2 EU Regional Actions

A number of EU regional actions have been implemented in the Western Indian Ocean, under the 10th EDF, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and the IcSP, as follows:

#### Regional Indicative Programme for the Region of Eastern Africa and Southern Africa, and the Indian Ocean (RIP EA-SA-IO) - 10<sup>th</sup> EDF

- Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE): The overall objective of MASE is to enhance maritime security in the EA-SA-IO region, thus contributing to global security and creating a favourable environment for economic development. The Programme works in five key areas, across four locations. These cover:

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particular States that have been weakened through conflict and insecurity; to protect the IGAD region, member states, communities and economies by strengthening the safety and security of maritime critical infrastructures such as ports, offshore installations and maritime transport systems; to accelerate the growth of safe and secure regional maritime transport, logistics and multi model systems; inclusive of supporting technologies; to develop regional standards for maritime safety security capacity building, human, technical and infrastructure; to protect the IGAD regions marine environment and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution.

<sup>26</sup> The MoU can be viewed at <http://www.iomou.org/pscmain.htm>. Also of note is the IOC's Strategic Development Programme for the period 2015-2017, endorsed by the IOC Council of Ministers in 2015, which proposes areas of intervention that include maritime security.

<sup>27</sup> SADC Member States include Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles. South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.



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1. The creation of alternative livelihoods through vocational development initiatives and support for advocacy against piracy and improvement of maritime coordination mechanisms in Somalia (IGAD).
2. The strengthening of national and regional capacities in legislation and infrastructure to ensure the arrest, transfer, detention and trial of pirates (EAC).
3. The reinforcement of regional capacity to disrupt the financial networks of pirates and their sponsors, thus reducing the economic impact of piracy (COMESA).
4. The bolstering of national and regional capacities for action at sea (IOC).
5. The bolstering of mechanisms to ensure regional coordination and exchange of information (IOC).

MASE is funded by the EDF but also forms an important element of the IcSP's long-term strategy in the region. For the CMR programme, the long-term objective is for coastal nations to assume greater responsibility for patrolling the waters of the Western Indian Ocean. The strengthening of maritime domain awareness (MDA) and the sharing of regional maritime data are crucial to this and form key components of multiple EU initiatives.

- Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risks (PMAR-MASE): In response to the need for improved maritime situational awareness in regions facing the threat of piracy, the EU conducted the Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risks project (PMAR), an in-depth study of technologies and their potential application to the fight against piracy. This pilot project was implemented by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre, under MASE Result 5. The project was scientific in nature and ran between 2010 and 2012. It explored the potential use of civilian technical and affordable tools – such as satellite technologies – to develop real-time maritime situational awareness.<sup>28</sup>
- Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (IRFS/SMARTFISH): SmartFish is a regional fisheries programme managed by the IOC, and co-implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. SmartFish is funded by the European Union,<sup>29</sup> and operates in twenty countries throughout the Indian Ocean Region, Southern and Eastern Africa. Its main focus is on fisheries governance, management, monitoring control and surveillance, trade, and food security.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> The same action was implemented in the Gulf of Guinea and Somalia

<sup>29</sup> The programme implemented by the IOC in collaboration with the COMESA, the East Africa Community (EAC) and IGAD. Other regional institutions involved include the SADC and regional fisheries management organisations, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC), the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO), and the Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA).

<sup>30</sup> The program's beneficiary countries include Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Though they do not benefit from 10th EDF ESA-IO funds, Mozambique and South Africa are involved as members of SADC and through the Inter-Regional Coordination Committee (IRCC) framework. Réunion (France) also participates as a member of the IOC; although not as a financial beneficiary.



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### Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

- European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA: Operation ATALANTA was launched across the Western Indian Ocean in December 2008, in response to European concerns over the impact of Somali-based piracy on the freedom of navigation of commercial and humanitarian shipping.<sup>31</sup> The operation was originally devised as a short-term crisis management intervention, but the Council of the EU is now due to extend the mandate of Operation ATALANTA until December 2020. This will ensure that EU NAVFOR continues its role in: protecting World Food Programme (WFP) and other vulnerable shipping in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean; deterring, preventing and repressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; monitoring fishing activities within the Somali Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); and supporting other EU missions (specifically MASE and CRIMARIO) within its means and capability.<sup>32</sup>
- EUCAP NESTOR/SOMALIA: In July 2012, the EU launched EUCAP Nestor, a civilian mission to help host countries to develop a self-sustaining capacity to enhance maritime security. EUCAP Nestor's original mandate (2012-2015) was to work across the HoA and Western Indian Ocean. Since the end of 2015, following a strategic review of the Mission, activities have focused solely on Somalia (including Somaliland), with the initiative rebranded as EUCAP Somalia. Here, EUCAP Somalia has made a key contribution to the capacity building of maritime civilian law enforcement capability. In carrying out its mandate, the mission cooperates with the EU Delegation to Somalia, Operation ATALANT and EUTM Somalia. EUCAP Somalia also organises joint activities with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as well as with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).
- European Union Training Mission SOMALIA (EUTM-Somalia): EUTM-Somalia is an EEAS mission responsible for organising training, mentoring and advisory activities. EUTM-Somalia trains a

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<sup>31</sup> The operational mandate of Atalanta derives from UNSCR 1816 and subsequent revisions, but also the written agreement of the Federal Government of Somalia, which permits EU NAVFOR unique access into Somali internal waters.

<sup>32</sup> Within EU NAVFOR's operational headquarters sits the Maritime Security Centre HoA (MSCHOA) to which 85% of ships still register when transiting the High-Risk Area, and from which ship vulnerability assessments are conducted. MSCHOA runs the only online forum (MERCURY) for counter-piracy responders, which now reaches 112 coast guards, navies and law enforcement bodies across 38 nations. MSCHOA is also responsible for EU NAVFOR's liaison with commercial shipping and thus the guidance issued in Best Management Practice 5 (released on 28 June 2018). The Centre also organises international convoy protection in the Internationally-Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) and issues (jointly with CMF) the Industry-Releasable Threat Assessments and Bulletins that advise the global shipping industry abo current maritime threats. Finally MSCHOA plays a leading role in the biannual Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) forum for all military counter-piracy forces operating in the GoA and Western Indian Ocean. It is as a direct result of EU NAVFOR's military presence over the last 10 years, coupled with the EU's civilian-led initiatives, that the EU is now recognised internationally as playing a valuable part in the maritime security architecture of the region (the EU's own Near Abroad).



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range of (integrated and multi-clan) bodies, including train-the-trainer activities. It also has an advisory and mentoring role in relation to Somali Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Somali National Army (SNA) personnel. These activities are conducted in close coordination with others international partners based in Somalia.<sup>33</sup>

### Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

- EU Transregional Responses to Drug Traffic and Organised Crime (EU-ACT): The overall objective of EU-ACT is to contribute to the prevention and disruption of organised crime, including the trafficking of illegal drugs, along the so-called “Heroin Route”.
- Enhancing Maritime Security and Safety through Information Sharing and Capacity Building (MARSIC): MARSIC was formulated in 2010 and implemented from 2011 to 2015, with the aim of reinforcing the capacity of Indian Ocean maritime administrations, law enforcement and coast guards to tackle the growing threats of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. The project was designed to support the DCoC and, more specifically, the implementation and sustainability of the four centres established following the signature of the Code. These include three information sharing centres in Sana’a, Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa, and the Djibouti Regional Training Centre (DRTC).
- CMR Law Enforcement Capacity Building in East Africa (CRIMLEA): CRIMLEA was launched in 2010 with the aim of enabling the national law enforcement agencies of nine selected countries in the Western Indian Ocean to respond to maritime piracy at the regional level, providing them with the necessary training and equipment to conduct these operations effectively and within the relevant legal framework. .
- CMR Wider Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO): Building on MARSIC’s achievements, CRIMARIO was designed to support countries in the region to enhance their Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA), namely their ability to share and fuse data from various sources to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the maritime domain, to promote its security and safety. CRIMARIO has also been working to improve cooperation, coordination and interoperability among its 10 beneficiary countries and five regional maritime centres. To achieve this, CRIMARIO has designed a range of activities including the introduction of the IORIS system: a web-based network to facilitate information sharing and incident management.

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<sup>33</sup> In the future, the Mission’s activities will not change and the SNA companies trained by EUTM-S personnel will be a further “tool” at disposal of Somali Authorities. These forces will assist in the struggle against Al-Shabaab and take concrete steps to the transitional process of the gradual withdrawal of AMISOM troops and the contextual hand over of security responsibilities to Somali Defence Forces.





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### 1.2.3 Non-EU/Multi-Donor Initiatives

- UNODC Regional Office for Eastern Africa (ROEA) Regional Programme 2016-2021: This UNODC Programme is entitled "Promoting the Rule of Law and Human Security in Eastern Africa", and is set to run from 2016 to 2021. The programme covers thirteen countries: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda. The programme takes a holistic, integrated and nationally driven approach to key security and justice challenges, incorporating the inputs and recommendations of the regional Technical Advisory Meeting held in Nairobi in June 2016 with expert delegates from all thirteen countries. Implementation of the Regional Programme is the sole responsibility of the Regional Office, and is composed of five Sub-Programmes:
  1. Sub-Programme I: Countering Transnational Organised Crime Trafficking
  2. Sub-Programme II: Countering Corruption
  3. Sub-Programme III: Terrorism Prevention
  4. Sub-Programme IV: Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
  5. Sub-Programme V: Prevention of Drug Use, Treatment and Care of Drug Use Disorders, and HIV and AIDS Prevention and Care.

This Regional Programme will further serve as a framework for action to support Member States in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as they pertain to UNODC's mandate.

- UNDOC Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) - Horn of Africa (HoA); and Indian and Pacific Oceans (IPO): This Programme assists states in both regions to strengthen their capacity to combat maritime crime. The GMCP grew out of the UNODC Counter Piracy Programme (CPP), which was established in 2009 in response to UN Security Council resolutions calling for a concerted international response to piracy off the Horn of Africa. The CPP played a central role in the establishment of a regional 'piracy prosecution model'. This involved the delivery of comprehensive criminal justice support to countries in the Indian Ocean region, which received suspected pirates for prosecution. This work continues under the GMCP-IPO sub-programmes, which deliver support to Indian Ocean littoral states to tackle wider maritime crime.<sup>34</sup> The GMCP-HoA continues to deliver technical, material and infrastructural support to MLE units along the Somali coast with the aim of building domestic capacity to manage maritime zones.
- Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS): Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008), the CGPCS was established in January 2009 as a voluntary, ad hoc international forum to coordinate international efforts in the fight against piracy off the coast of

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<sup>34</sup> Under the auspices of the GMCP-IPO and with the financial support also from MASE, the UNODC has developed further initiatives, such as: the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime (IOFMC), the Southern Route Partnership (SRP), and the IOFMC Prosecutors' Network.



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Somalia.<sup>35</sup> This serves as the nodal point of a large counter-piracy network, which connects hundreds of actors, including states, international organisations, industry associations, naval missions and counter-piracy projects.

- The Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: In January 2010, at the request of the CGPCS, the UN Secretary-General established the Trust Fund to Support the Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. The objective of the Fund is to support prosecution and detention-related activities, as well as other priorities related to implementing Contact Group objectives on combating piracy. Since its inception, the Fund has considered 20 projects and approved ten, with a total value of US\$4.2 million. Those projects approved include initiatives aimed at strengthening criminal justice systems and law enforcement systems to fight piracy in Somalia, Kenya and the Seychelles. The Fund has also launched a media project to support partners in designing and disseminating anti-piracy messages in Somalia.<sup>36</sup>
  
- African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) - Maritime: AMISOM conducts a limited range of maritime operations in close coordination with ongoing operations by international partners. On 3 December 2011, the AU Peace and Security Council authorised the training and deployment of Vessel Protection Detachments (VPD) on board supply vessels for AMISOM. The VPD is a specialised military detachment designed to act as vessel security for AMISOM supplies. AMISOM Maritime is also used for special assignments by the various countries that bring humanitarian aid and supplies from Nairobi. Beyond this, AMISOM provides security to ships waiting to dock at Mogadishu and Kismayo seaports.
  
- Project EVEXI (Evidence Exploitation Initiative): Project EVEXI was funded by the government of Norway and implemented by INTERPOL, Project EVEXI was designed to provide a framework for the systematic and coordinated exploitation of evidence, enabling law enforcement officials to target the leaders of the Somali piracy networks within the framework of EVEXI, INTERPOL also supported countries in the region in their investigations of maritime related crimes, by providing

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<sup>35</sup> The CGPCS operates through four thematic working groups: Working Group 1 on military and operational coordination, information sharing, and capacity building; Working Group 2 on legal issues; Working Group 3 on the strengthening of shipping self-awareness and other capabilities; and Working Group 4 on public information. The CGPCS also convenes on an ad hoc basis to foster international cooperation to disrupt the illicit financial networks that fuel piracy. The CGPCS facilitated the operational coordination of an unprecedented international naval effort from more than 30 countries working together to protect transiting vessels; it partnered with the shipping industry to improve and promote Best Management Practices that merchant ships and crews can take to avoid, deter, delay, and counter pirate attacks; strengthened the capacity of Somalia and other countries in the region to combat piracy, in particular by contributing to the UN Trust Fund Supporting Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; and, it launched a new initiative aimed at disrupting the pirate enterprise ashore, including its associated financial networks, through approaches similar to those used to address other types of organised transnational crime networks.

<sup>36</sup> <https://www.un.org/undpa/sites/www.un.org.undpa/files/ckfiles/files/UN%20Piracy%20Brochure.pdf>



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databases (including the Global Database on Maritime Security), deploying Incident Response Teams (IRTs),<sup>37</sup> and providing analytical support.

### 1.3 South East Asia: Landscape Analysis



South East Asia Map<sup>38</sup>

Southeast Asia’s maritime domain is of significant economic importance to the EU. The EU is the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest trading partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) after China, accounting for 13% of ASEAN trade. With 60% of the world’s trade (worth US\$5 trillion) passing through the South China Sea, maritime stability here is of global importance.

However, South-East Asia is also the site of a number of complex and interlinked challenges to maritime security. Of geopolitical importance is the deterioration of regional security in the South China Sea, which has escalating since 2009. The dispute over competing historical and legal claims to sovereignty over maritime territories in the South China Sea has at times escalated into minor naval skirmishes. There are four dimensions to the geopolitical tensions playing out in the East and South China Seas: geostrategic balance, national identity politics, regional and domestic institutions, and international

<sup>37</sup> <https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Response-teams/Incident-Response-Teams>

<sup>38</sup> <https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/seasiatm.htm>



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maritime law. The persistence of these tensions amongst key regional stakeholders means that a significant breakthrough in maritime governance will likely depend on the formation of a broad constituency that encompasses trading sectors, fisheries, energy and transport industries, scientific communities, NGOs, think-tanks, environmental activists and local communities, who are capable of coordinated action even when diplomatic relations break down.

Maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia also include a range of criminal activities, such as IUU fishing, human smuggling, THB, narcotics smuggling and SALW trafficking. As the most significant regional organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has thus far been responsible for dealing with security challenges in the region. In 2015, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was formally established, marking an important milestone in the ASEAN economic integration agenda and in the transition from the AEC Blueprint to the AEC Blueprint 2025. Under the new Blueprint, ASEAN will work towards a stronger AEC with the following characteristics:

- A highly integrated and cohesive economy;
- A competitive, innovative, and dynamic ASEAN region;
- Enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation;
- A resilient, inclusive and people-oriented, people-centred ASEAN; and
- A global ASEAN that incorporates new focus areas such as global value chains (GVCs), good regulatory practice, sustainable development, global megatrends, emerging trade-related issues, better connectivity in transportation and other infrastructure networks.

The 2025 Blueprint also encourages cooperation between law enforcement agencies. However, as with many regional forums responsible for coordinating collective action, some issues persist due to unequal levels of capacity among member states, lack of trust, fear of loss of sovereignty, and reluctance to sanction intervention. In terms of maritime security, however, some cooperation in various ad hoc functional maritime security issues (border control, piracy, etc.) does occur between littoral states, mainly on a bilateral and trilateral basis.

### *1.3.1 South East Asia Regional Maritime Security Initiatives*

A number of key regional maritime security initiatives exist in the South-East Asia region. Each is reviewed in turn, as follows.

- ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025: The AEC Blueprint 2025 was adopted by the ASEAN Leaders at the 27th ASEAN Summit on 22 November 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The Blueprint provides the strategic direction for the AEC from 2016 to 2025. Amongst its many goals, the AEC Blueprint 2025 aims to establish an ASEAN Single Shipping Market (ASSM) and promote maritime safety, security and strategic economic corridors within ASEAN. It aims to do, first, by strengthening maritime connectivity within ASEAN through the establishment of ASSM regional maritime transport cooperation. It aims to do so, secondly, through effectively implementing the IMO conventions on creating integrated, efficient and competitive maritime transport, including through fostering a culture of maritime safety within ASEAN and developing strategic maritime logistics corridors.



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- Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF): The first EAMF was held in Manila in October 2012. The Forum was convened in response to statements made by then ASEAN Leaders, as well as by Leaders of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in November 2011, encouraging dialogue with EAS participating countries to capitalise on opportunities to address common challenges on maritime issues, thus building on the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF).
- Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP): This initiative was launched in 2006, building upon trilateral patrols by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (MALSINDO) that began in 2004. The MSP is a comprehensive regional effort to safeguard the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, including through "Eyes-in-the-Sky" Combined Maritime Air Patrols and the Intelligence Exchange Group.
- The Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols / the "Trilateral Cooperative Agreement" (TCA): The TCA was formalised in 2017 between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (with Singapore and Brunei as observers) to address smuggling, piracy and terrorism in the Sulu Sea.

### *1.3.2 EU Regional Actions*

A number of EU regional actions have been implemented in the South-East Asia region, as follows:

- EU-ASEAN High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security Cooperation: The EU-ASEAN High Level Dialogue aims to gather ideas and inputs on how and where ASEAN and the EU can cooperate on maritime security. The Dialogue explores pathways for bilateral cooperation between EU and ASEAN Member States to improve maritime surveillance, information sharing, law enforcement at sea, and the development of efficient, secure and environmentally friendly ports. At a regional level, it enables ASEAN and the EU to discuss how cooperation may enhance marine environmental management, preventing the escalation of conflicts in disputed waters, as well as how such cooperation may facilitate the creation of joint resource development mechanisms, drawing on the experience of EU Member States in relation to these pressing issues. Four high level dialogues have taken place to date: in 2013 in Jakarta, in 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, in 2016 in Bangkok, and in 2017 in Manila.
- South East Asia Project (in collaboration with the IMO): This project is funded under the IfS and is supported through cooperation between littoral countries on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The project aims to contribute to the improvement of safety of navigation in the area. To this end, in December 2010, the EU signed a contribution to the IMO Trust Fund to support cooperation among stakeholders, specifically through the project "Capacity Building on Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) Preparedness and Response". The Database for HNS supports decision-making processes in case of a maritime accidents involving a chemical, biological and radioactive substance material.



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*1.3.3 Non-EU/Multi-Donor Initiatives*

- MAST Project: Project Mast is a two-year programme implemented by INTERPOL and funded by the Government of Canada. It aims to strengthen investigative resources and specialised forensic capabilities; to improve information sharing amongst national and regional law enforcement agencies using INTERPOL policing capabilities; and to enhance maritime law enforcement cooperation in the Southeast Asia region. The project has four beneficiary countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. It builds on recently concluded capacity building projects for port and maritime security in Malaysia and the Philippines. The aim is to bring together the maritime law enforcement community in the four beneficiary countries, including key decision makers, investigators, frontline officers, maritime security experts and INTERPOL National Central Bureaus (NCBs), to strengthen cooperation in regional waters.
- UNDOC Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) – Maritime Law Enforcement Dialogues (MLED): Coinciding with the opening of its office in the Southeast Asia and Pacific region in 2017, the GMCP launched a Maritime Law Enforcement Dialogues (MLED) series for Southeast Asia. At the MLEDs, maritime law enforcement decision-makers, operators and legal advisors from a range of Southeast Asian countries are provided with the opportunity to share trends, best practices and work through practical ‘table-top’ exercises. The aim is to build a common understanding of the maritime crime challenges each faces and to identify avenues for collective action.
- US Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) for Southeast Asia: The Southeast Asia MSI involves a number of ASEAN states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as Singapore, Brunei and Taiwan. The MSI aims to improve the ability of these countries to address a range of maritime challenges, including China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. Much of the funding provided supports the functioning of a maritime and joint operations centre; improvements in maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR); maritime security and patrol vessel support; support for search and rescue operations; and participation in multilateral engagements and training.



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## **2. Evaluation of the CMR Programme<sup>39</sup>**

Having considered the broader security context and the range of initiatives in operation in the regions under consideration, this chapter outlines the findings of the monitoring and evaluation conducted. The results are presented in line with seven pre-identified criteria: relevance, quality of design, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, coherence and synergies, and EU project visibility.

### **2.1 RELEVANCE**

#### *2.1.1 Relevance of Individual Projects*

##### *Gulf of Guinea*

###### *CRIMGO*

In 2010, the CMR Programme extended its scope to cover the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region with the establishment of the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) project. Following an identification and formulation phase between 2010 and 2013, the project was launched in 2013 and ended in October 2016.

The specific purposes of the project are as follows:

- Purpose 1: To assist and support the implementation of the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (ICC) at an operational and strategic level, by providing the necessary expertise for the set-up of its structures.
- Purpose 2: To support the development and provision of both theoretical and practical training courses, including the planning and organisation of crisis response training exercises (CRT) focusing on inter-agency/regional maritime cooperation and law enforcement.
- Purpose 3: To reinforce existing regional training structures (within regional maritime universities - ARSTM, RMU), focusing on state action at sea.
- Purpose 4: To support regional capability to exchange maritime information, particularly through operational and technical expertise provided to the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre and regional organisations.

As such, the overarching objective of CRIMGO was to support, improve and, when appropriate, reinforce regional and international initiatives against piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea.

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<sup>39</sup> The only two regions considered in this section are the Gulf of Guinea and the Western Indian Ocean, as CMR projects have not implemented activities in South East Asia. South East Asia has been included in the geographical scope of this study as a region facing increasing maritime security issues that must be taken into consideration. Moreover, before its reformulation, a number of countries in South East Asia were included in CRIMARIO's original geographical scope.



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CRIMGO made progress against several of the goals outlined above by establishing a sound footing for regional maritime training and education and helping to build up existing regional structures. It also established the baseline documentation for the ICC.

The project was deemed relevant, as testified by the fact that in March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea, which commends the project's role and wider CMR Programme for reinforcing regional and international initiatives against piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea.<sup>40</sup>

*GoGIN*

The Gulf of Guinea Inter-Regional Network (GoGIN) was launched in December 2016 to improve safety and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, notably by supporting the establishment of an effective and technically efficient regional information sharing network.

The project covers 19 countries across the Gulf of Guinea, although its initial actions have focused on a pilot area corresponding to Zones D and E of the Yaoundé architecture (extending from Togo to Gabon).

GoGIN also supports the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and process. To that end, the project will work to improve regional capacity for dialogue and coordination in the maritime domain through activities to support intersectorial coordination, as well as inter-regional maritime dialogue.


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<sup>40</sup> The Council of the European Union, 'EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea', Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 17 March 2014, Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu\\_strategy\\_on\\_the\\_gulf\\_of\\_guinea\\_7.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_strategy_on_the_gulf_of_guinea_7.pdf)





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GoGIN’s architecture in the Gulf of Guinea<sup>41</sup>

The relevance of both CRIMGO and GoGIN in relation to the threat posed by regional piracy and armed robbery at sea was deemed to be clear and sound.

A further insight into the relevance of both CRIMGO and GoGIN relates to the ICC. The multifaceted role of the ICC is defined by the Yaoundé Process. However, some regional and supporting stakeholders expressed concerns that the ICC only adds a further layer to an already complicated information sharing structure in the region. A meeting with the ICC’s Board of Directors provided evidence of the high expectations of the leadership, as well as their focus on establishing a ‘monitoring room manned by international staff’ to monitor and coordinate information flows in the region. Overall, any issues related to GoGIN’s relevance appear to lie primarily with the ICC and the complementarity of the role that the RECS and ECOWAS in particular continue to hold over strategic decision making.

<sup>41</sup> <https://gogin.eu/index.php/mission/?lang=en>



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In terms of duplication of other initiatives, it became evident that an alignment was being considered with the Madagascar Fusion Centre and ReCAAP and that this was ‘supported by the GoGIN technical programme’. Experts based in Nigeria also reported that an MoU had already been signed to deconflict the SWAIMS programme with GOGIN.<sup>42</sup> Alignment with other important initiatives providing strategic guidance and encouragement for the creation of national focal points was seen as a longer term and lower priority goal.

So far, GoGIN has had some success in working to create national inter-agency bodies as a focus for national input into regional projects. However, the absence of formal national focal points across the region still hampers the project’s ability to deliver cohesive regional mechanisms, and interviews suggested that some states felt less included than others in the initiative.<sup>43</sup> National input often remains disjointed and single-agency in nature, amounting only to a small share of the input agreed to in regional strategies and the Yaoundé Architecture. This missing layer could increasingly affect the project’s relevance, impact and sustainability as it develops.

### Western Indian Ocean

#### *MARSIC*

MARSIC (Enhancing Maritime Security and Safety through Information Sharing and Capacity Building) was launched in 2010. It was the first project established under the CMR programme and aimed to support the implementation of the DCoC.<sup>44</sup> The project ran until 2015, with a focus on supporting the Information Sharing Centre in Yemen (REMISC) and establishing the Djibouti Regional Training Centre (DRTC). MARSIC also oversaw the establishment of the Mombasa Protocol, which defines the rules of governance amongst countries hosting regional information centres. This work was conducted in collaboration with the IMO’s DCoC Implementation Unit, which oversaw the initial phases of implementation of the DCoC, with MARSIC providing support especially for ReMISC and DRTC. Between 2010 and 2015, MARSIC worked alongside the IMO and played a crucial role in the establishment of a regional training mechanism run by the DRTC, building on initial IMO work to establish an information sharing network.

In many ways, MARSIC’s regional relevance lies in the fact that it matches the IMO’s regional reach within the DCoC. In the period leading up to 2010, integration between the DCoC and regional maritime strategies was virtually non-existent, with the role of the RECs left unrecognised (they were not signatories to DCoC and have no voice in UN bodies). This created issues of relevance, because as REC maritime strategies developed, MARSIC did not align to them as this would have required a considerable change of direction from its initial purpose.

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<sup>42</sup> Interviews with organisations based in Abuja, Nigeria

<sup>43</sup> Interviews with individuals stationed in Ghana, Interviews with individuals stationed in Cameroon

<sup>44</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/2015-06-25-crimario-mombasa-press-release\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/2015-06-25-crimario-mombasa-press-release_en.pdf)



## **Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II**

Some stakeholders interviewed during the field visit thought that MARSIC did not address the needs of the individual member states and the project was implemented in an ad hoc manner. Overall, however, stakeholders considered MARSIC relevant as it enabled the DCoC in turn to demonstrate its relevance as a mechanism for regional cooperation. Nevertheless, there was some concern about the actual reach of MARSIC since it did not extend to interested stakeholders such as the Practical Action Eastern Africa (PAEA) or other projects seeking similar results.

The fact that Somalia was not engaged earlier in MARSIC was a shortcoming of the DCoC. No other regional States were prepared to share information with Somalia, and there was insufficient transparency and governance in place to commence training on maritime security issues. Instead, the CGPCS, UNODC, UNSOM and IMO all worked with relevant Somali agencies in a separate forum, the Kampala Process, which sought to establish a single voice for Somalia on maritime matters and which took three years to achieve tangible results. MARSIC thus never engaged with Somalia.

### *CRIMLEA I and II*

CRIMLEA I (2010-2014) was managed by INTERPOL and was designed to run training courses for relevant authorities including law enforcement, forensic examiners/officers and the coastguard on evidence preservation and collection, maritime crime scene investigation, interviewing techniques, the presentation of evidence in court, criminal intelligence data analysis, and IT forensic exploitation. The project also supplied specialist equipment, including crime scene kits, mobile phone and Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems.

CRIMLEA II was launched in 2014 and was also managed by INTERPOL. The project sought to build on the achievements and lessons learned from CRIMLEA I. It also sought to reinforce the forensic and investigative capacities of beneficiary states, as well as their ability to prosecute acts of piracy and other maritime-based organised crime.

The overall relevance of the two phases of CRIMLEA is assessed to have been significant. However, the relevance of the projects has generally been under-reported. This owes in large part to the fact that many project activities lacked visibility (see EU Project Visibility section below). In considering the relevance of CRIMLEA II, it should also be noted that, given delays to the implementation of the COMESA/MASE component,<sup>45</sup> a number of lectures on financial investigation were proposed under the umbrella of CRIMLEA II. This was done to ensure a smoother and faster transition to the regional programme.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> MASE component 3 covers the reinforcement of regional capacity to disrupt the financial networks of pirates and their sponsors and to reduce the structural and economic impact of piracy (COMESA).

<sup>46</sup> The INTERPOL Maritime Security sub-directorate, which was responsible for both Projects, wanted to ensure complementarity between the two different EU-funded initiatives.



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CRIMSON II**

*CRIMARIO*

CRIMARIO was launched in 2015, after an identification phase that began in September 2012 with several field missions to relevant countries. The outcomes of the missions were presented at a validation workshop in Singapore in February 2013, where experts and stakeholders from key countries could express their views on the preliminary findings, thus paving the way for future engagement. Based on this workshop, it was decided that the project should proceed on the basis of three “geographic clusters”, each relevant for ensuring sustainable maritime transport. The first cluster covered the North of the Indian Ocean, including the common “trunk route” from Suez to the Horn of Africa and the Strait of Hormuz, and the maritime route to the Southern tip of India. The second cluster covered the South-West of the Indian Ocean, from the Horn of Africa to the Mozambique Canal, and down to South Africa. The third cluster covered the Eastern Indian Ocean, ensuring the continuity from India to the Strait of Malacca and Asia-Pacific regions.

CRIMARIO aims to identify IT solutions that enable sustainable information sharing between the geographic clusters. This element is judged to remain relevant across the region, and in its technical application to MASE Result Areas 4 and 5.

The second element of CRIMARIO’s work extends beyond the information sharing mechanism developed under MARSIC. This element aims to enhance maritime safety and security in the West Indian Ocean by supporting coastal countries in improving Maritime Domain Awareness. CRIMARIO pursues this objective by providing MDA courses and MDV analysis for the information sharing centres in the region, as well as for national administrations. However, this aim has been particularly challenging to achieve, owing to the strategic challenges the project has encountered when dealing with the regional ISCs. CRIMARIO had originally intended for the establishment of two information fusion centres: one in the Northern and one in the Southern part of the region. The UAE were engaged in talks with CRIMARIO to host the Northern centre. However, after disagreements over the ownership of the proposed Fusion Centre and fact that the UAE requested this step to be clarified before they agreed to host the centre (while CRIMARIO proposed to facilitate this process upon agreement to proceed with the Centre), the dialogue ended and the UAE withdrew its commitment to host the fusion centre. As a result, CRIMARIO had to be reformulated, which took approximately 8 months.

Clearly, the inability of CRIMARIO’s design framework to respond to the challenges posed by the sudden breakdown in the dialogue with the UAE caused considerable delays to the project’s implementation. It also had implications for assessments of the project’s broader relevance. Since the first audit, (which set out the requirements for CRIMARIO to constructively move forward) there is evidence that the project has progressed beyond expectations and is currently providing a valuable resource for stakeholders. CRIMARIO is increasingly recognised as a point of technical expertise for information sharing systems, and this is enhancing the potential for other programmes such as MASE to tap that knowledge for their own ends. The fieldwork also exposed substantial engagement by the project officer with key stakeholders. Many of these stakeholders underlined the importance and relevance of CRIMARIO, as well as the relevance of the new thrust of the project with regard to the provision of technical solutions for information sharing.



## **Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II**

It is also worth noting that there have been issues concerning geographical scope and timing in the design and implementation of CRIMARIO. In 2013, the project's scoping phase began, during which a number of countries were visited. However, given the large geographical scope of the project (covering the entire Indian Ocean Rim) not all the countries could be visited, thus limiting the analysis conducted in the scoping phase. Between 2013 and 2015, several events affected the areas in which CRIMARIO was due to operate, namely the withdrawal of the UAE from the dialogue to host the Northern fusion centre and CRIMARIO's lack of awareness of the actions of MASE in relation to the establishment of the fusion centre in Madagascar. These events had a significant impact on the first few months of implementation of CRIMARIO. Beyond this, the fact that two years passed between the scoping phase and the actual launch of the project in 2015 meant that implementation began in a different context to the one analysed in 2013.

### *2.1.2 Overall Relevance of the CMR Programme*

On balance, the stakeholder interviews conducted for this report suggest that the CMR Programme is relevant and purposeful. However, stakeholders pointed out that the programme would require modification in some areas if individual projects are to achieve the overall strategic aims of the programme to improve the security of shipping lanes of communications and maritime governance.

For example, to remain relevant some projects may require tighter alignment with the priorities set out in regional maritime strategies, and may need to place greater attention on other maritime issues beyond piracy, including maritime governance and the blue economy as a driver of sustainable maritime security and safety. Some participants thought that the EU could better engage with relevant RECs to improve alignment with Partner Government policies. Others emphasised that piracy is no longer at the top of the agenda for many African States, although it does provide a focus for many donor States and the G7++. Stakeholders from all regions also stated that projects that do not consider the integration of the land and sea domains should be avoided. Interviewees stressed, however, that for now, the CMR Programme's purpose and overall objectives remain consistent and relevant to stakeholder needs.

Where possible, interviewees also noted that opportunities that would allow projects to better align to other projects with a similar focus should be more comprehensively explored. A successful example of this is the crossover between MASE and CRIMARIO which has seen CRIMARIO's technical expertise help to drive forward MASE's information sharing objectives, including the provision of training in regional maritime centres funded by MASE. Opportunities also exist for CMR programming to engage with external projects such as the EU Galileo Satellite programme, which could promote maritime agencies as an important end-user for satellite services in Africa. Likewise, the EU could engage with the US Maritime Security Initiative, which provides substantial resources for SEA. In addition, the Combined Maritime Forces Programme, which provides substantial information exchange mechanisms, has a strong influence in the Indian Ocean as a 'law enforcement' type initiative bringing together global maritime forces for specific patrol missions.

Collaboration between INTERPOL, EUCAP Nestor, EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA and REFLECS 3, as well as EU Member States, is imperative to ensure projects maintain their relevance and do not drift into siloes.



## Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II

### *2.1.3 Recommendations*

- To ensure continued relevance, projects should incorporate regional priorities as well as specific EU objectives. This could entail placing less emphasis on countering piracy, while focusing on the protection of critical infrastructure and incorporating areas connected to the concept of blue economy.
- Projects emanating from the European Commission should establish robust engagement with RECs to ensure regional synergy. Importantly, RECs should be consulted and included in the formulation phase of projects in order to ensure strong connections and relevance in the field.
- Collaboration with INTERPOL, the UN, RECAAP, World Bank, regional organisations and other actors engaged in efforts to enhance maritime security must be prioritised to avoid 'silo' culture and a corresponding decline in relevance.
- EU projects should seek coherence and alignment with other projects within the same field e.g. CMF, US Galileo Sat programme etc.
- An EU, African and South-East Asian intercontinental approach should be developed to maximise the relevance of projects. Many components of different approaches pursued across different regions have common relevance and could be developed through a forum to elicit lessons learned and best practice. Online platforms and forums accessible to multiple stakeholders across all regions (law enforcement agencies, ministries, regional organisations, etc.) could be set up to discuss gaps, needs and opportunities for the development of relevant activities under the framework of these projects.

## 2.2 QUALITY OF DESIGN

### *2.2.1 Quality of Design of Individual Projects*

#### *Gulf of Guinea*

##### *CRIMGO and GoGIN*

In terms of quality of design, it is important to note that GoGIN follows a well-established project model comprised of technical capacity building through both training and education. It should also be noted that GoGIN builds on the legacy of CRIMGO in terms of project design. However, it became clear during the visits conducted for this report that the design of CRIMGO failed to account for the need to build national focal points as a core pillar of the project, before implementing a comprehensive regional programme. GoGIN has also failed, but in a different way, as the project requested the correct national focal points from the countries but these were not provided. As a result, both CRIMGO and GoGIN have taken a top-down approach to creating a regional system without establishing the necessary national foundations first.

The quality of design of these EU projects therefore lacks cohesion and does not align neatly with either regional or EU maritime strategies, except in a single overarching area: that of maritime security. This has resulted in EU projects requiring MoUs to de-conflict from one another, when this work should have



## Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II

been undertaken at the design phase – at this point, greater priority should have been placed on ensuring compatibility and cohesion between projects. This is an issue that should be addressed and harmonised before future projects in the region become operational.

### Western Indian Ocean

#### *MARSIC*

The project design of MARSIC has clearly provided a platform for other initiatives to build upon in the region. However, it is also clear that it lacked the regional reach and political support required to be fully effective. MARSIC's project design concentrated on the three DCoC centres<sup>47</sup> and the DRTC, none of which has been fully effective. This was in part due to a lack of commitment at the national level to fully implementing the ISC functions agreed to in the ToR – by, for example, not committing sufficient manpower. This was despite external donors – not only MARSIC – providing substantial support. MARSIC did however provide a springboard for an analysis of the issues that were then undermining the ability of member states to respond effectively to the growing crisis in Yemen. In addition, MARSIC was very active in encouraging DCoC States to participate in the actions of the Code, especially in terms of training and information sharing, which its design allowed it to support well.

It should also be noted that recipients of the survey that was issued declared that they were aware of MARSIC, but most did not know what the project was about or its general aims or objectives. This suggests that the project could have incorporated a greater range of outreach activities as part of the project design.

Other regional developments also affected MARSIC's design. For example, the split within DCoC member states over whether an expansion of the Code should include wider maritime security threats presented an opportunity for the project to develop new work streams outside of counter-piracy. This movement on the part of parties to the DCoC resulted in a number of States signing the Mombasa Protocol in 2015. However, the Protocol never achieved active status and was subsumed back into the DCoC by the Jeddah Convention.

#### *CRIMLEA I and II*

In terms of their design, it is clear that CRIMLEA I and II were very well linked together and sought to address a specific outcome: to reinforce the forensic and investigative capacities of beneficiary states to investigate and prosecute acts of piracy and other forms of maritime-based organised crime. Further reflective of the strengths in its design is the fact that CRIMLEA achieved agreement from East African

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<sup>47</sup> DCoC Centres are: the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC) in Mombasa, the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Dar Es Salaam and the Regional Maritime Information Sharing Centre (ReMISC) in Sana'a



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Police chiefs that law enforcement officers trained in specialist subjects under the project would remain in post and be retained to use these skills gained.

### *CRIMARIO*

According to its initial project design, CRIMARIO was scheduled to follow on from MARSIC, without being a MARSIC II. CRIMARIO was to be involved in the establishment of an information fusion centre (IFC) for the northern part of the region, and dialogues were started with several possible hosting countries, including the United Arab Emirates. It took between 6 and 12 months for CRIMARIO to assess the situation in the Arabian peninsula, but before the assessment was finished the UAE withdrew its commitment to host the new information fusion centre. This long assessment period was said to have been caused mainly by two factors: a lack of political support and orientation from the EC and EEAS, and the limited analytical capability of the implementing agency in terms of ability to foresee such setbacks during project design.

This change in emphasis nonetheless resulted in a reshuffle of project staff, which was undertaken during a major review in early 2016. In line with this, CRIMARIO was revised to include a stronger emphasis on maritime cross-border issues and domain awareness, alongside the provision of associated training and maritime awareness and management platform development. This filled a gap in the development of Indian Ocean countries' ability to counter threats to the maritime domains and was a timely and effective shift of emphasis away from DCoC and piracy. This shift also demonstrated that CRIMARIO's project design was able to be adaptive to shifts in emphasis in the region, and to shifts in maritime awareness initiatives in the Indian Ocean.

### *2.2.2 Overall Quality of Design*

Each of the CMR projects reviewed for this report has utilised a log-frame as their overarching project management tool. In some cases, however, this log-frame has shown itself to be too rigid and has resulted in lengthy processes where project adaptation was required. Many stakeholders saw this as a flaw in the overarching project design process, noting that changes in project needs or developing threats can occur quickly and projects need to be able to adapt rapidly to new threats and opportunities. An unfortunate example of this lack of flexibility is the impact on CRIMARIO of the decision of the UAE to withdraw its commitment to host the IFC for the northern part of the region.

Instead, there should be the common aim at EU level to create more flexible, transparent and easily comprehensible log-frames to detail how each project intends to achieve its results and deliver impact across a range of beneficiaries. It is argued that greater transparency would help external agencies and project beneficiaries to have a better understanding of what the project is trying to achieve and would better facilitate their assist where possible. In terms of flexibility, meanwhile, it is recognised that the ability to be more flexible within the confines of a log-frame will require the agreement of key stakeholders and the EU alike.

This is nonetheless held to be crucial: the adoption of a more flexible approach (based, for example, on an annual assessment process) is required to ensure that changes in the security landscape are matched





## Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II

with feasible project initiatives within relatively short timescales. Within limit, this may require that project directors be invested with a wider mandate to adapt the design of their projects. To achieve this, project risk matrices could be discussed at regular steering group meetings with regional representatives and the EU's contact points to help identify potential changes in project direction.

Another issue identified by this report is the failure to adhere to Specific, Measureable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound (SMART) objectives during the project design phase. Likewise, there is reason to suggest that key risks and assumptions are often overlooked in the initial phases of the project design, leading to complications when unexpected complications arise. It was suggested that projects would become more flexible and adaptive if risks and assumptions could be reviewed on an annual basis throughout the project lifecycle.

Interviewees also maintained that regional stakeholders and project beneficiaries should be involved throughout the design process – especially where the project hopes to support or influence a regional strategy or body. Whilst certain project teams reported that attempts to include local stakeholders in the initial project design have failed in the past, it was argued that these efforts should be renewed and refined.

In addition, some interviewees indicated that project design could be improved by ensuring that cross cutting issues are better addressed throughout the project. Greater capacity in this area could help to improve the programme's ability to gain political traction at the national level, by better addressing regional and EU priorities within the confines of one project. This may also attract the required local input during the design phase, where previous initiatives have found such engagement challenging. Another reason why it might have been difficult to attract local stakeholder engagement during the design phase is that the projects assessed here are usually designed to impact a specific threat to maritime security at a regional level. This means that project design often does not allow for an incremental approach, which builds from the national level upwards to reach a regional solution. This approach means that the varied expectations of local State actors risk being overlooked or left behind when there is a purely regional implementation focus. In the future, it was suggested that successful project design will need to find a more effective balance between international and regional ambition and national focus and capability.

Finally, it is evident from the interviewee lists alone that gender is not a significant element of project design. As a result, several of the projects run contrary to the EU's expectations and values in terms of their staffing. This is an area that deserves more attention during project design at both a strategic and operational level.

### *2.2.3 Recommendations*

- Projects should seek to develop flexible, transparent and easily comprehensible log-frames. In particular, a more flexible approach to logframes (based, for example, on an annual assessment process) should be adopted to ensure that changes in the security landscape are matched with feasible project initiatives within relatively short timescales. This may require that project



## Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II

directors be invested with a wider mandate to adapt the design of their projects and change direction within project design parameters when threats and opportunities are identified.

- To achieve the above objective in terms of flexibility of logframes, project changes should be driven by an evolving analysis cycle, drawing on input from regional stakeholders, with project risk matrices discussed at regular steering group meetings with these regional actors to help identify any required changes in direction.
- Special attention should be paid to the creation of the DoA and the use of the risk and assumption matrix by implementing partners, to ensure that adjustments can be made rapidly in response to unforeseen events;
- It is strongly advised that the M&E mechanisms within projects and particularly risk and assumption matrices are reviewed on an annual basis, to take account of emerging risks. The insertion of an M&E mechanism in the framework of a project should be considered from the design phase.
- Stakeholders should be involved in the design process with earlier engagement during inception phases by EUMs. In particular, it should be acknowledged that successful project design will need to find a more effective balance between international and regional ambition and national focus and capability.
- Cross-cutting issues should be integrated into project design. This could improve projects' ability to gain political traction at the national level, and may again require greater local input during the design phase.
- Gender issues should be considered more carefully at project design stage, at both a strategic and operational level.
- When applying the ROM Framework in the evaluation of a project, results have at times been problematic. If the ROM framework is used as an evaluation tool, all indicators to allow its use must be included in the project's design.

### 2.3 EFFICIENCY

#### *2.3.1 Efficiency of Individual Projects*

##### *Gulf of Guinea*

###### *CRIMGO*

Interviewees noted that CRIMGO was able to efficiently establish a foundation in a small number of Gulf of Guinea countries, upon which the full project could then be built. By focusing on training and educational initiatives, the project provided the building blocks for improved operational cooperation. Between 2013 and 2016, CRIMGO was aligned to the YCOC, lending the project greater influence and access to a wider regional audience. This was particularly successful in relation to the project's counter-piracy initiatives. In this respect, the project was able to efficiently carry out not only its own activities, but efficiently established a clear route on which its successor, GoGIN, could subsequently engage.



## Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II

### *GoGIN*

The overall efficiency of GoGIN appears to be good. This is supported by a strong internal Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) component, which has helped to quickly identify risks to the project. This has allowed project leaders to be responsive and flexible during implementation, whilst still remaining within the project's confines. The project therefore appears to be well planned and understood by the implementers.

As such, on the whole, GoGIN is proceeding efficiently at a technical level. Nevertheless, the efficiency of its interaction with other actors in the field (other organisations, centres and projects) is more difficult to determine. Here, one criticism that could be made in relation to GoGIN today relates to expectation management. There is a risk that some of the solutions proposed by the project are too long term, while some inputs are needed immediately.

Importantly, by partnering with the UNODC on legal aspects, GoGIN has rationed its funds and expertise. However, some stakeholders also recognised that the existence of a local MoU to clarify potential areas of overlap with SWAIMS (and PASSMAR) may inhibit the efficiency of the project, as this requires frequent monitoring of the outputs of the various projects.

In the experts' view, there is still time to reduce overlap between these non-operational projects, thus addressing any issues relating to efficiency. A potential avenue for complementarity could see SWAIMS/PASSMAR work at the strategic level within the ICC, and GoGIN develop the operational level at CRESMAC/CRESMAO and lower levels. This would create a natural flow of EU support towards the REC and the regional States as signatories of the YCOG. It might also address some of the reluctance by RECs to empower the ICC in accordance with the June 2013 MoU. Moreover, it would represent an efficient use of EU expertise to address all aspects of regional maritime security, including governance, development and law-enforcement, as outlined in EU and REC regional strategies.

This would not mean that GoGIN should terminate its working relationship with the ICC, as the centre is also in charge of coordination for pooling and organisation of technical solutions. GoGIN would keep supporting the ICC assisting when there is the need to put technical processes into practice.

### *Western Indian Ocean*

#### *MARSIC*

By mirroring the activities of the IMO in implementing the DCoC, MARSIC was efficiently run overall. Technical and training improvements in the ISCs were well handled and at an appropriate level, with the exception of ReMISC. To avoid overlap, training coordination work was undertaken with the IMO and Djibouti to emphasise and enhance the capability of a regional coordinating body based in Djibouti (nominally the DRTC). A large number of training activities also took place with both MARSIC expertise and IMO funding, underpinning the DRTC output.



## **Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II**

### *CRIMLEA I and II*

Through the delivery of training and the provision of technical equipment, the project focused on strengthening the forensic and investigative capabilities of law enforcement units involved in maritime security and related investigations, including criminal investigation departments, marine police, forensic units, financial investigation units and coast guards. Whilst the project appears to have been efficient in delivering the activities it was able to complete, setbacks encountered by CRIMLEA owed mainly to the deterioration of security in Yemen. This type of setback risks creating disillusionment among stakeholders and can in turn influence the credibility of the EU and supporting institutions. A robust Monitoring and Evaluation system incorporated during the design phase, including a comprehensive risk matrix, could have helped to avoid such issues and improved project efficiency.

### *CRIMARIO*

CRIMARIO has faced a range of challenges in the course of its implementation that have affected the project's efficiency. For example, in 2014–15, a number of factors undermined elements of the project's initial plan. Chief among these was the decision by Abu Dhabi to withdraw its commitment to host the IFC in the north, and the establishment of the Fusion Centre in Madagascar supported by MASE. It is at this point that the design framework should have allowed implementers to refer to a risk matrix, along with an internal monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Since then, however, the project has adjusted its framework, focusing more on the technical element of its outputs, and has performed very efficiently as a result. However, it is also important to note that, since 2015, CRIMARIO has had three different team leaders. This has inevitably caused challenges in terms of efficiency and consistency in the implementation of the project.

### *2.3.2 Overall efficiency of the CMR Programme*

Efficiency on the part of the individual projects evaluated above does not necessarily add up to broader efficiency across the CMR programme. Greater alignment at the project design phase for new projects might help to overcome some of the inefficiencies caused by overlap and lack of cohesion, as seen for example between GoGIN and SWAIMS. If this situation continues, then GoGIN will likely overlap with PASSMAR as well, once implementation begins. There is also scope to broaden the overall efficiency of EU projects by developing a more efficient method of centrally monitoring which projects overlap, and by proposing adjustments to project design or project log-frames to create a more efficient EU centric output.

Under the current system, this oversight is fulfilled solely through the scheduled CRIMSON assessments. However, given that CRIMSON is not an EU authority, this project is unable to provide the full extent of the umbrella oversight required to coordinate projects at an EU level. The creation of an authority capable of such oversight, such as a regional coordinator, may help to increase the efficiency of the CMR programme overall, by harmonising external and internal project designs and supporting their amalgamation into the wider CMR and EU-Africa developmental picture. Greater harmony between projects may also help to accelerate and encourage the growth and development of CMR and other programme components to move efficiently from an embryonic to a mature status.



## Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II

Several stakeholders also suggested that project efficiency could be improved by developing more robust in-house and external non-biased Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms. As it stands, the experts identified a disparity between IcSP and EDF funded projects, which could be addressed by the EU by using standardising monitoring tools. For projects such as GoGIN and CRIMARIO, the sharing of an independent M&E coordinator appears to be working efficiently.

Where log-frames and project design have not been robust, interviewees noted that the snowball effect from one minor issue can compromise the overall efficiency of the project, often resulting in severe and potentially avoidable delays. All stakeholders agreed that every project design framework should incorporate an M&E tool that could be better used to ensure the sustainable implementation of projects. Such an M&E tool would allow for the timely and cost effective mitigation of risks to a project.

### *2.3.3 Recommendations*

- Consider the possibility of establishing an authority to provide EU umbrella oversight over projects by region, to bind EU projects of a similar nature together and aligning them with EU and regional strategies. This would also help to accurately identify the need for future projects and to support any new projects' amalgamation into the wider CMR and EU-Africa developmental picture.
- To support this goal, it is also necessary to appoint competent and trained staff at EUDs in beneficiary countries to guarantee effective input into these issues and into implementation of projects on a daily basis.
- SWAIMS and PASSMAR could work together at the strategic level within the ICC, while GoGIN could work at the operational level at CRESMAC/CRESMAO and at lower levels (keeping in mind the technical processes that must be put into practice while working with the ICC).
- Consider the possibility of appointing and empowering a regional coordinator to provide regional oversight of the CMR programme as a whole, as well as EU-wide regional projects.
- Develop and standardise robust in-house and external non-biased Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms. Where log-frames and project design have not been robust, the snowball effect from one minor issue can compromise the overall efficiency of the project, resulting in severe delays.

## 2.4 EFFECTIVENESS

### 2.4.1 Effectiveness of Individual Projects

#### *Gulf of Guinea*

#### *CRIMGO*



## **Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II**

Over the course of its implementation (2013-2016) CRIMGO was highly effective in terms of its ability to directly reach beneficiaries. CRIMGO provided over four academic courses and ten crisis response training (CRTs) activities, benefiting almost 800 participants. The project also helped to set the ICC in Yaoundé on its current track. However, misunderstandings about the operational role of the ICC established in CRIMGO Phase 3 led to some complications with RECs, which had understood that the ICC would be limited to strategic oversight.

In some ways, the effectiveness of CRIMGO was limited by the same factors as was MARSIC, in terms of the challenges associated with attempting to incorporate bilateral initiatives into mechanisms in which they were not originally included, such as the DRTC and DCoC, and the ICC and YCC. Whether such moves add or detract from the project's overall effectiveness cannot be judged within the confines of this report, but they can affect regional partnerships and expectations when additional entities are drawn by projects into fully negotiated and signed international agreements.

### *GoGIN*

Experience under GoGIN has shown that work is required to create national focal points for inter-agency coordination mechanisms in Gulf of Guinea states. Currently, individual ministries or agencies are not fully effective national focal points as they cannot speak on behalf of national governments. As a consequence, projects and initiatives under the GoGIN umbrella are only single-ministry backed, which undermines the potential efficacy of CMR programming in terms of its ability to secure a 'whole of government' commitment. Single-ministry engagement is an issue that is not limited to GoGIN. For example, the EU and other donor organisations also often work at single-ministry level (e.g. EEAS with Foreign Ministries, IMO with Transport Ministries, NAVAF etc. with MoDs).

Moving forward, inter-agency cooperation should be negotiated in the States engaged with the GoGIN project to ensure that regional programmes are comprehensive in nature and capable of mobilising government action at the highest level. The effectiveness of regional solutions is likely to remain weak until these inter-agency and high-level focal points are identified and integrated into the project's implementation strategy.

Most stakeholders interviewed consider it pertinent to increase the project's emphasis on Zones D and E to meet the immediate maritime security issues. It was agreed that GoGIN is proving effective in its efforts to do so.

Whilst not specifically a GoGIN issue, the ICC has a key role to play in making GoGIN truly effective at the trans-regional level. As a general issue, a 'strategic director' is required at regional level to match agreements made at the political level to political will and inter-agency engagement at the national level. According to the YCoC, this role should have been undertaken by the ICC. Nevertheless, the work of the ICC is currently not fulfilling this task.

Some stakeholders shared concerns that positioning the ICC within the YCoC information sharing structure risks over complicating an already convoluted regional mechanism. Another gap in both regional strategy and YCoC delivery identified by most interlocutors was that national inter-agency working to support regional initiatives through national focal points is missing and this devalues the



## **Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II**

overall effect. This is particularly relevant to GoGIN's work. However, now that the ICC has been established and has a role to fulfill, this should ensure that the region's States are stepping up to fulfill regional strategies and codes of conduct and working to create functioning national focal points.

When the ICC is fully empowered and enabled through SWAIMS/PASSMAR support, there is a real opportunity to build on the intent of the MoU of June 2013 and provide strategic guidance and scrutiny of national needs and capabilities. This would allow realistic feedback about progress to spread across the maritime security/governance nexus and provide direction to future and existing EU programmes. It may also create opportunities for greater pan-regional (ECOWAS/ECCAS) ownership from individual States upwards.

If the two EU-REC support programmes, SWAIMS and PASSMAR, focus on the ICC as a body responsible for providing strategic direction to members and partners, GoGIN may be able to become more effective by concentrating on the technical aspects of the YCOG at the CRESM and lower levels. The SWAIMS/PASSMAR project teams should therefore be embedded within ICC to take advantage of this opportunity. This simple shift of emphasis could overcome many of the gaps in the current regional approaches taken by all parties, and result in a more effective and timely regional impact.

### Western Indian Ocean

#### *MARSIC*

As a direct result of international political issues and internal divergences exposed during the Ministerial Meeting in London (29-30 May 2014), the DCoC was no longer considered by MARSIC (along with Yemen and Djibouti) as a reliable and sustainable governance structure for the DRTC and the ReMISC. The May 2014 meeting exposed a rift between States wishing to expand the DCoC to cover wider maritime security issues, and those wanting to continue with a piracy-only focus. MARSIC saw an opportunity to overcome this by responding to new requirements in terms of training and information sharing of the most regionally involved countries and to establish a structure of governance for the DRTC and ReMISC for the period after the IMO's implementation withdrawal in 2015.

It was thought that such an initiative would equally have the potential to attract donors and development actors, including beneficiaries of the training. One of the results of the regional split over the direction of the DCoC was that MARSIC proposed the redaction of the Mombasa Protocol. Despite the representatives of Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen approving the final draft of the Protocol, the document stalled due to the continuing problems of engagement in Yemen, and a lack of wider regional support for what essentially was a project-derived protocol. The DCoC was updated by the regional States after considerable work by the IMO and its scope was widened to include maritime security at the Jeddah Convention; by this point, MARSIC had become CRIMARIO. Overall, MARSIC can be considered an effective action.

#### *CRIMLEA I and II*



## **Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism CRIMSON II**

The delivery of CRIMLEA I and II activities appears to have occurred effectively. During the implementation of the two phases of CRIMLEA (2011-2014), 921 law enforcement personnel were trained, and 68 capacity building activities were delivered. The training included on- and off-site instruction on evidence preservation and collection, crime scene investigation, collection of biometric data, financial investigation, witness and suspect interviewing techniques, presentation of evidence in court, criminal intelligence data analysis and mobile phone, GPS and computer forensic exploitation. Equipment supplied to participants included crime scene kits, mobile phone and computer analysis tools, as well as an Automated Fingerprint Identification System.

It should also be noted that CRIMLEA II effectively paved the way for the implementation of the COMESA component of MASE, delivering holistic training with a focus on financial investigation. As this component of MASE started later than expected, CRIMLEA was able to provide early experience on this issue in a complementary manner.

### *CRIMARIO*

CRIMARIO appears to be effectively supporting the design and implementation of IORIS, the regional platform for information sharing and incident management in the Indian Ocean. IORIS will be used by the regional entities in charge of maritime security, initially the two regional centres covering the ESA-IO region (Eastern and Southern Africa-Indian Ocean), following decisions made at the Ministerial meeting held in Djibouti on 15 May 2016. These centres include the RMIFC based in Madagascar and RCOC based in Seychelles. National agencies of the coastal countries also appear set to benefit from the tool according to the global access policy.

CRIMARIO also appears to be effectively supporting the establishment of Maritime Security Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs) and Contingency Plans, which are nationally customised and regularly verified by the execution of regional exercises involving the maritime industry and local communities most directly affected.

### *2.4.2 Overall Effectiveness of the CMR Programme*

The effectiveness of regional solutions under the CMR programme will remain less than it could be so long as the projects continue to interact with individual agencies rather than forging inter-agency cooperation. Work is required to bring into being 'maritime law enforcement/safety/security' inter-agency coordination mechanisms in each State. These must then be replicated across EU projects by sharing project experience, output, and ambitions across all regional projects.

It is also vital that projects are integrated with the goals articulated by regional maritime strategies. If such strategies are not considered, this will leave a gap at the strategic level between the political strategies of the RECs and the political will of the member States to cooperate with individual projects and the CMR programme overall.

CMR projects in general have proved effective in achieving the objectives defined by their log-frames. However, better coordination between the different projects would increase effectiveness. Furthermore, there are opportunities for projects to explore 'value added' activities that might





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contribute to the overall effectiveness of a project whilst meeting the objectives of regional partners. CMR programming should consider the potential of “attracting donors and development actors” by providing opportunities for stakeholder involvement in the long term and creating training systems that are harmonised across East and West Africa and South East Asia.

Overall, however, the effectiveness of the projects described above should only be measured according to the outputs documented in project log-frames. This is because these are the objectives that project activities are designed to achieve. However, this analysis has already found that the log-frames used by CMR projects could be improved by including risk matrices to avoid issues such as the impact of the withdrawal of the UAE as the site for the IFC on CRIMARIO.

Finally, it is crucial that stakeholders have a clear view of the remits of the range of initiatives being implemented. Although creating complementarities (e.g. the support of CRIMLEA to the COMESA/MASE component) are paramount for the effective implementation of activities, it is important to distinguish initiatives accurately. In the case of CRIMLEA, it was fundamental that the training provided by INTERPOL was presented as CRIMLEA training supporting MASE (and not a MASE or INTERPOL training). A clear categorisation would avoid confusion among stakeholders.

### *2.4.3 Recommendations*

- All projects should develop and implement a robust M&E plan, including a comprehensive risk matrix, to remain on target, reduce time lost and mitigate any unforeseen impact on the project’s effectiveness;
- All projects should report regularly against OVIs/targets for the PPs as appropriate;
- The results (except those that are sensitive) of all projects should be made available and easily accessible to regional beneficiaries to extend coordination and added value opportunities;
- A functioning system of representative multi-agency national focal points should be given a higher priority in the Gulf of Guinea;
- The ICC should be further empowered by RECs to deliver strategic direction between the political and operational levels, with an emphasis on establishing credible national focal points and legal frameworks to support operational elements of maritime law-enforcement.
- A regional approach, which encompasses all countries’ needs, is extremely difficult to manage and coordinate, given the existing differences in states’ interests, capabilities and expectations. To be effective, the regional approach should be broken into a series of approaches for sub-regional areas (see the division into Zones in the Gulf of Guinea).



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2.5 IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

*2.5.1 Impact and sustainability of individual projects*

*Gulf of Guinea*

*CRIMGO*

Overall, one of CRIMGO's greatest impacts was that of raising awareness of the regional maritime security issues affecting the Gulf of Guinea and the steps required to mitigate them. However, CRIMGO's regional impact was limited by its limited geographical footprint. By the end of the project in 2016, however, regional awareness had been raised to the extent that a more encompassing fully regional programme was designed. CRIMGO also had a major impact on the two regional maritime universities: RMU Accra and ARSTM Abidjan. Both became true partners in the delivery of security educational training, exhibiting real ownership and benefiting in their work from a number of already-trained trainers. This expertise has been used in Togo during a recent crisis. A further impact of the project was that of drafting all of the baseline documentation for the establishment of the ICC.

*GoGIN*

The wide acceptability of GoGIN to its regional beneficiaries is an asset that will help to ensure the project has a positive regional impact. This impact will likely be enhanced through the partnership established with UNODC with regard to the legal framework. However, the project's impact may be limited by its position in the middle ground between regional strategies and national capabilities. To secure its long term legacy, GoGIN should therefore seek to find an opportunity to embed or align the project with existing regional strategies and codes of conduct. GoGIN could also seek to increase its impact by seeking strategic synergy with the work overseen by SWAIMS/PASSMAR through the ICC.

*Western Indian Ocean*

*MARSIC*

As the forerunner of future projects in the Western Indian Ocean, MARSIC has successfully mapped out maritime security issues of regional importance. It is therefore unfortunate that, whilst the development of the Mombasa Protocol should have provided the means from which Information Sharing Centres could have evolved, this work fell by the wayside with the insecurity in Yemen. Although this could have been better mitigated by incorporating a more robust risk matrix into the project design, this report appreciates that this factor was beyond the project's control.



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Of further note in terms of impact, the Information Sharing Centre (ISC) network established three operational centres: the ISCs in Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam, which are operated within their respective Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC), and the Regional Maritime Information Sharing Centre (ReMISC), located in Sana'a, Yemen, which unfortunately failed due to insecurity in the country. Beyond this, a network of 21 National Focal Points, corresponding to the DCoC signatories, was linked to the ISCs via a secure internet connection. The impact of project MARSIC's was further secured through the development of CRIMARIO, which will continue to build the information sharing network structure established by MARSIC and MSA more widely.

Nonetheless, a number of criticisms have been made regarding the sustainability of MARSIC's training activities, relating to a reported lack of consistency among the certifications issued by providers. This is seen to have reduced MARSIC's impact as many training companies no longer exist and thus the accreditation is invalid. It is hoped that CRIMARIO will be in a position to learn from and avoid these issues.

### *CRIMLEA I and II*

The reach – and thus potential impact – of CRIMLEA I and II is substantial. CRIMLEA covered seven beneficiary countries: Djibouti, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania and Yemen. CRIMLEA II expands this work and targets nine beneficiary countries: Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania and Yemen.

In its first four years of implementation, CRIMLEA I organised 30 training events attended by 294 participants. With a budget of EUR 2 million (April 2014 to March 2017), CRIMLEA provided specialist investigation training to selected law enforcement units in relation to piracy and organised crime. The financial investigation aspect was not covered during the first phase and was instead included in the second phase to support the MASE/COMESA component. Whilst these training sessions served to provide relevant skills to investigating officers, in the experts' opinion, these training courses (regardless of the thematic area) cannot be considered fully 'sustainable' if they do not incorporate a train-the-trainer component. This is because training benefits stop at those attending the course and will not evolve to ensure continuity.

Most stakeholders greatly appreciated the quality of the CRIMLEA training activities, noting their view that the project should be extended<sup>48</sup> (the launch of CRIMLEA III is upcoming). However, even though beneficiaries welcomed training activities, this does not mean that sustainability has been achieved. It is clear that CRIMLEA should have included annual train the trainer activities in its training portfolio (not limited to the later period). It is appreciated that "WhatsApp" discussion forums<sup>49</sup> were created to allow trainees to keep in touch after the training, both among themselves and with the trainers. Such schemes

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<sup>48</sup> Input from INTERPOL

<sup>49</sup> Such a tool was not designed to exchange sensitive police information. Should such a need arise, the participants were encouraged to exchange sensitive information via their respective NCBS.



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proved to effective in terms of building trust, reinforcing collaboration between front line officers and promoting regional cooperation.

CRIMLEA I and II have effectively considered sustainability in other respects, too. For example, CRIMLEA has complemented the work of project MASE and helped to ensure a smooth transition with COMESA action starting later than expected. Moving forward, it is essential that the projects continue to collaborate and de-conflict.

### *CRIMARIO*

In terms of impact, CRIMARIO has provided numerous outputs, including the provision of training activities, including those on ways to exploit the full potential of IORIS. The project also appears to have had a substantial impact in supporting costal countries to enhance MDA at the national and regional levels.

From a sustainability perspective, CRIMARIO has emerged as a robust project, delivering outputs that will continue to hold their value into the future. For example, train-the-trainer initiatives amongst the first pool of 16 participants in the IORIS training will help to ensure the sustainability of the initiative. It is also encouraging from a sustainability perspective to see that CRIMARIO has engaged with external programmes such as EU NAVFOR Atalanta, who sent a representative to attend a training session, ensuring that cooperation is enhanced among European initiatives in the field of maritime security in the Wider Indian Ocean. Notably, the CEO of the RMFIC also explained that CRIMARIO would have a significant impact on work conducted through the MASE programme.

The training provided by CRIMARIO on topics such as MDA continues to have a substantial impact on partner states, as well as those operating beyond formal project partnerships. Whilst some improvements could be made to the training itself, for example by providing sessions in French, the beneficiaries interviewed for this report were very pleased with the technical training provided through project, and believed that it would have a sustainable impact into the future, as long as train-the-trainers activities continued.

### *2.5.2 Overall Impacts and Sustainability of the CMR Programme*

Overall, it is evident that CMR programming has had a positive impact for project beneficiaries. In particular, capacity building in the form of expert training has been highly rated and many stakeholders expressed that current projects would have a sustainable impact into the future, as long train-the-trainer activities continued as a key part of the project design. The development of new infrastructure, such as the DRTC in Djibouti, the ICC in Yaoundé and the ISC in Madagascar, also provided evidence of tangible impacts in the maritime security domain. However, some felt that the EU could have achieved a greater regional impact if more attention was devoted to creating a complementary and deconflicted set of regional projects.

In the absence of pan-regional strategic direction and accountable cross-government focal points, however, States may find it difficult to sustain the benefits or ongoing requirements of regional



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programmes. This was seen as a key threat to the sustainability of the CMR programme. Regional States therefore need to prioritise the establishment of inter-agency mechanisms to address maritime security. Once this inter-agency culture is established, it will be easier for a State (which understands the national-level links between its maritime economy and the need to mitigate any risks and threats to it) to commit to applying the skills taught by the CMR programme in the future.

There are, however, some potential threats to the sustainability of the initiative. For example, some project OVIs/targets are not necessarily achievable under changing conditions, or are too ambitious. It was felt that this is most likely because regional strategies and baseline capabilities have not been integrated into the initial design phase process, with many projects focusing solely on the implementation of Codes of Conduct. Those projects with the highest anticipated impact and sustainability were those where project planning and viable exit strategies were considered in some capacity from the outset. A good example is the DRTC which was adopted by the Djibouti government, but now remains idle with very few organisations being able to procure the centre for training. Other projects have not been able to identify a ‘champion’ to maintain databases, making end results inoperable post project, despite the fact that this could have been considered during the project design phase. Sometimes, a transitional plan may be required to ensure that beneficiaries take on ownership of project outcomes as the project closes and are in a position to sustain them.

Likewise, the substantial impact of external conflicts underlines the importance of integrating a robust M&E process into the project design. In the absence of an effective and realistic risk matrix, both CRIMARIO and MASE have found it difficult to respond to unplanned security challenges – such as governance issues in Somalia – in a timely manner.

Stakeholders were of the opinion that to ensure sustainability, it is essential that projects are open to new cross-issue methodologies that respond to both EU and regional priorities. This includes projects that look at maritime security in a holistic way, accounting for environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic threats and opportunities. Currently, many projects do not adequately integrate concerns about maritime security with opportunities to bolster the maritime economy. This is a significant cross-cutting issue where the security and development nexus is evident in the maritime domain. Either way, it should be a consideration when designing projects as maritime development is now an important a cornerstone of regional approaches to maritime security.

For regional beneficiaries, it was considered important that project log-frames and proposed end-results were made transparent from the outset to enable regional institutions to adapt and plan for the future. Here, however, affordability is a key concern. For CMR programming to achieve a long-lasting regional impact, is critical that project results and products can be supported institutionally at a national or regional level, and that the necessary funds are in place. Project designers should also seek to produce a financial/economic phase-out strategy, supported by a dedicated implementation plan, as a core part of the design phase.

### *2.5.3 Recommendations*

- To ensure sustainability, regular train-the-trainer programmes should be a central component within all project providing capacity building and training activities;



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- Attention should be paid to engaging project beneficiaries at the political level on how to strategically consolidate the outputs of a project and ensure the results are sustainable;
- Project OVIs/targets must be realistic and not too ambitious. They should also be flexible, and project managers must have the ability to review the log-frame in light of changing contexts;
- In addition to incorporating greater flexibility, project log-frames should be open and transparent to enable regional institutions and stakeholders to propose adapting them to align with the post-project maritime domain;
- Projects should seek to address cross-cutting issues that encompass both EU/donor and regional priorities;
- Projects should seek to identify intersections between bolstering the blue economy and maritime security. At present, projects do not adequately integrate concerns about maritime security with opportunities to bolster the maritime economy – a significant cross-cutting issue where the relevance of the security and development nexus is evident;
- Priority should be given to project sustainability within the initial design phase of the project, outlining the continuity of proposed end-results. To this end, project designers should incorporate a financial/economic phase-out strategy as a core part of the design phase, supported by a dedicated implementation plan.
- All project results and products or systems generated by CMR programming should be designed such that they can receive institutional support at a national or regional level, with any necessary funds for the transition phase in place ahead of decommissioning the project.

### 2.6 COHERENCE AND SYNERGIES

#### *2.6.1 Coherence and Synergies of Individual Projects*

##### *Gulf of Guinea*

In the Gulf of Guinea, there is a general lack of coherence among projects relating to maritime security. Project outputs are often delivered unilaterally within the specific area of intervention, and as a consequence these are unlikely to have as significant an impact on transnational crime threats in the region as they could. Fortunately, there is evidence that project managers are interested in the work of other projects operating within the same thematic area, and are willing to collaborate, deconflict and harmonise project activities. There is also awareness amongst project staff about where projects overlap, including, for example, GOGIN and SWAIMS (presumably the same will eventually apply to PASSMAR) and the MoU signing between the EUD Abuja, FEI, UNODC and DEVCO B5 and E2.

Many of the projects in the Gulf of Guinea share common goals, including mitigating the threat of transnational crime, legislative reform and information sharing. It is therefore paramount that synergy is found between the projects. However, all ongoing projects are at different stages of delivery, meaning that their harmonisation needs to be carefully planned. To initiate this process, it could be useful to establish an annual two-day in-region team leader and project manager meeting to informally discuss individual progress and plans and expose any overlap and/or gaps and cooperation opportunities in the region. The results of this forum could be used to produce a report delivered to programme directors on



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findings, conclusions and recommendations for their projects' directions over the next year. This could provide a useful forum for information sharing between project implementers as well as a coherent regional 'audit' of progress.

### *CRIMGO*

As a pilot programme limited to only seven states, CRIMGO had little coherence with other regional projects. The project was in its third iteration following the signing of the YCoC, and this provided the required regional hook for the expansion of its work. The project therefore developed coherence around the spirit of the YCoC and aligned itself accordingly.

### *GoGIN*

Moving forward, it is essential that coherence is found between GoGIN at the operational level and SWAIMS/PASSMAR at the strategic level. Both of these projects require regional strategic direction, as recognised but not as yet solved by the MoU of June 2013 and the creation of the ICC. To achieve regional coherence, any technical support provided by GoGIN to the ICC should support its regional coordination role, as identified by SWAIMS/PASSMAR. This will allow GoGIN to focus on establishing functional, coherent maritime law-enforcement in Zones D and E, for later roll-out in other zones, as well as allowing it to minimise duplication. Whilst other projects develop the 'soft' regional skills required to bolster governance and development, GoGIN should prioritise activities that maximise the benefits of its civil/military expertise. Integrating regional initiatives in this manner could create a more coherent and more comprehensive EU approach in the Gulf of Guinea.

### *Western Indian Ocean*

The situation in the Western Indian Ocean is similar to the Gulf of Guinea in so far as there appears to have been limited interaction between projects in the region. This is exacerbated by the fact that there are numerous organisations and agencies operating in the region, the EU being only one. It is clearly not possible for the EU to oversee all projects in the region that are supported by other funders. However, there is a remit for both the EU and in-region project managers to reduce duplication amongst future efforts by promoting their projects to as wide a regional audience as possible. Several stakeholders agreed that this approach had not been sufficiently exploited to date, and explained that it could be difficult to obtain information on the aims and objectives of other EU projects. This lack of publicly available information was reported by stakeholders to have resulted in unnecessary duplication and a lack of awareness about the ways external projects could support EU initiatives. MASE has made some headway with this in the development of ministerial meetings, but more work remains to be done in this area.

To achieve regional coherence, it is vital that there is a good level of communication between the national agencies that execute the training and administer the advice generated by regional projects and the projects themselves. CRIMARIO is a positive example of a project that has attempted to avoid a 'siloes approach'. Evidence from observations and stakeholders suggests that CRIMARIO has also made



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substantial progress in engaging with donors and organisations operating within the same sphere to extend the reach and overall impact of the project.

### *MARSIC*

As MARSIC was a forerunner project, there was possibly limited opportunity for synergy with other projects. However, evidence procured from stakeholders indicates that MARSIC lacked a strong communication strategy, focusing more on the work at hand. Nonetheless, it provided an internet link to a website at a time when it was difficult for many stakeholders to access online technology. Although this problem has improved, limited access to the internet still remains the norm in some geographical pockets, frustrated by a lack of reliable electrical power connectivity. A number of stakeholders stated that they had never received any information in relation to MARSIC.

### *CRIMLEA I and II*

CRIMLEA II enabled beneficiary law enforcement agencies to adapt to and make best use of the new legal and institutional framework set up in the framework of Result 3 of MASE.

CRIMLEA was also represented at all regional maritime meetings, as well as at regular meetings held with EU NAVFOR, CGPCS, IOC, EAC, UNODC, EUCAP NESTOR, AMISOM, IMO, IOC, and a range of embassies. This representation was prioritised specifically to ensure exchange and complementarity with other projects in the region, and to avoid duplication of work.

However, stakeholders agree that better coordination is required to harmonise the work of the range of different agencies operating in this area, to ensure a more effective response at national, regional and continental levels. At the same time, limited interaction was reported between CRIMLEA and the other two CMR projects in the region (CRIMARIO and MARSIC) in the early stages.

### *CRIMARIO*

CRIMARIO made extensive efforts to engage with other actors, particularly at the Ministerial level. As mentioned previously, however, this work was frustrated by the lack of guidance from EEAS in terms of engaging in dialogues at higher level.

However, as CRIMARIO has progressed, it has continued to prioritise the development of synergies, particularly in relation to the second aspect of its log-frame. A number of stakeholders stressed that CRIMARIO has increased its integration and interaction with other projects, including MASE, EUCAP-Nestor and UNODC. Effort has also been made to ensure attendance at key meetings such as those of the Contact Group.

### *2.6.2 Overall Coherence and Synergies of the CMR Programme*

Stakeholders concurred that project coherence could be enhanced by greater policy support, which in many cases depends on greater clarity on the interaction between project and policy level. Some also feel that they are operating outside of regional strategies at a policy level. GoGIN, for example, operates outside of the regional strategy, which is the most important in the region at a policy level. Such regional





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strategies provide a clear indication of the real needs of the region, which should be embraced at every opportunity, including at design phase, to facilitate coherence and synergies with other projects working toward the strategy through the project's implementation. A second example is the IGAD Integrated Maritime Strategy 2030, whose road map for implementation includes many of the elements covered by MASE and CRIMARIO, yet has is not fully considered by the projects at the early stages. Here considerable added-value may be lost because some EU projects seemingly operate in 'siloes', whereas they should be more closely aligned and coherent with regional policies, strategies and requirements.

By incorporating national/regional policies into the design and development of EU projects, it is more likely that relevant national, sectoral and budgetary policies will provide support, thus further increasing potential synergies and coherence across a region. Alignment with national and regional policies can also reduce the impact of any potential policy change embarked on by newly elected incoming governments.

In terms of enhancing coherence in this way, MASE is a good example of what can be achieved, and of how far a project can align itself with these structures. By adopting such an approach, the benefits of MASE are likely to endure beyond the life of the project. GoGIN appears to be moving in a similar direction to MASE, and it is clear that the project could gain considerable benefits from the experience of MASE. CRIMARIO, in its new form, is also operating coherently with MASE to deliver technical solutions, along with the training, which is critical for sustainability and coherence.

As noted, all projects have been able to demonstrate positive relationships with each other, and with other new or existing institutions. However, these relationships could be enhanced through a greater focus on promoting coherence between projects and programmes. CRIMSON is well placed to support such an initiative and should be supported to do so in the future.

Of significant concern here, however, is a lack of coherence, complementarity and coordination with stakeholders beyond the EU – including the private sector. More work is required by the EU with regard to engaging private industry in the course of its projects. Indeed, the importance of private industry in terms of maritime security cannot be underestimated; in many cases (particularly in relation to the blue economy), there are opportunities for private enterprises to engage with a project, in technical terms or through the provision of services. It is also feasible that a private entity could financially support a project's outputs after its end, especially where it plays an important role within their industrial sector. Promoting and encouraging such private sector engagement should be considered an integral component in the development of a project. The difficulty here will be that the private sector requires quicker results than most projects or States are able to deliver, and thus a certain amount of mutual education will be required for all parties if this is to succeed.

### *2.6.3 Recommendations*

- In the Gulf of Guinea (and possibly beyond), an annual two-day in-region team leader and project manager meeting should be instituted to allow informal discussion of individual project progress and consider overlap or gaps and cooperation opportunities in the region. Moreover, it is advisable that experts in the field, such as national focal points, organise more frequent meetings – every two to three months – in order to keep everybody informed about changes in



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the environments in which they are operating. These fora could be used to produce a report on findings, conclusions and recommendations with regard to coherence and synergies across the region, as well as providing a coherent regional 'audit' of progress.

- CRIMSON should be supported to facilitate initiatives, such as that outlined in the previous recommendation, designed to promote coherence between projects and programmes. CRIMSON is also well placed to coordinate coherence, complementarity and cooperation with regard to cross-cutting issues such as the blue economy.
- Regional strategies provide a clear indication of the actual needs of a region, as perceived in region; these needs require attention at every opportunity, especially during the project design phase, to ensure that synergies with other projects working to support these goals can be maximised.
- EU projects must avoid a 'siloed' approach by fully considering and incorporating national/regional policies as part of their design and development. By internalising national/regional policies, it is more likely that relevant national, sectoral and budgetary policies will provide support, thus further increasing potential synergies and coherence across a region.
- Embracing regional and national policies as part of project design should be supported further in the interests of project coherence, as this can serve to reduce the impact on existing projects of newly elected incoming governments, reducing the potential for policy change with regard to project operations;
- In terms of enhancing coherence, MASE is a good example of how far a project can align itself with these broader policies; other projects such as GoGIN should seek to learn from its experience in this regard.
- Private sector engagement should be considered an integral component in the development of a project. The importance of private industry in terms of maritime security cannot be underestimated; there are often numerous opportunities for projects to engage with private enterprise in technical terms or through the provision of services. Such engagement is also crucial since private entities could be in a position to financially support projects after their end.
- There is a need not only for EU-funded activities to be better coordinated, but also for more effective coordination between activities funded by the EU and by Member States.
- Given internal discrepancies and divisions at project level (in line with ministerial boundaries, budget lines, execution times, and the use of a rigid land/sea definition), coherence and synergies among actions are difficult to achieve. A more centralised political view could help project designers to better situate their work within the regional strategic framework.
- In many cases, there is a natural convergence between the aspirations set out in regional strategies and the projects implemented by the EU. Nevertheless, achieving coherence between initiatives is often challenging when projects are fractured according to ministerial boundaries, financial lines, execution times, and the use of a rigid land/sea definition. The result is the absence of single body charged with overseeing how individual programmes interact to meet regional strategic aspirations. A more centralised political view should be developed, to help project designers to better situate their work within the regional strategic framework.



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### 2.7 EU PROJECT VISIBILITY

#### *2.7.1 Coherence and Synergies of Individual Projects*

##### *Gulf of Guinea*

##### *CRIMGO*

CRIMGO enjoyed a high level of visibility because it was the first anti-piracy initiative launched by the EU in the Gulf of Guinea. It was also the only such initiative in existence when the International Community transferred its attention from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Guinea in relation to the piracy threat. This has created a strong expectation in many countries, particularly around the CRTs.

Although the project designed and distributed a brochure and a video, the project's Twitter page was not updated regularly. This is particularly important when dealing with African stakeholders, many of whom rely on information sharing through social media. The CRIMGO Team Leader was interviewed several times by French and local African media, but the connection with the EU/CMR programme was not highlighted. These interviews and the introductory video are still visible on the YouTube channel of the CMR programme.<sup>50</sup>

The CRIMSON I website also hosted a page on CRIMGO, but the website was somewhat confusing. The CMR Programme access URL was <http://www.crimson.eu.com>. This resulted in difficulties in identifying the programme through the URL, thus reducing the programme's and projects' visibility (CRIMGO included).

During the final months of CRIMGO, CRIMSON II worked hard to increase the visibility of the project, creating videos and interviewing stakeholders during the closing ceremony in Abidjan in November 2016.<sup>51</sup> CRIMSON II also fed information on a quarterly basis into the CMR Dashboard on the new CMR website (<https://www.criticalmaritimeroutes.eu>) to provide an overview of the capacity building activities conducted under the project.

##### *GoGIN*

A communication and visibility expert was hired by Expertise France to launch the GoGIN website ([www.gogin.eu](http://www.gogin.eu)) and to update the project's social media pages. The website was structured on the same lines as the Critical Maritime Routes website, thus helpfully creating continuity across the programme. Nevertheless, the website has not been regularly updated and the use of social media (Twitter) is limited.

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<sup>50</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWyIZPIQIJLPPn5DbjbQeKQ>

<sup>51</sup> <https://criticalmaritimeroutes.eu/projects/crimgo/>



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In December 2017, Expertise France hired a new communication and visibility expert who is more engaged in the use of the Twitter page. One of the GoGIN experts also frequently posts about GoGIN. The website is still somewhat outdated and does not mention the fact that GoGIN sits under the CMR programme. There are also no elements/hyperlinks connecting viewers to the CMR website.

In light of the fact that GoGIN will be under reformulation in the coming months, the project team have noted that they are awaiting a clearer sense of any change to the objectives of the project before revisiting the website.

In the meantime, CRIMSON II has worked closely with GoGIN to update and increase the visibility of the project through the CMR webpage and Twitter page. CRIMSON II worked on a photo reportage during the launch of GoGIN in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in June 2017, publishing pictures and testimonies from the main stakeholders involved.<sup>52</sup> As such, it is clear that CRIMSON II can serve as a crucial instrument in efforts to increase the visibility of GoGIN during its reformulation.

### Western Indian Ocean

#### *MARSIC*

A general leaflet on MARSIC was produced to promote the project during conferences and when visiting decision makers. On these occasions, EU actions within the CMR programme were highlighted. In light of the results achieved by the team, the project also assisted the ReMISC team in Sana'a and the Djibouti Regional Training Centre (DRTC) in preparing professional communication materials.

MARSIC was the first CMR project to be launched in the Indian Ocean. This was a fact that was heavily stressed in the leaflet and in a PowerPoint presentation that sought to introduce the broader context in which the project operated, present the project's main achievements and give an outline of its next steps. Upon request, this was sent to stakeholders, published online and used as a basis for press releases. It is worth mentioning that the visibility of MARSIC decreased with the launch of EUCAP Nestor (now EUCAP Somalia) and MASE.

The launch of the project was announced in a press conference in June 2013 in Mombasa (Kenya), organised by EU NAVFOR Atalanta. This provided substantial visibility both to the project and to the CMR programme as a whole. Another ceremony for the launch of MARSIC took place in Brussels, where the leaflet and the project were presented at the DEVCO InfoPoint.

The decision was made not to set up a MARSIC website but to use the CRIMSON I website to publicise the project. Nevertheless, the website was somewhat confusing. MARSIC's main outputs were also illustrated on the DRTC website, which was subsequently re-designed by MARSIC's communication and

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<sup>52</sup> <https://criticalmaritimeroutes.eu/projects/gogin/>



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visibility expert. A video was also created to increase the visibility of the Mombasa Protocol, the main output of MARSIC. The video is still available on the CMR website and on the CMR YouTube Channel.

### *CRIMLEA*

The visibility of CRIMLEA as a CMR project was low. It was important that INTERPOL provided clear and specific information to stakeholders about the fact that CRIMLEA is a CMR project funded by the EU, but this did not happen to the extent that it should have. Instead, CRIMLEA was perceived as an INTERPOL project, not an EU/CMR one. At the same time, during CRIMLEA trainings and events, the logo displayed was almost always the INTERPOL one alone (sometimes accompanied by the EU flag).

INTERPOL has an international reputation that was a major plus in the implementation of the project. It has a “brand” and reputation in the world of law enforcement, which the EU has not yet established (except perhaps in those countries where EU Police Missions are operating). The consequence of this was that the project implementer was always destined to be seen as representing INTERPOL rather than the EU. For example, the UNCTAD report mentions actions implemented by INTERPOL with EU financial support, but neither the CMR nor CRIMLEA are mentioned.

Like CRIMGO and MARSIC, CRIMLEA did not have its own website. A webpage was present in the CRIMSON I website and a restructured and clearer page is now visible on the CMR website managed by CRIMSON II. However, the CRIMLEA project is barely visible on the INTERPOL website. The name of the project is briefly mentioned in the page dedicated in the EU-funded actions,<sup>53</sup> and a more complete explanation is given in an article on a news page.<sup>54</sup> It is important to note that this article also reports sentences like “INTERPOL, through its Project CRIMLEA, ... provided crime scene collection kits” and speaks of “An INTERPOL training course in Madagascar”. These are additional elements that present CRIMLEA as an INTERPOL project and not as a EU one. Neither are there hyperlinks linking viewers to the CMR website.

### *CRIMARIO*

CRIMARIO is undoubtedly the CMR project with the strongest communication and visibility strategy. The project is readily accessible online, with its own website ([www.crimario.eu](http://www.crimario.eu)) and a page on the CMR website. CRIMARIO is heavily active on social media, particularly on Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, SlideShare and RSS. It is the project with the highest number of followers (462) and more than 1200 Tweets<sup>55</sup> among the CMR projects.

The project’s communication and visibility expert is responsible for producing the bimonthly newsletter and for the circulation of press releases. These outputs are also published on the Issuu page on the CMR

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<sup>53</sup> <https://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/International-partners/European-Union/Cooperation>

<sup>54</sup> <https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2016/N2016-057>

<sup>55</sup> Last update 13 August 2018



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website. CRIMARIO also provides CRIMSON II with pictures and videos on a regular basis; these are published on the CMR Flickr page and the CMR YouTube channel.

The website is periodically updated with news and articles on project activities and on the maritime domain. The website clearly shows the link between CRIMARIO and the CMR Programme, mentioning it in the bottom banner of each page and more clearly in the project description. There are also a number of hyperlinks connecting the CRIMARIO website to the CMR website.

### *2.7.2 Overall EU Project Visibility across the CMR Programme*

There is a clear lack of visibility across the CMR programme as a whole. Despite the efforts made by CRIMARIO and CRIMSON II to present the projects as part of a wider programme, stakeholders in the field appeared confused when considering the CMR programme as a whole. Many stakeholders are aware of the existence of many of the individual projects, but not of the fact that they sit under an umbrella programme.

The concept of the CMR programme as a whole can also be confusing for project partners. Local stakeholders underlined the lack of visibility of EU actions regarding maritime security, even where actions are successfully implemented. To give an example, the CMR programme is analysed in the third chapter of the UNCTAD report on Maritime Piracy, entitled 'International cooperation and multilateral action to combat piracy'.<sup>56</sup> The CMR programme is explicitly mentioned at the same level as EUCAP Nestor, MASE, and PMAR. However, on the one hand, MARSIC is the only CMR project mentioned, and on the other hand, the information is partial as no mention is made of the ISCs in Kenya and Tanzania, or of the cost of the programme. To add further confusion, CRIMGO is mentioned outside of the section on the EU, and therefore outside of discussion of the CMR. This again highlights a lack of clarity in relation to CMR actions.

Meanwhile, on the CMR page of the Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) website,<sup>57</sup> only CRIMLEA, CRIMSON, MARSIC and CRIMARIO are highlighted as components of the programme. GoGIN is not mentioned and CRIMGO features only in passing. Moreover, all of the hyperlinks included connect to the old CMR/CRIMSON I website. Before the launch of the new CMR website in October 2015, the OBP page was the best-known instrument to obtain (albeit incomplete and incorrect) information about the CMR programme. The webpage has not been updated since the launch of CRIMSON II. This significantly affects the perception of the CMR programme as a whole.

Moreover, CMR projects have not always communicated well among themselves. Although many maintain positive relationships, interaction has been limited in the past. To bolster communication, there is a need for an organisation to prioritise this work. CRIMSON II is well placed, as it already has a platform to provide information within the CMR programme. CRIMSON II has also created two animated

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<sup>56</sup> [http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb2013d3\\_en.pdf](http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb2013d3_en.pdf)

<sup>57</sup> <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/eu-critical-maritime-routes-programme-cmr>



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videos (one for the Gulf of Guinea and one for the Indian Ocean) illustrating the main achievements of the projects and the maritime architecture in their respective areas of action.

### *2.7.3 Recommendations*

- CRIMARIO’s communication and visibility strategy should be used as template for other CMR projects to follow;
- In order to provide continuity, it could be useful for the new GoGIN website (as well as other project websites) to follow the colours, theme and structure used on the CMR website;
- At all external events, projects must display communications to the effect that the project is not only an EU project but a CMR project. This is particularly important for GoGIN, as CRIMARIO is already named the “Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean”. By contrast, GoGIN’s full name, the “Gulf of Guinea Interregional Network”, does not reference the CMR;
- A CMR Banner should be displayed along with project banners during all public events;
- CRIMSON II should organise “CMR Weeks” to increase visibility of the projects among key stakeholders;
- GoGIN should ensure that it remains active on Twitter and/or other social media platforms, as well as updating its website regularly. It should also ensure that its website details the fact that GoGIN sits under the CMR programme, and include hyperlinks linking viewers to the CMR website.
- INTERPOL should increase the space given to CRIMLEA on its website and present CRIMLEA as an EU project under the CMR. This will be particularly important during the implementation of CRIMLEA III.<sup>58</sup>
- CRIMSON II could support both GoGIN and CRIMARIO financially and logistically to increase their visibility among key stakeholders and present the projects as part of a larger programme. In particular, relevant stakeholders should be encouraged to subscribe to a CMR programme newsletter.

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<sup>58</sup> It should be noted, however, that CRIMLEA III will fall under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF, not the IcSP (CMR Programme)



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### **3. Research and Overarching Observations**

#### 3.1 Security Challenges in the Maritime Domain

This report has identified a number of drivers that contribute to security challenges in the maritime domain. Some of these apply across the regions under consideration, with their roots in political tensions, terrorism, organised crime and poverty. Others are specific to the particular regions in question.

National-level responses to many of these issues are unlikely to be effective. However, international collaboration to address these challenges has in many cases been limited, particularly in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea. However, with growing movement toward the development and refinement of regional maritime strategies provides a clear signal that States in these regions are willing to engage in collective efforts to identify and address the challenges they face.

Indeed, both the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea now have regional strategies, some accompanied by implementation plans. This development suggests that both regions are adopting a refreshed and purposeful outlook to criminal and other security challenges in the maritime domain. South East Asia currently lacks a regional maritime strategy but there is a clear desire to collaborate, as underlined through commitment to RECAAP.<sup>59</sup>

One of the key challenges here lies at the national political level, however. This was alluded to by stakeholders in both the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea, who drew attention to the fact that Governments and their ministers are subject to regular change, which may have a significant impact on progress made by previous ministers in relation to maritime security issues.

#### 3.2 Laptop Ministers

This issue has been flagged by numerous stakeholders and described as ‘laptop minister’ syndrome. The core problem here is that, on leaving office, many Ministers take their laptops with them, along with all of the information they may have gathered during their terms, and all the initiatives on which they had

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<sup>59</sup>The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The ReCAAP Agreement was launched in November 2006 with 14 Asian Contracting Parties including North, Southeast, and South Asian countries. It has 20 Contracting Parties today, including Europe (Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the United Kingdom), Australia, and the United States. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) established in Singapore on November 29, 2006. At the 12th Governing Council Meeting in 2018, the Council announced that ReCAAP ISC has met the criteria to be a Centre of Excellence for information sharing in combating piracy and armed robbery at sea.





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been working – including those on maritime security. New Ministers are therefore forced to begin their terms from scratch.<sup>60</sup>

It is therefore difficult to attract and retain political willingness and support for ongoing initiatives. The only solution to this is to supply hard evidence of ongoing initiatives and previous government support, in the form of reports, well-developed strategies or policies that a Minister may build on in his or her new position. A further strategy has seen the development of regional strategies promoted as providing a platform for national Ministers to receive acclaim and accreditation. The value of the development of such strategies clearly lies the foundation stones they offer, on which future work can be built.

### 3.3 Codes of Conduct

This leads to a related observation around the Djibouti and the Yaoundé Codes of Conduct. Each of these codes of conduct is just that – a code of conduct, which serves simply to lay out countries' expectations and guiding principles in terms of the implementations of appropriate response mechanisms. Such codes, however, require widespread buy in. Of particular interest to this report is the fact that RECs are not parties to either Djibouti or Yaoundé. In South-East Asia, meanwhile, ReCAAP is the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. All three agreements incorporate members beyond the regions of concern, such as France, America and the UK.

It may be argued that each CoC provided the initial 'knee jerk' and emergency response reaction from which to respond to the emerging crisis of piracy. The amendment to the Jeddah Convention, which will expand the remit of the DCoC to cover additional issues such as IUU fishing, serves to lay out a more complete picture of enforcement requirements. Both CoCs, however, essentially represent a statement of regional intention around a pressing and specific issue, principally that of piracy. The signed version of the DCoC, in particular, paid no attention to any regional maritime strategy and paid the price by creating a momentum that was only relevant whilst piracy existed as a pressing threat. This issue was addressed at the initial meeting of the Jeddah Convention. The YCC, coming later, learned from this lesson and provided a wider remit to encompass broader maritime threats, going beyond piracy alone. Whilst the current versions of the CoCs include reference to the need for national maritime strategies, they still emphasise regional solutions. However, ultimately, it is states that ascribe to the CoCs, to protect their own maritime and sovereign interests, despite a majority lacking any maritime strategy on

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<sup>60</sup> To elaborate, the typical turn around for the political process is four years, during the first year the Minister may only just gain his position. The second year he may begin to gain the necessary knowledge to enable his position (depending on how much information he has from the previous Minister). The third year he may make some progress but will unlikely begin the interactions with other strategic Ministries, clearly inter-ministerial exchange is critical to the success of overall interagency cooperation; which in turn is vital to the success of addressing maritime enforcement challenges along with overall national security priorities. During the fourth year, the Minister will be engaged in many political processes to ensure that his party has the best prospects to win the election round and thus maintain his position.



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which to situate those interests. This missing link could affect ownership and sustainability after international organisations withdraw support, potentially undermining the cohesive strength of other regional programmes.

The point here is that national and regional strategies have developed at the correct political level. They have embraced the CoCs, but many have developed through country-to-country collaboration and therefore supercede the CoCs and Regional Cooperation Agreements. Indeed, the Jeddah Convention alludes to the importance of National Maritime Strategies and urges signatory states to make efforts to develop them. Fundamentally, ownership is critical if solutions are to be sustainable into the future, and national and regional strategies can serve to underscore that ownership.

### 3.4 Integration with Continental, Regional and National Policies

Legal frameworks established by the EC at times do not fully consider the legal frameworks established by regional organisations. All stakeholders noted that Africa has a number of continental strategies and policies at the African Union level. Those adopted have been signed by the majority of Member States. Those strategies and charters, in turn, provide the context for the development of Regional Maritime Strategies, which then provide the regional context for the development of National Strategies. Numerous stakeholders underlined the importance of those documents and noted that new projects should ensure that there is synergy with these documents, which encapsulate the needs and priorities of a region. In doing so, the inception of EU projects should be situated within processes of security sector reform articulated in these strategies from an African perspective. This is an approach that is all too often missing. MASE, for example, has not embraced the IGAD Integrated Maritime Strategy 2030, despite the existence of clear synergies. It is here where the CoCs can provide guidance frameworks for action: it is critical, for example, that national and regional strategies are encapsulated by a project or programme, especially if these contribute to an agreed strategic roadmap.

### 3.5 Nigeria

In this context, it is important to acknowledge the difficulties involved in working with Nigeria, and the country's perceived reluctance to cooperate at regional level, due to the assessment that the country is on a higher level than others in the Gulf of Guinea. A possibility here might be that of working at a sub-governmental level

At present, the EU Delegation in Abuja does not have contacts with the maritime administration and this is an issue that prevents GoGIN from working properly with the country. Meanwhile, at times, projects attempts to deliver in Nigeria are thought to be hampered by the existing relationship between the EU and the country. Nevertheless, the EU is under political pressure to work with Nigeria. IMO could be a good intermediary partner to do this with, in light of their excellent relationships with the Nigerian authorities.

### 3.6 Lack of Inter-Project Coherence

Stakeholders agreed that a number of 'thematic' management requirements exist for solutions to maritime challenges to be sustainable into the future. These relate to a number of areas, including



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maritime governance, infrastructure and human resource development, maritime industry/blue economy, port and offshore critical infrastructure, safety/security and law enforcement, and marine environmental protection. Discussions revealed that safety and security have been the priority to date among these topics. However, stakeholders underlined the importance of maritime industries and the development of the blue economy as the primary component of future projects, which will in turn help to ensure the sustainability of safety and security-focused interventions.

All stakeholders agreed that the CMR and MASE programmes have had significant impact and have created the foundations from which States can initiate actions against criminal networks. However, some had limited knowledge of the programmes in question, noting that better availability of information would allow for better integration between the various actors and agencies operating in the maritime enforcement domain. Stakeholders noted that some projects were operating in a siloed manner. One of the causes of the lack of coordination and communication was held to be the absence of a policy and network mechanism coordinating efforts, actions and dialogues within the EU. The key point here was that future design frameworks should consider the wider enforcement picture, the importance of connections between initiatives, the linkages between project objectives and the need to straddle the land/sea divide.

Many stakeholders noted that there were issues around promoting a clear understanding of EU actions, due to the array of programmes and projects in operation. Here, a lack of clarity in Brussels may contribute inadvertently to problems among projects and stakeholders in the field. Whilst there is no shortage of documents attempting to define the EU's maritime security strategy<sup>61</sup>, there is a need for a clear document laying out the comprehensive approach adopted by the EU.

### 3.7 Overall Terminology

Stakeholders noted that inter-agency integration is key to unlocking available resources and operating effectively, and suggested an adaptation to the terminology used in this sphere to facilitate this. In particular, it was noted that use of the term 'border enforcement' in place of 'maritime security' could provide a more inclusive approach that would favour more fruitful civ-mil co-ordination. It is thought to be more comprehensive as a term, incorporating defence, law enforcement, justice, customs, border control, and other relevant issues. Additionally, it was suggested that this term would help to traverse the land-sea divide more effectively than the term 'maritime security', and would favour a more inclusive approach. However, they must be used with care, so as not to lose sight of the security dimensions of these activities.

### 3.8 Development of the CRIMSON and Africa Knowledge Bank

Stakeholders concurred that effective knowledge exchange was key to success in the fight against maritime crime and insecurity. Many were of the opinion that information and outputs generated from

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<sup>61</sup> *Inter alia*: the EU Maritime Security Strategy, June 2014 or the EU strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, March 2014.



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the Gulf of Guinea could inform projects in the Western Indian Ocean and vice versa, as well as benefiting stakeholders in South East Asia.

During fieldwork interviews, stakeholders also noted that outputs such as database structures, templates and management systems could be made available to partners within other project structures, and could be transferred from region to region. They held that this could provide substantial benefits to stakeholders in other locations. Importantly, it was also argued that significant added value could be procured from the development and sharing of such knowledge resources, with a substantial potential impact in terms of efficiency, reducing duplication and providing a structure through which big data could be used at the EU and AU levels.

### 3.9 Liaison between EEAS and DEVCO

A number of the stakeholders interviewed argued that the CRIMSON team should continue to liaise between all relevant national actors to ensure their needs are taken into account. It was argued that it should also continue to liaise with Asian and African countries and European counterparts to facilitate trans-regional experience sharing.

Part of the need for this lies in a limited interaction between different bodies in the EU. As such, concerted EC-EEAS action is needed. Cooperation within the EU, and coherence regarding EU MS initiatives (for instance among the IcSP, CSDP, etc) is paramount. For project partner and stakeholders, the structure of the EU can also be confusing, creating problems of visibility. For example, stakeholders noted that EU projects are often provided by different entities, further complicating an understanding of who is doing what, and why. Interviews demonstrated that some EU Delegations were not aware of all EU initiatives regarding maritime security, nor were a range of local stakeholders.

### 3.10 Input for Programming

It became evident throughout the fieldwork missions that a range of overlaps exist in relation to active initiatives (for example, MASE and CRIMARIO). From a technical standpoint, these overlaps should be avoided as they contribute to confusion among stakeholders/beneficiaries as to who is doing what, why and how interaction should work across projects. The role of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is a strong one in this regard, in light of its constant contact with the local stakeholders and Regional Organisations.

The CRIMSON mechanism has consistently provided expert advice and support for decision-making. IT has also facilitated the development of coherent strategies within the beneficiary countries through the provision of relevant and up to date information.<sup>62</sup> In this way, CRIMSON supported the launch of

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<sup>62</sup> During the project implementation, following desk works, allocated by DEVCO, have been delivered:  
- Comments to Annex I, Description of the Action, CRIMARIO (Draft);



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CRIMARIO's implementation phase and the project's mid-term monitoring and evaluation revision. CRIMSON also supported the new project GoG 2015, as well as carrying out the CRIMGO Mid-Term Revision, over the course of March, April and May 2014, as well as the evaluation of CRIMGO training material in 2016. In light of these results, there is an opportunity to extend the remit of CRIMSON to allow for the additional dissemination of information and provision of greater support for the coherence of all projects, particularly at the design phase.

### 3.11 Critical Maritime Routes information Portal

In 2013, CRIMSON I set up a CMR Information Portal (<http://www.crimson.eu.com>). The aim of the website was to provide a gateway for the dissemination of information and networking materials. In 2016, CRIMSON II renovated the website, collating updated information on the different CMR projects to ensure visibility both of the individual projects and of the programme as a whole ([www.criticalmaritimeroutes.eu](http://www.criticalmaritimeroutes.eu)).

However, stakeholders agreed that this instrument did not do enough to encourage African stakeholders to visit, because when browsing for information, they would look at official EU websites. Information should thus be made more accessible by placing it on an existing, widely used African Maritime Safety and Security Agency website. If developed within already functional information platforms, this could significantly reduce costs.

### 3.12 Annual Continental Conference to Promote Projects

All stakeholders agreed that it would be extremely useful to have an annual conference, based on the 'Our Oceans' model. This would allow programme managers and partners to present their projects to African stakeholders and representatives of other EU projects, as well as to other interested parties and agencies. This would facilitate knowledge exchange, assist in the harmonisation of different approaches and avoid duplication, while simultaneously underpinning sustainability.

### 3.13 Information Exchange on CMR Projects

#### *Organise meetings*

To provide an information gateway on CMR projects and to strengthen communication and EU/EC visibility, the following activities should be considered:

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- Comments to SPECIFIC ToR, Identification and Formulation Study for a project on Maritime Security –GoG, IcSP – Protecting Critical Infrastructure, FWC IFS 2014 - LOT 03 (Draft) ;
  - Comments to Letter/Protocol requested by Togo ;
  - Amended CRIMGO ToR (Draft);
  - CRIMGO Lines to Take (LTT) paper.



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### *Visual Identity*

Stakeholders noted that even though a number of arrangements are in place, more work is required to ensure global visibility, to publicise the programme, and to promote videos showing the work conducted to date. Stakeholders also recommended the adoption of a common visual theme across programmes operating within similar areas – something that is not yet in place. The main conclusion was that a common CMR communication strategy should pursue two main objectives:

- Strengthening global awareness of all EU activities, including awareness within the Union itself;
- Improving beneficiary countries' understanding of EU activities. This latter point was considered critical as a means to reinforce beneficiary country engagement with the projects, and the development of a sense of ownership. It was also considered crucial to ensuring better coordination both among EU projects and with other projects led by other international partners.

### 3.14 Accessibility

In general, stakeholders noted that there are an insufficient number of 'accessible expert focal points of contact' in some locations, which could take the form of a regional front office. Here, stakeholders recommended that an Africa-centric approach be adopted, with an emphasis on responding to beneficiary requests in line with local/regional strategies. It was noted that the absence of a focal point at the outset contributed to a lack of knowledge of the specificities of each country and of the local balance of power. It also exacerbates the risk that projects results are not aligned with local stakeholders' expectations (i.e. provision of assets vs. training).

### 3.15 EU Front Offices

In this regard, interviewees underlined the importance of the EEAS offices. In most cases, stakeholders noted that they were very happy with EEAS offices and their functionality. However, the Djibouti office was described by one stakeholder as 'doing everything it could to prevent the implementation of the programme' (with reference to MASE), raising unnecessary barriers to prevent the project moving forward. It was noted that some stakeholders had in fact become so frustrated that they vowed never to work with the EU again. Clearly, this experience is not a positive one and appears to have emanated from the attitude of specific individuals rather than the office itself. Attention needs to focus on the functionality of the EU offices and officers that support EU projects and programmes, to ensure that the input provided is benefitting projects rather than hindering them.



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## **4. Recommendations**

Recommendations have been made throughout the report in relation to each of the seven evaluation criteria. These recommendations apply at project level, as well as a number of other levels, and can be found throughout Chapter 2. This chapter will not repeat these recommendations; instead, it will present a series of recommendations for consideration at the EU level. In addition, a number of key points are laid out for consideration when establishing future projects.

### 4.1 Recommendations at the EU level

- The EU should ensure that all necessary agreements are in place with regard to protocols guiding information exchange before and during the implementation of EU projects.
- Regular progress review meetings should be held, bringing together key EU actors and projects staff, as well as beneficiary countries, regional organisations and other EU stakeholders, in addition to any industry partners involved in broader maritime security initiatives.
- An improved tasking and coordination structure within the EU is required to create a clear institutional framework to guide actions. As part of this, a coordinator should be selected by the EU who will have oversight of all projects and the power to influence project design.
- EEAS support for projects should be strengthened, in light of the contact it enjoys with local stakeholders and regional organisations. Indeed, EU Delegations offer important support for projects on the ground, but more must be done to ensure that this support is provided in a sustainable manner;
- The EU (namely the EEAS) should increase its support to projects at a political and diplomatic level, including through liaising with beneficiaries. At the same time, however, projects should themselves place greater emphasis on maintaining contact and interacting regularly with domestic and other actors in the field.
- A single EU body should take the lead on ensuring coordination across all EU maritime security programmes, with the aim of capitalising on existing structures and practices and avoiding duplication, improving synergies and inter-linkages between projects, and ensuring that relevant lessons learned are circulated such that other programmes and projects can benefit from them equally. In addition, opportunities for face-to-face interaction between these programmes should be enhanced, through activities such as joint capacity building workshops, events, exchange programmes, and meetings to discuss future plans that cover the full African and SEA programming regions;
- The EU should establish a position for an experienced individual to act as a continental representative, thus acting as the single EU ‘point of contact’ through a permanent presence in the region. This should be supported through the creation of a dedicated network of personnel, and the adoption of an approach to delivering services that responds to expressed ‘recipient requirements’.
- This would help to ensure that EU actions are more closely aligned to the expectations and requests of partner countries.
- The disparity between IcSP and EDF actions in terms of in-house and external non-biased Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms could be addressed through the adoption at EU level of standardised monitoring tools. A two-level monitoring system comprised of a project advisory



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committee (in which all partners are involved) and an internal EU steering committee could be an efficient way to standardise project M&E.

**4.2 Comments of Relevance to Future Initiatives**

- 1) Future initiatives should operate mindful of a key challenge at the national political level – that arising where elections and the appointment of new ministers leads to ‘laptop minister’ syndrome. This could be mitigated by ensuring accurate records are kept and by requiring those in post to deliver written reports, strategies or policies such that this work can be continued by successors.
- 2) A further consideration for future initiatives is the need to ensure alignment with continental strategies and policies at the African Union level, as well as those at other levels. Strategies and policies adopted at the AU level have been signed by the majority of Member States and have provided the overarching context for the development of all future Regional Maritime Strategies.
- 3) It is crucial to bear in mind that a code of conduct simply sets out states’ expectations and guiding principles for appropriate response mechanisms, and can be superseded by Regional Strategies. Indeed, the development of Regional Maritime Strategies provides a clear signal that States are willing to engage at a practical level on identifying and effectively responding to maritime security challenges.
- 4) Equally important is the consideration that each country that signs up to a Code of Conduct does so to protect its own maritime and sovereign interests, despite a majority lacking any national maritime strategy with which to align those interests. This missing link between regional and national efforts can negatively affect ownership and sustainability at the point at which international organisations withdraw support, undermining the cohesive strength of regional programmes. This of crucial importance since ownership is critical if solutions are to be maintained into the future. The provision of support for the development of national and regional strategies could help to underscore that ownership.
- 5) Throughout this study, it is clear that a number of ‘thematic’ areas exist in which greater involvement is required. These include maritime governance, infrastructure and human resource development, maritime industry/the blue economy, port and offshore critical infrastructures, safety/security and law enforcement, and marine environmental protection. In particular, stakeholders underlined the importance of the Maritime Industries and the development of the Blue Economy as a focus for future initiatives, which will ensure the sustainability of safety and security interventions.
- 6) It is important to note that improved information flow would allow for better integration between the various actors and agencies operating across maritime enforcement regimes. As such, effective knowledge exchange between regions and the adoption of a continental approach are both fundamental to the success of efforts across Africa and South East Asia to combat maritime crime and insecurity.
- 7) It would be valuable if outputs such as database structures, templates and management systems were made available to other partners within other project structures and transferred from region to region, to ensure benefits and added value for all stakeholders.





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- 8) In considering future initiatives, it is important to recognise that the EU's operating model when proposing regional solutions is based on a top-down approach. It would be valuable to consider how this logic can be reversed, by influencing partner countries at national level and establishing similar regional initiatives, but from the bottom up.
- 9) When considering future initiatives in South East Asia, it is important to note that the region currently lacks a regional maritime strategy, but that the desire to collaborate is underlined through the commitment to RECAAP.<sup>63</sup>


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<sup>63</sup>The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The ReCAAP Agreement was launched in November 2006 with 14 Asian Contracting Parties, including North, Southeast, and South Asian countries. Today, ReCAAP has 20 Contracting Parties, including a number of European countries (Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK), Australia, and the US. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) was established in Singapore in November 2006. At the 12th Governing Council Meeting in 2018, the Council announced that ReCAAP ISC had met the criteria required to become a Centre of Excellence for information sharing in combating piracy and armed robbery at sea.



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## Annex 1 - Diagrammatic Map of Past and Present CMR Projects





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**Annex 2 – Notes from the Stakeholders**

**1. BLUE ECONOMY: Development of the African Maritime Clusters Network, Intercontinental Africa project**

**Relevant Countries:** Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Ghana and Togo

**Mission:** To accelerate the sustainable development of Africa’s Maritime Sector and Blue Economy

**AIM:** To design and implement a robust methodology to help identify and cultivate Africa’s maritime and blue economy clusters, and encourage increased communications and collaboration between Africa and global industries with comparable interests.

**Objective One:** Identify and create a classification system for the specific internal sectors representative of the maritime and blue economy sectors.

**Objective Two:** Develop an internal platform to identify, attract and initiate communication, collaboration and coordination with African maritime and blue economy sector industry representatives.

**Objective Three:** Develop an internal platform to identify, attract and initiate communication, collaboration and coordination with global maritime and blue economy sector industry representatives;

**Objective Four:** Identify the tools and mechanisms required to facilitate progressive and dynamic dialogue between Africa and Global maritime and blue economy industry representatives

**Objective Five:** To design and implement a purposeful web based platform to host both internal platform along with a central ‘support’ structure aimed at facilitating and brokering sustainable partnerships between African and Global maritime and blue economy industries, accelerating the sustainable development of Africa’s Maritime Sector and Blue Economy.

- African Maritime Cluster Network therefore will be a network of government and business and innovation organisations that support the development and growth of African trade markets in particular those that support the growth of the African Maritime Sector and Blue Economy. Its primary mission is to enable the successful collaboration, of African Governmental and Business Needs with International Industrial and Business providers;
- AMCN will offer economic and technical assistance services to Governments and Industry in Africa and couples requirements with International Commerce. The



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aim is to accelerate the growth of African regional/ national Maritime Sector and Blue Economy. The services delivered to national and regional administration institutions, industrial clusters and individual businesses;

- AMCN project will provided the reports necessary to enable political support by the identification of the value of the Maritime Sector to National GDP, as well as a harmonised approach to assess Regional and eventually Continental contributions;
- AMCN will interlink with the European Union Maritime Cluster Network to ensure log programme longevity

### 2. Maritime Safety and Security-The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Maritime Council

**Relevant Countries:** Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, Supportive REC, IGAD.

The Red Sea and GoA Council will be aimed at the Gulf of Eden and the Red Sea; this particular maritime basin requiring a unique and merits a tailor-made strategy.

Such a maritime basin strategy will promote growth and development strategies that will exploit the strengths and address the weaknesses of the large sea region of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. To include the implementation of climate change adaption measures, marine environmental management, crisis response, resource extraction, as well as to problems of sea and ocean pollution, maritime safety and freedom of navigation and the strengthening of responses to maritime security challenges.

### 3. South East Asia, ASEAN Regional Integrated Maritime Strategy

**Relevant Countries:** Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (and Sri Lanka as South Asia country)

Unaccountable governance and/or corruption mixed with societal tensions or grievance have been cause for extreme violence in some parts of the SEA region. In these instances, the absence of the rule of law and a lack of governmental administration has nurtured a vast array of criminal activities such as piracy and terrorism and these have flourished in some countries. Furthermore the threats to security have not only emerged from SEA member states; international criminals have taken full advantage of the porous borders increasing regional instability severely influencing prospects for local economic development and impacting negatively on the local communities. A good example is IUU fishing.

Persistent poverty in some countries, often the result of conflict, destroys the stability on which economic growth and investment depend; these factors have denied many of the regional communities' confidence and aspirations for a better future.



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SEA Member States, in identifying and addressing security challenges linked to the sea and waterborne border management, have established strategic interests both internally as a region and across the global maritime domain. This underlined through the RECaP initiative. It is true that as a region, member states communities, enterprises and investors expect effective and cost-efficient responses to the challenges posed in the protection of the marine environment and the maritime domain. This includes securing borders, ports and navigational routes, in order to protect water borne trade and legitimate maritime practices whilst, addressing potential threats from unlawful and illicit activities at sea.

The SEA regions coasts, seas and oceans have the potential to be a major source of new jobs and growth and these can contribute to the SEA overarching maritime vision and the aspirations. However, there are threats, challenges and weaknesses that undermine the regions capacity of growing its maritime sector and 'Blue Economy' and one of the main obstacles is the region's maritime insecurity. Problems include under-investment in knowledge, poor access to finance, the high cost of infrastructure, duplication of actions, and the regions slow progress towards interoperable standards.

The SEA maritime diplomacy and wider diplomatic effort will continue to radiate widely from a strong nucleus in increasing spheres of engagement, starting with the regions member states and immediate maritime domain as well as land based districts. As an embryonic maritime region, SEA is actively contributing to capacity building and operational coordination to address maritime threats from non-state actors, crisis response and search and rescue provision. It is foreseen that this role will increase and greater emphasis will be attributed SEA member states critical maritime infrastructures are widely dispersed in geographical terms underlines the importance of creating and sustaining strong stratagem for regional communication, collaboration and coordination whilst extending the regions maritime influence (capacity) reach and versatility.

The development of a cohesive and coherent Integrated Maritime Strategy will set out how the region can utilise its regional capabilities to identify, assess and address maritime domain security issues and how to improve the regions ability through the most efficient use of available resource. A priority driver is to unlock the regions maritime sectors potential and the sustainable management and exploitation of marine resources.

The SEA Regional Integrated Maritime Strategy will set out the vision, aims and principles from which measurable objectives will be obtained within an integrated, communicative, collaborative and coordinated framework of regional action provided by an associated and planned roadmap.



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**Annex 3 - Methodology**

**Timeframe**

**Selection of Appropriate Indicators**

**Standard Selection Criteria**

The research framework designed for the CRIMSON II CMR programme considers these influencing factors and developed by way of first identifying and outlining the specific indicators addressed throughout the CRIMSON II lifespan.

These are based on LEVEL 3 indicators as set out by IEG Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership Programmes : Indicative Principles and Standards<sup>64</sup> and are adopted directly from the actions set out to achieve the objective of CRIMSON II which is to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various CMR activities financed by the European Union.

CRIMSON II indicators should be able to satisfy preset selection criteria to ensure their viability. These criteria provide a series of guidelines that can orientate the decision making process and which results in an indicator that meets the needs of the program. It is important to put the selection criteria into a standardised format that can be useful for all the CRIMSON CMR relevant programmes.

Standardisation of the selection criteria will help streamline the indicator selection process, reduce costs, prevent a duplication of effort, and will provide an overall consistency, thereby increasing the potential for cross-programme comparisons.

It is proposed that the CRIMSON II should focus on indicators for which techniques, protocols, or equipment are either available or in advanced stages of development, rather than concentrate on potential measures. The use of measures in the context of CRIMSON II is constrained due to the 3-year project time limitation. The focus on attainable goals is more important to the implementation of CRIMSON II and in the first instance use the information provided by CRIMSON I to compile and substantiate the initial indicator selection.

**Criteria Groupings**

Methodical validity is the base for determining whether data can be utilised within a comparable format and this is important for the effective implementation of CRIMSON II. Data collected from one element of the CMR programme may become irrelevant if the data is difficult to compare with conditions found at a second implementation position. This is important because the application of CMR programmes are specifically aligned; therefore, there is a great deal of opportunity to share best practices and actions. In reality, elements associated with the CMR programme should be balanced when considering the validity of an indicator and the CRIMSON II application. A CRIMSON II indicator must not only be

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<sup>64</sup> IEG Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership Programmes : Indicative Principles and Standards: The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) is an independent, three-part unit within the World Bank Group.



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methodologically valid; but its application but be practical and should avoid being costly or complex. More importantly, the indicator must be able to address the questions that CRIMSON II looks to answer. For discussion purposes, these criteria are divided into three categories: scientific validity (technical considerations); practical considerations, and programmatic considerations. Although discussed separately, these categories are not entirely separate entities, but rather portions of characteristics that provide some guidance in the indicator-selection process.

### **Rationale for use of indicators in CRIMSON II**

In the context of assessment, an indicator is a quantitative metric that provides information to monitor performance, measure achievement and determine accountability. Rationale for the use of indicators in CRIMSON II for meeting CMR programme objectives are relevant to selected actions. Very simply, the CRIMSON II indicators will act as standardised measures that will allow for comparisons over time, over different geographic areas and/or across CMR projects. By increasing the capability to compare temporally and spatially differentiates indicators from raw data, the ability to aggregate data for higher-level interpretation and application will also increase leading to the availability of greater value information. These selected status and trends indicators meant to illustrate the appropriateness of CMR projects resources and selected indicators designed to help CMR programme managers attain better integration, increase the vitality and acceptability of the projects, which in turn will accelerate the overall implementation of actions and achievement of key goals. The key challenge with indicators is to ensure their quality and integrity CRIMSON II indicators tested to generate data that are needed, useful, understandable, practical and feasible.

The MERG<sup>65</sup> Indicator Standards & Tools, were used to help formulate the CRIMSON II indicators; these provide the global standard for indicator development for the M&A purposes, to ensure 'fit for purpose' each of the primary standards were assessed within an EU frameworks which is the background against which the CMR programme (and the different projects') coherence and coordination are considered.

Monitoring<sup>66</sup>: This indicator is all about good quality monitoring systems that use SMART indicators specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound to track the use of inputs, the progress of activities, the outputs associated with key activities, and outcomes. While objective data on inputs and results are always preferable, some data may also reflect subjective or summary assessments. Data collection is timely, of adequate periodicity to facilitate problem solving and support decision making, and is controlled by a quality-assurance system. Accountability for data collection and quality assurance is clear, and incentives are appropriate to ensure an acceptable level of quality. Monitoring reports to

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<sup>65</sup> The Indicator Standards & Tools, developed by the Monitoring and Evaluation Reference Group (MERG),

<sup>66</sup> Monitoring is a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on indicators to provide the management and the main stakeholders of an on-going development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds. (OECD/DAC, 2002. Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management)



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management and governing bodies are clear, accessible, and easy to understand, and include definitions and parameters<sup>67</sup>.

Coherence and Coordination: The application of coherence and coordination protocols can place pressure on all partners to adopt a maximal approach to coherence, regardless of their relations to each other and the operational context. The purpose of the coherence and coordination indicator from the CRIMSON II perspective should not be understood as an indicator that has a main objective to blanket a single approach for all. In fact partners should not be expected to achieve the same level of unity of effort because the geographical context of the CMR programmes do cause for some restriction of that type of approach. CRIMSON II coherence and coordination indicator needs to be considered within a balance of relationships, and the most appropriate and realistic level of coherence and coordination that can be achieved will depend on the exact arrangement and operational context of the CMR programmes and how that fits within a model of interdependent relationship.

Visibility, liaison and information sharing: Public opinion is a vital factor in influencing politicians and decision makers. It provides a gauge for understanding public support and interest and is a motivation for individuals at all levels to lead and to take more action. The purpose of this indicator for visibility, liaison and information sharing is therefore to measure attitudes of the CMR programme interested parties and stakeholders in relation to issues such as: value for money and effectiveness in delivering the overall CMR program; funding; knowledge of and value (financial and otherwise) assigned to the CMR programmes

Expert analysis and awareness raising: The Critical Maritime Routes programme (CMR) under the Instrument for Stability objective is to increase maritime security and safety of critical maritime routes. To enable that programme to deliver results it is imperative that expertise is nurtured and enabled to ensure aspirations and priorities are effectively delivered. The purpose of this indicator is to ensure that CRIMSON II produces expert relevant, credible and reliable information that will efficiently influence the implementation of the CMR program. In addition this indicator will ensure that outputs and deliverables are disseminated efficiently.

Recommendations: The purpose of this indicator is to ensure that lessons learnt, reports and advised changes are relevant and targeted to the intended users. CRIMSON II recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions and be firmly based on evidence and analysis. They should be realistic e.g. the priorities, responsibilities for action, and provisional time-frames for action should be as clear as possible. A CRIMSON II evaluation report should correctly identify lessons that stem logically from the findings, present an analysis of how these can be applied to different contexts and/or different sectors, and take into account evidential limitations such as generalizing from single

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<sup>67</sup> The U.S. Programme Evaluation Standards for professional evaluators include a set of seven “utility standards” to help ensure that evaluation will serve the information needs of intended users. The African Evaluation Association has adapted these standards to the African context.





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point observations. In fact in this context lessons will only be drawn if they represent a contribution to general knowledge.

### Internal Indicators CRIMSON II

#### Key Indicators

*Provision of benefits for component managers of the Critical Maritime Routes programme, beneficiaries; contribution on further programming and updating of multi-donor databases*

Means of Verification: CRIMSON II Deliverables

#### Indicator 1. Comprehensive Monitoring & Evaluation Framework

*The progress made by CMR individual projects relating to difficulties and challenges ahead, measures taken by the implementing partners and the response by the beneficiaries under each component of the Programme Monitoring:*

#### Means of verification

Number of contacts and dialogue with the implementing partners of each component of the Programme, with EU stakeholders (first and foremost the Contracting Authority (CA), but also EU Delegations and other relevant colleagues) and with local relevant stakeholders;

- Number of relevant documents cleared and put into knowledge depository;
- Number of expert missions carried out;
- Number of analysis carried out;
- The number of the different components of the CMR Programme monitored;
- Number of contact databases created;
- Number of Human Rights considerations carried out.

#### Indicator 2. Coherence and Coordination:

*The level of unity of effort, balance of relationships, and the most appropriate and realistic achievable level of coherence and coordination within the exact arrangement and operational context of the CMR projects and how that fits within a model of interdependent relationship*

#### Means of Verification

- The number of clear coherent and coordination structures developed between the different components of the CMR Program;
- The number of clear coherent and coordination structures developed between the different components of the CMR Programme and other relevant initiative (EU or non EU);
- The number of links and synergies identified between the different CMR projects;



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- The number of training observation tasks carried out;
- The number of semi-structured interviews carried out.

Indicator 3. Visibility, liaison and information sharing:

*Measure attitudes of the CMR programme interested parties and stakeholders in relation to issues such as: value for money, coordination and effectiveness in delivering the overall CMR program; funding; knowledge of and value (financial and otherwise) assigned to the CMR programmes*

### Means of Verification

- The number of promotional activities carried out through CRIMSON 11 to increase the visibility of the EU and of the CMR Programme within the EU, Member States, beneficiary countries, partner countries and organisations;
- The number of liaison and meetings held with all components of the Programme as well as relevant stakeholders;
- The number of information sharing meetings held with all components of the Programme as well as with relevant stakeholders;
- The number of individuals reached through the website;
- The number of promotional literature distributed;
- The number of participants attending special events or conferences;
- The number of participants taking part in online survey tasks;
- The number of individuals impacted by the CRIMSON II communication strategy;
- Number of newsletters distributed.

Indicator 4. Expert Analysis and Awareness Raising:

*Provision of expert relevant, credible and reliable information that will efficiently influence the implementation of the CMR program. In addition this indicator will ensure that outputs and deliverables are disseminated efficiently.*

### Means of Verification

- The number/quality of reports delivered under the different components of the CMR Programme to the EU containing expert analytical advice;
- The number/quality of updates delivered under the different components of the CMR Programme to the EU containing expert advice on current trends in the concerned regions;
- The number/quality of updates delivered under the different components of the CMR Programme to the EU containing expert advice on availability of an information gateway;



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- The number of updates delivered under the different components of the CMR Programme to the EU containing expert advice on CMR relevant national, regional and international initiatives/events/activities/projects planned or carried out in CMR active domains;
- The number of participants attending expert focus groups;
- The number of specialised expert meetings.

### Indicator 5. *Recommendations*:

*Provision of relevant updates and lessons learnt, reports and advised changes that are relevant and targeted to the intended users. These should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions and firmly based on evidence and analysis. They should be realistic e.g. the priorities, responsibilities for action, and provisional time-frames for action should be as clear as possible*

### Means of Verification

- The number of opinions and recommendations provided to the EU on needed and advisable adjustments to on-going projects;
- The number of opinions and recommendations provided to the EU on appropriate actions to be undertaken under future programming;
- Number of monthly updates provided.

### **CRIMSON II Research Methodology:**

The development of the CRIMSON methodology and instruments has been adopted from the following resource: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/monitoring-results\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/monitoring-results_en.htm).<sup>68</sup> The handbook related to the Results Oriented Monitoring procedure methodology was also followed. The CRIMSON II methodology evaluation index allows for the assessment of the relevance, quality, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, coherence and synergies, EU visibility as well as the EU-added value of CMR projects. The methodology encompasses the specifically developed and appropriate methodology and instruments enabling to judge the performance of external aid programmes. A copy of which is available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm)

The research design incorporates a mixed multidisciplinary qualitative and quantitative methodology; this was selected so as to not rely on a single method and thus increase the reliability and validity of results. By adopting a multi-method research framework and combining three or more different

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<sup>68</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/documents/rom\\_handbook2011\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/documents/rom_handbook2011_en.pdf).



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approaches it was possible to support the qualitative research elements within a triangulation<sup>69</sup> process<sup>70</sup>, ensuring that potential gaps and weaknesses of one method would be compensated for by the strengths of the others. A social interview/survey type methodology was also selected because these underpin key knowledge in the widest possible sense.

### CRIMSON Implementation Phases and Tools

*As proposed by the EC methodology the assessment analysis process will be conducted in three phases*

**Desk phase:** In this phase the CRIMSON Team analyses the intervention logic on the basis of official documents. Therefore, the first months of the CRIMSON II should be dedicated to the collection, collation and classification and analysis of secondary data. This will include the reports of the previous CRIMSON I programme as well as Lessons Learnt and Best Practice documents.

Additionally it will require the collection and collation of significant reference documents deemed vital for the implementation of the CRIMSON II Research process. For example the Yaoundé Protocol.

*The analysis of the collected data will be used in a number of ways.*

**First:** The analysis will provide the information to initiate the CRIMSON II Base-Line Study. This report will provide the contracting Authority an analysis describing the situation prior to the implementation of the CRIMSON II intervention, against which progress can be assessed or comparisons made (otherwise known as CRIMSON II Benchmark One).

**Second:** The analysis will provide the CRIMSON II team with all the pertinent background documents that need to be considered within the research framework. These will require a classification procedure as to their relevance and/or significance to the CMR programmes and the framework. For example; alignment to EU, African Union, or Regional agendas. Additionally it will also provide a 'clearing house' removing unnecessary documentation that may serve to frustrate future analysis. All benchmarks and indicators requiring development in line with the expectations of pertinent documentation, ensuring that quality control measures are implemented at all stages of the CRIMSON II Lifespan.

**Third:** The secondary data will also collect, collate and analyze all the relevant CMR programme timeframes and expected deliverables. A detailed examination of the portfolio of development interventions, and the assistance strategy behind them, for each CMR programme partner country. Understanding the timings of the different actions will help streamline the CRIMSON II process, maximizing on available opportunity whilst optimizing resources. By establishing a transparent method

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<sup>69</sup> Triangulation involves the conscious combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies as a powerful solution to strengthen a research design where the logic is based on the fact that a single method can never adequately solve the problem of rival causal factors (Denzin 1978; Patton 1990; De Vos 1998).

<sup>70</sup> Triangulation: The use of three or more theories, sources, or types of information, or types of analysis, to verify and substantiate an assessment. By combining multiple data sources, methods, analyses, or theories, evaluators seek to overcome the bias that comes from single informants, single methods, single observers, or single theory studies



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for the research implementation, it will be possible to ‘target’ dates for constructive feedback to CMR Programme Managers.

**Fourth:** Secondary data collection will also provide the CRIMSON management reference system, it will provide the details of recipients, consultants, the individuals, groups, or organisations, whether targeted or not, that benefit, directly or indirectly, from the development of the M&E intervention. This will require updating on a six monthly basis.

This phase will allow new recruited non-key experts, the opportunity to review relevant documentation as desk-work in their own residence places. During the desk phase a work plan for data collection and analysis is developed. The phase will end at the Full Team Meeting where changes to the evaluation questions and judgment criteria (also called "reasoned assessment criteria") will be proposed to the EU Reference Group.

### DESK PHASE - SECONDARY RESEARCH TOOLS

This includes the collection, collation and analysis of various reports and other relevant materials from a range of sources. In particular reports pertaining to the different activities delivered by the Critical Maritime Routes programmes by managers of individual CMR projects along with records from meetings that influenced CMR delivery. Published statistics, texts and secondary analyses made by other ‘experts’ as well as other support materials. This provided a literature review and allows the CRIMSON team manager to develop a specific ‘information platform’ that can be used to store and make available the collected data for the whole team.

### MISSION PHASE - PRIMARY RESEARCH

During this phase the CRIMSON II Team will implement its work plan for final data collection. It will apply the specified techniques (described below) and will begin to test the assumptions. The phase will end at the Intermediate Analysis Team Mtg. The field work will be carried out through expert consortia of two or more experts led by one of the KEs.

The work will include:

- Approving the indicators and providing partial answers to the questions on the basis of existing information;
- Clarifying the assumptions to be tested in the field;
- Testing in the field at each identified site;
- Visits to key stakeholders in Europe and desk work at experts’ own residence places.

### TARGET GROUPS

The groups targeted by the project in the beneficiary countries are relevant maritime authorities, mainly coast guard, maritime law enforcement with a coast guard function and/or others.

Actors involved are inter alia:

- RECs, Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS),



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Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), African Union, ReCAAP and its Cooperative Mechanism, ReMISC, DRTC, Changi (Singapore) Information Fusion Centre;

- CSDP Operations (EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUCAP Nestor);
- EU Member States agencies and liaison officers;
- Participants of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, International Maritime Organisation (IMO), Asia Regional Office of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC), World Maritime University (WMU), regional maritime universities in West Africa, UNODC, INTERPOL, Participants of G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea, International Maritime Bureau, Oceans Beyond Piracy, NATO, shipping and oil industry.

### PRIMARY MISSION PHASE TOOLS

*Qualitative/Quantitative semi-structured key informant interviews.*

A semi-structured face to face interview technique is selected for the main body of the CRIMSON II M&E framework, because it will allow a degree of flexibility for the CRIMSON II team to pursue information in more detail. The interviews are organised around several key questions derived from the context of the areas to be explored. The selections of interviewees must be selected from the outputs of the secondary research which has a sub-objective of identifying the key stakeholders, benefactors and key interested parties of the CMR programmes.

### BACKGROUND CONCLUSION SHEETS

Background Conclusion Sheets are the central methodological tool in ROM. The outputs ensure methodological consistency and therefore a crucial factor contributing to the success of the field missions.

CRIMSON II as an EU M&E project has adopted the BSC<sup>71</sup> guide for its primary data collection, data analysis and reporting structure because the issues raised in the BCS can guide the ROM expert's empirical data collection.

### SYNTHESIS PHASE:

During the synthesis phase it is suggested that the CRIMSON II Team could draw information from which to generate the expected report; this will include the findings and conclusions which respond to the questions asked, as well as an overall assessment. These reports will provide the Contracting Authorities with recommendations that may suggest for some small alterations in the delivery of individual CMR Projects to enhance its productivity. The final report will exemplify improvements to the delivery of the

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<sup>71</sup> BCS is not a questionnaire but a guide for structured thinking



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CMR programme in line with the overarching goal and will provide grouped and prioritised recommendations. The synthesis phase will end at the Final Analysis Mtg.

### SYNTHESIS PHASE TOOLS

#### *Secondary data analysis*<sup>72</sup>

Secondary data analysis involves the analysis of existing datasets, information and reports that are collected previously by another source.

Secondary data collected by CRIMSON II will undergo a number of procedures, in terms of classification, date, relevance and quality, selected data will then be cleared and placed into a prepared 'knowledge repository'.

Classification will be undertaken through a process of grounded coding or 'creating specific codes relating to the key questions', collected data can then undergo a 'data reduction' process; the goal of which is to make a large amount of data manageable. Analysis goals are to search for commonalities, which contribute to the codes or which may create new codes and to identify contrasts/comparisons.

Once the extrapolation and coding of information is complete, the resulting data can be used as a reference tool for the CRIMSON II Team and will provide evidence to where data gaps might exist as well as provide a snap shot of the current picture in relation to the implementation of the CMR program. Additionally the outputs of the secondary analysis will help inform the typology of questions for the qualitative/quantitative semi-structured key informant interviews.

Primary Data analysis carried out using the EU ROM methodology. However, this may be limited to the questions relevant to a ROM analysis and will focus on the objectives of the study rather than a monitoring and evaluation process.

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<sup>72</sup> Analysis of secondary data, where "secondary data can include any data that are examined to answer a research question other than the question(s) for which the data were initially collected" (p. 3; Vartanian, 2010)



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**Annex 4 - Consolidated Comments and Responses of the Evaluators**

<b>CRIMSON CMR Evaluation Report v.1 (IFS/2014/353-303) – CONSOLIDATED COMMENTS FROM THE REFERENCE GROUP<sup>73</sup></b>				
<b>Ref. No</b>	<b>Position in the draft Report</b>	<b>Text</b>	<b>Comment by the Reference Group</b>	<b>Response of the Evaluators</b>
1	General	General	The Reference Group’s overall impression of the Report is positive. Most members of the Reference Group praised the critical tone of the Report and consider it would be a very useful product in future work of the EU institutions in the area of maritime security.	
	Contents	p.iii	Suggestions for Chapter 1: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Missing subchapter 1.1.2 and 1.1.3</li> <li>• Missing subchapter on SE Asia Regional Security Initiatives, both from contents and from the text. Considering the maritime importance of the SE Asia, I’m sure there are some initiatives. For instance, under subchapter on SE Asia: Landscape Analysis ASEAN Blueprint initiative is described. This should be under subchapter on SE Asia Regional Security Initiatives.</li> </ul> Suggestions for Chapter 2:	<b>ADDRESSED:</b> Amended both in table of contents and in text Amended both in table of contacts and in text

<sup>73</sup> The draft CMR Evaluation Report was distributed to the Reference Group on 23/05/2018. The Reference Group’s comments were consolidated on 06/06/2018. Additional comments received from all parties have been incorporated into Annex 4, as submitted to DEVCO on 7 August 2018.





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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Title of the chapter should be 'Evaluation of the CMR Programme', because the chapter emphasis is on evaluation.</li> <li>Subchapters should be named just 2.1 Relevance, 2.2 Quality of Design, 2.3 Efficiency etc.</li> <li>Subsubchapters should be named: 2.x.1 Relevance of Individual Projects, 2.x.2 Overall Relevance of the CMR Programme 2.x.3 Recommendations</li> </ul>	
2	Executive Summary	General	The Reference Group considers the Executive Summary looks more like an introduction than an actual executive summary. Please make sure that the Executive Summary contains main findings and recommendations of the Report. Further, the Executive Summary should touch upon everything prescribed by the Terms of Reference. The Executive Summary should be organised as per Terms of Reference and should not exceed two pages.	The Executive Summary has been restructured as per ToR.
3	Introduction	p.2	The Reference Group believes the content of the Executive Summary could be the initial part of the Introduction.	Addressed in the text
4	Introduction	p.2	The evaluators should consider deleting the first two paragraphs.	ADDRESSED in the text in the Introduction section
5	Introduction	p.2	Before the last paragraph the evaluators should consider adding a new paragraph on non-CMR projects, since the TOR reads ' <i>the state of play of EU projects acting on the maritime security domain</i> '.	ADDRESSED throughout the introduction section
6	Main Findings	General	The Reference Group finds that the findings are disconnected from the main evaluation of the report. Findings need to be a logical outcome of the evaluation and some of them are not even mentioned in the main text. Kindly ensure coherence between findings and	ADDRESSED Main findings have been deleted and an Executive Summary has been created as per ToR keeping in mind the content in the text and in the Main Findings



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			recommendations both within the main text and the Executive Summary and between them.	
7	Main Findings	General	The Reference Group believes that the essence of the findings belongs in the Executive Summary. Preferably, it should be grouped as much as possible for purposes of clarity. A possible structure would be: 1. Relevance re strategy/policy (EU, regional, IcSP). 2. Project identification and design 3. Project implementation and management (seeking synergies) Etc.	ADDRESSED Main findings have been deleted and an Executive Summary has been created as per ToR keeping in mind the content in the text and in the Main Findings
8	Main Findings	General	Kindly note that both the MARSIC and the CRIMARIO projects have been very successful. According to the evaluators: MARSIC has had a ‘...tremendous impact...’ and has been a ‘...complete success...’ (p. 37). Further, the CRIMARIO project is described as having ‘...performed extremely efficiently’ (p.30); ‘the impact of CRIMARIO is now becoming very evident’ (p.38); CRIMARIO has also ‘...provided numerous outputs...’. The evaluators should consider reflection of these positive assessments in the Main Findings section.	PARTIALLY ADDRESSED throughout the document in the CRIMARIO and MARSIC sections.
9	Main Findings and Subchapter 2.1.1 (Conclusion Projects’ Relevance)	Finding 2 on p.3 and twice on p.25: <i>This indicates that projects from EEAS and DEVCO should be more cohesive due to EEAS robust engagement with RECs, such as MASE.</i>	This sentence is not clear. Kindly revise. Probably “...such as through MASE.”	ADDRESSED: Syntax error, ‘such as MASE’ – Deleted in all relevant locations.
10	Main Findings	Finding 3 on p.3:	True, but the EU initiatives should reflect EU interests and	ADDRESSED: Main findings section



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		<i>Piracy is no longer at the top of the agenda for many of the African States, with wider maritime and land based challenges becoming more of a challenge. Stakeholders from all regions stated that projects that do not consider the integration of land and sea divide should be avoided.</i>	for the EU and EU Member States piracy is still at the top of the agenda. This is regularly presented by the EU MS industries’ representatives in international fora (i.e. during G7++). Evaluators should consider acknowledging that.	deleted. Section addressed with minor rewording in section 1.3 to reflect the difference between regional view and the focus of EU Partners.
11	Main Findings	<i>Finding 4 on p.3: Concerning the intervention logic of each of the projects considered, the log-frame should be transparent and clearly defined as to how the different result areas will achieve their results and deliver impact.</i>	Since there are a couple of findings that concern log-frame, the evaluators should consider presenting them all as one major finding.	PARTIALLY ADDRESSED: Main findings section deleted. Section addressed with minor rewording in the Executive Summary to reflect the need for all stakeholders to agree the level of flexibility and have it validated by the EU.
12	Main Findings	<i>Finding 6 on p.3: Cross cutting issues are not addressed</i>	The Reference Group agrees with this point. Cross-cutting issues are of great importance to the EU and Member States. However, these issues are often not a priority for	ADDRESSED: Main findings section deleted. Section addressed with minor rewording in the Executive Summary and



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		<i>particularly well. This observation should constitute an important element during the development of new projects, in particular gender issues.</i>	our African partners and having a focus on this issue when working at operational level can be counterproductive, create tensions and jeopardise projects. The evaluators should consider a more balanced formulation.	to reflect the difficulties that could ensue from project managers pushing too hard on issues that are viewed differently in region. The need remains for project managers to continue to pursue cross-cutting issues but not at the expense of priority output. Possibility for a separate EU programme to address cross-cutting issues such as gender separately from operational projects.
13	Main Findings	<i>Finding 9 on p.3: There is scope to broaden the overall efficiency of EU projects by a constant centralised monitoring of who is doing what and proposing adjustments to project design or project log frames to create a more efficient EU centric output.</i>	Even though this is necessary, the evaluators should also consider what is the designated authority, accepted by all relevant EU entities, with a real power to orientate and arbitrate between projects. The “centralised monitoring” system would only be a tool to support this authority.	ADDRESSED: Main findings section eliminated. Section addressed with minor rewording in the Executive Summary and later in the text to reflect the need for pre-agreed authorities from all EU components to be transferred to project directors.
14	Main Findings	<i>Finding 16 on p.4: It is evident that all projects have resulted in significant positive</i>	Kindly qualify the first sentence of this finding. Further, it is not at all clear that “a continental coherent programme” is the best approach. The maritime problems and their answers respond to sea basin logic and not to a continental one. This is due to the nature of	ADDRESSED: Main findings section deleted.



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		<i>impacts for recipients from all three regions. However they could have done a lot better if they had been a part of a continental coherent programme.</i>	problems faced (e.g. Mediterranean sea vs GoG) and the Coastal States and regional actors ability to respond. The evaluators should consider developing the second sentence of the finding as a recommendation.	
15	Main Findings	Finding 20 on p.4: <i>The potential contribution a project will have for an economy is completely overlooked.</i>	Kindly explain this finding.	ADDRESSED: Main findings section deleted. Section addressed with new text in section 2.4.
16	Main Findings	Finding 22 on p.4: <i>It is critical that project final services/results are supported institutionally, and that available funds in place.</i>	This statement is true; however, it is not a finding. A finding would be that project results are not supported institutionally or that they are sufficiently supported intuitively. Kindly present it as a finding and explain.	ADDRESSED: Main findings section eliminated. Additional explanations added to section 2.6.1.
17	Main Findings	Finding 26 on p.5: <i>Through the incorporation of regional/national policies into the design and</i>	Is this a finding or a recommendation? Kindly reformulate. Further, some members of the Reference Group expressed doubt re budgetary support of beneficiary countries for EU funded projects. International partnership is firstly considered like a financial support to tackle the lack of available budget.	NOT ADDRESSED: It is a moot point whether programmes are devised to fill gaps in stakeholders' budgets.



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		<i>development of EU projects, it is more likely that relevant national, sectoral and budgetary policies will provide support.</i>	Integration of policies in the projects will probably not change the game.	
18	Chapter 1 (Overview of the Regional Areas of Interest: Landscape Analysis and Maritime Security Actions)	p.6	The Reference Group suggests that each geographical region includes the map so the reader can actually see the projects. The maps up front, rather than in the annexes, would help in visualizing the information.	ADDRESSED: Maps inserted in each subsection
19	Subchapter 1.1 (West Africa: Landscape Analysis)	General	Many members of the Reference Group believe that ‘ <i>West Africa</i> ’ in all relevant chapters should be replaced by either ‘ <i>West and Central Africa</i> ’ or by ‘ <i>Gulf of Guinea</i> ’, since our partners in Central Africa are quite sensitive to this issue.	ADDRESSED: GOG substituted throughout unless in document titles.  13/07/2018: Further reviewed and updated where necessary in the report.
20	Subchapter 1.1 (West Africa: Landscape Analysis)	Paragraph 6 on p.6 and paragraph 8 on p.7	These two paragraphs should be part of Chapter 2 on evaluation.	NOT ADDRESSED: these two paragraphs give an overall vision of the issue. The second chapter is strictly on CMR projects
21	Subchapter 1.1.1 (West Africa Regional Maritime Security Initiatives)	p.7	The evaluators should consider describing the 2015 AIM Strategy, the Lomé Charter and the Yaoundé Declaration.	ADDRESSED: Lomé Charter inserted with description and reference to AIMS 2050



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22	Subchapter 1.1.1 (West Africa Regional Maritime Security Initiatives)	Memorandum of Understanding, p.7	The evaluators affirm that the ICC has been created “for the implementation of the regional strategy for maritime safety and security (EIMS)”. There is a major confusion between the regional strategy to be implemented by the ICC, meaning the regional strategy between ECOWAS, ECCAS and GCC for the whole GoG as recommended by the UN resolution 2039 in close cooperation with AU and dedicated to security and safety (and confirmed in the Yaoundé declaration), and the ECOWAS integrated maritime strategy of 2014 (after the creation of the ICC) with the holistic approach of maritime strategy but only applicable to ECOWAS region. The evaluators have probably been influenced by the present view from ECOWAS to use the ICC to improve their own strategy but it was clearly not the intention of the Yaoundé summit participants when they create the ICC (and approved by the Heads of States and Governments). This vision is new and acceptable if it is a real political change, but cannot be endorsed as a mistake when drafting the EU projects.	PARTIALLY ADDRESSED: EIMS removed from the paragraph to make it more pan-regional  <i>Discussion: This is a matter of interpretation. The MoU of 2013 talks of ICC coordinating regional strategies. The Heads of State Declaration at 1.13 talks of : United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2018(2011) and 2039(2012), which call for the development and implementation of regional, sub-regional and national maritime safety and security strategies; and gives passing reference to YCOG at 1.9. Thus the MoU expects the YCOG to work with RECs strategies. ECOWAS did not express a view on this, it is the expert’s view based on the documentation and interviews.</i>
23	Subchapter 1.1.1 (West Africa Regional Maritime Security Initiatives)	p.7 and p.8	The evaluators should consider to explain better relation between the Y. CoC (stats agreement) and the MoU between ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC (lifting the Y. CoC to a cross regional level). Perhaps, clarify the often misunderstood role of the ICC, so that the reader gets a better grasp of the historical context.	NOT ADDRESSED: The current wording is an extract from the MoU.
24	Subchapter 1.1.2 (EU Regional Actions)	p.8	No mentioning of the CSDP actions. Further, kindly make a difference between former projects, operational projects and future projects for a better understanding.	PARTIALLY ADDRESSED: There are no CSDP actions on maritime security in the GoG, as per authors’ knowledge and



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			The time lag between these projects is probably one of the main reasons why there is lack of coherence between EU projects (almost two years between GoGIN and SWAIMS/PASSMAR).	confirmation form EEAS. The second part has been addressed by 2 minor amendments to text in section 1.1.2
25	Subchapter 1.1.3 (Non-EU Actions)	Footnote 4	It is not clear why the actions described in the footnote should not be described in the main text. Further, the evaluators should consider mentioning the French role on capacity building and training specifically through the structural cooperation with Navies by Navy advisors in a large majority of countries and through their permanent ship in the region (“Operation Corymbe” and “NEMO exercises”).	ADDRESSED: added to footnote.
26	Subchapter 1.2 (East Africa: Landscape Analysis)	p.10	The evaluators should consider renaming the Subchapter (and others) to “ <i>Western Indian Ocean: Landscape Analysis</i> ”, so that it adequately covers the wider maritime region in question. Further, the whole subchapter except the first paragraph is a description of the DCoC and should be under East Africa Regional Maritime Initiatives.	ADDRESSED throughout the text 13/07/2018: the DCoC has been kept in the WIO section as it covers many of the countries in question. This can be revisited at a later date if required.
27	Subchapter 1.2.1 (East Africa Regional Maritime Initiatives)	p.13	The Reference Group believes there are other regional initiatives which should be described.	ADDRESSED: Inclusion of SADC Maritime Strategy added. Nevertheless, please note that SADC is not a Western IO organisation, although covering countries that are as well under the geographical area under analysis (Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles and Tanzania). For your information, EAC does not have a maritime strategy yet.
28	Subchapter 1.2.2 (EU Regional)	General	The evaluators should consider explaining why the European Commission is funding the various capacity-	ADDRESSED in the Introduction





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	Actions)		building interventions under the IcSP long-term financed 'Critical Maritime Routes' (CMR) programme and the EDF (in particular the MASE project). This is to prepare the exit strategy for EU NAVFOR Atalanta and to help build minimum levels of maritime capacities within the relevant agencies in the coastal countries from Djibouti to Madagascar. The long-term objective is for the coastal nations to take a greater share and responsibility in the patrolling of the waters in the Western Indian Ocean. The strengthening of maritime domain awareness (MDA) and the sharing of regional maritime data are necessary steps for this. Such explanation would give the reader a wider context of the EU maritime security efforts.	13/07/2018: Addressed in text, see MASE in WIO section 1.2.2
29	Subchapter 1.3 (South East Asia)	General	Kindly ensure that naming of subchapters is consistent. This subchapter should be named <i>1.3 South East Asia: Landscape Analysis</i> . Further, the part on AEC Blueprint should be part of <i>1.3.1 South East Asia Regional Maritime Initiatives</i> , which is currently completely absent from the text. There must be some initiatives, considering the maritime importance of the SE Asia.	ADDRESSED: inclusion of AEC Blueprint and EAMF
30	Chapter 2 (CMR Projects' Evaluation)	General	There is no evaluation of any SE Asia activities. If evaluation of the SE Asia activities is omitted on purpose, there should be a footnote with an explanation.	Addressed in the footnote
31	Subchapter 2.1 (Projects' Relevance)	p.21 <i>At the height of GoG piracy it was most relevant, but its limitations were its limited focus on piracy and armed robbery at sea</i>	Kindly include references or statements justifying such remarks. Is this the evaluators view or do they base the statement on some other independent assessment (in which case a reference is to be included). That being said, it is not exact to say that CRIMGO had a limited focus on piracy and armed robbery. The aim of the project as defined in the DoA was to improve maritime security with a focus on piracy. This focus was not exclusive of	ADDRESSED: Text deleted and re-worded



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		<i>alone, when other threats and emerging strategies were also relevant.</i>	considering other threats and that was done by the project team during training sessions with universities and trainings at sea (CRTs) where themes were built-up with African partners during planning conferences.	
32	Subchapter 2.1 (Projects' Relevance)	GoGIN, p.22: <i>Currently no EU project is working to create national inter-agency bodies to provide national input to regional projects.</i>	Some members of the Reference Group find it quite surprising to read this statement, because all CRIMGO and now GoGIN actions on the field are clearly inter-agencies orientated. During academic sessions various administrations are represented, during CRTs, participants come from between 10 to 20 different administrations. In the majority of participating countries the inter-agency body is already built-up and the project supports its implementation (Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin, Cameroun, Gabon, Sao Tomé for example).	ADDRESSED: text amended in section 2.1.  <i>Comment: This finding is possibly limited by a mission to only 3 countries none of which had a multi-agency NFP system in place.</i>
33	Subchapter 2.1 (Projects' Relevance)	On GoGIN, paragraph 4, p.22	This paragraph is obviously important. Evaluators should consider expanding it and making it clearer.	ADDRESSED: text redrafted in section 2.1  <i>Expert's view based on documentary analysis and speaking with ICC Board and other stakeholders holds: 1. CRIMGO paper IFS/2012/301-386 Annex II Tors amend 3 is very clear that it is based upon the RECs having signed the YCOC: 'Since ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC are signatories of the Code of Conduct of Yaoundé and leaders of the creation of the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC), they are beneficiary regional organisations of the CRIMGO project'. They might be beneficiaries of CRIMGO but they are not signatories to YCOC. The YCOC as with other UN based documents</i>



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				<p><i>is signed by States not organisations or regional bodies. Thus the premise to bring it into CRIMGO is flawed.</i></p> <p><i>2. YCOC is aimed at states and is a roadmap of actions that States by signing have agreed to take. As YCOC is aimed at the lowest common denominator = State level, it implies a bottom-up approach.</i></p> <p><i>3. The YCOC is neither a project nor a strategy.</i></p> <p><i>4. The ICC is therefore technically not part of the YCOC, but as stated in the MoU June 2013 is part of the regional strategies initiative.</i></p> <p><i>5. Notwithstanding it is on a path and its role needs to be adjusted as it moves along that path.</i></p> <p><i>Thus, the expert's proposal to place SWAIMS/PASSMAR in ICC to establish strategic output, with GOGIN concentrating on CRESMs and below, but still providing technical support to ICC, possibly on a conditional basis of the delivery of other strategic work.</i></p>
34	Subchapter 2.1 (Projects' Relevance)	p.23 <i>Regional Economic Communities (RECs)</i>	There is no explanation of the abbreviation REC before in the main text, but suddenly there is here. Kindly revise.	ADDRESSED throughout the text
35	Subchapter 2.1 (Projects'	p.23 Paragraph	This paragraph should be a continuation of the previous paragraph, not a new paragraph.	ADDRESSED in text in section 2.1



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	Relevance)	beginning with <i>Nevertheless...</i>		
36	Subchapter 2.1 (Projects' Relevance)	p.23 Paragraph beginning with <i>It was a shortcoming of the DCoC implementation...</i>	The first sentence of the paragraph implies that MARSIC did engage with Somalia, but not early enough. And the last sentence of the paragraph concludes that MARSIC was never engaged with Somalia. Kindly clarify.	ADDRESSED in text in section 2.1  14/07/2018: Further addressed to clarify how this affected the project's relevance
37	Subchapter 2.1.1 (Conclusion Project's Relevance)	p.24 <i>This indicates that projects emanating from EEAS and DEVCO should be more cohesive due to EEAS robust engagement with RECs, such as MASE.</i>	EEAS does not manage projects. Therefore, kindly revise text so that all formulations " <i>EEAS and DEVCO projects</i> " are replaced by " <i>European Commission projects</i> " or " <i>EU projects</i> ".	ADDRESSED throughout the text
38	Subchapter 2.1.1 (Conclusion Project's Relevance)	p.25 <i>For example, the crossover between MASE and CRIMARIO as well as external projects.</i> Similarly, on MASE and CRIMARIO on p.41: <i>Projects demonstrate overlap and total duplication of effort</i>	The Reference Group considers that the overlap between the MASE and CRIMARIO projects is more of a complementary nature. The added value of the CRIMARIO project is the EU expertise which the project brings. The CRIMARIO team is helping to drive the regional information-sharing effort (IORIS) and providing critical training, including for the regional maritime centres (the RMIFC in Madagascar and the RCO in Seychelles, both funded by MASE).	ADDRESSED: Some addition to section 2.1  Addressed 14/07/2018: comment integrated in section 2.1.2



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		<i>in others.</i>		
39	Subchapter 2.1.2 (Recommendations Projects' Relevance)	p.25 Recommendation 1	Kindly expand and state more examples.	ADDRESSED in text in section 2.1.2
40	Subchapter 2.1.2 (Recommendations Projects' Relevance)	p.25 Recommendation 2	This recommendation is formulated as a specific objective. "Improve the relevance of the REC maritime policies and ensure that they are in line with national maritime policies."	ADDRESSED in text in section 2.1.2
41	Subchapter 2.1.2 (Recommendations Projects' Relevance)	p.25 Recommendation 3 <i>Projects emanating from EEAS and DEVCO should be more cohesive aimed at enabling better developmental opportunities, due to EEAS robust engagement with RECs, such as MASE.</i>	So it is evaluated that EU maritime projects are not cohesive enough, and the recommendation is "EU projects should be more cohesive". Kindly provide more concrete action please.	ADDRESSED in text
42	Subchapter 2.1.2 (Recommendations Projects' Relevance)	p.25 Recommendation 5 <i>Develop an EU and African and SEA intercontinental approach to maximise on the implementation of</i>	This recommendation is not clear. Kindly revise.	ADDRESSED in text



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		<i>'relevance' factors, many things have a common relevance and could be addressed through a lessons learned/best practice forum.</i>		
43	Subchapter 2.2 (Projects' Quality of Design)	p.26: <i>From a bird's eye perspective, the quality of design of these EU projects lacks cohesion and does not align neither with the regional nor EU maritime strategies, except in a single overlapping area: maritime security.</i>	The evaluators should consider revising this statement. Many members of the Reference Group do not agree with it. First, the confusion between ECOWAS strategy and regional strategy as presented during the Yaoundé Summit is at the origin of this affirmation and cannot be accepted to cover a change in the RECs orientation since the beginning of the project. Secondly, the GoGIN team leader has been associated to all G7++ since the validation of this strategy and has been in permanent contact with the EU senior Coordinator in charge of the implementation of this strategy. These projects have been raised by this authority as the best concrete examples of contribution to the EU strategy, in the domain of security and safety. The project's Team leader never received any advice or order to re-orientate the project goals to better join the strategy. Therefore, the Reference Group kindly asks the evaluators to substantiate their statement.	ADDRESSED: New wording in section 2.2  <i>Comment: The criticism here is not of GOGIN but of a system that accepts project designs that are not aligned to the regions own, or the EU's regional strategies. Ultimately this is the view of both experts and has not specifically come from stakeholders.</i>
44	Subchapter 2.2.2 (Recommendations for the Quality of Design)	Recommendation 7, p.28: <i>Greater scrutiny of project risk matrices discussed at regular</i>	Kindly consider that the involvement of regional representatives in the projects' steering committees is an EU political choice. For the IcSP projects it has been decided at EU level to have a two levels process. The first level through project advisory committee to examine the	ADDRESSED: New recommendations added  <i>Comment: This is an interesting point. ECOWAS is increasingly seen as part of</i>



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		<i>steering group meetings with regional representatives and the EU's 'contact points' would help identify potential changes in project direction early and involve the beneficiaries in the process.</i>	effectiveness of the project and answer partners expectations, the second one at EU internal level to be able to exchange on efficiency and financial aspects without beneficiaries.	<i>the problem since a change of personnel in the maritime security department. They were unwilling to meet the expert and are not adhering to the empowerment of the ICC as outlined in the MoU. There is some work for EEAS here.</i>
45	Subchapter 2.3.1 (Conclusions Projects' Efficiency)	p.30 <i>There is scope to broaden the overall efficiency of EU projects by a constant centralised monitoring of who is doing what and proposing adjustments to project design or project log frames to create a more efficient EU centric output. In the current system it would seem that CRIMSON could provide this type of</i>	The Reference Group believes the evaluators should provide a counter-argument for such a recommendation. Many consider this would create an additional unnecessary layer between the Commission and the project. The solution that GoGIN and CRIMARIO adopted was to share the same M&E expert, since the two projects are similar in nature. Kindly see a comment on finding 9 above.	ADDRESSED in text in section 2.3.1



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		<i>umbrella oversight with the aim of binding EU projects of a similar nature.</i>		
46	Subchapter 2.4 (Projects' Effectiveness)	p.33 <i>Without a system of national focal points representing national inter-agency policies in place regional States' support for regional programmes such as GoGIN will be disjointed and will be hard to sustain once programmes draw to a close.</i>	The evaluators should consider that national focal points of contacts with existing inter-agencies prerogatives are already in place in some GoG States and must be shown as a model for others. Further, GoGIN works in close coordination with ICC to develop these national points of contacts in all countries	ADDRESSED: Reworded in section 2.4  <i>Comment: This sentence is based on comments made during the mission and in interviews with partners where the consensus was that greater focus was required to create NFPs (or State Points of Contact : SPOCs as they are increasingly being called). During long discussions with ICC this was not exposed despite pushing for information on establishing NFPs. From missions and dialogues during visits in the field, the ICC had this as long-term work as it was so difficult.</i>
47	Subchapter 2.4 (Projects' Effectiveness)	Section on CRIMARIO, p.34	The Reference Group considers that the effectiveness of CRIMARIO cannot be addressed only through IORIS. Another important activity of CRIMARIO is the training and capacity building, especially the Maritime Data Processing (MDP) course that lasts several months (carried out in 2016/2017 for Malagasies and Comorians, in 2018 for Kenyans, Seychellois and Mauritians). The feedback of the trainees is particularly favourable. The evaluators could consider that aspect of the CRIMARIO project.	NOT ADDRESSED: There is mention of the training actions and in fact one recommendation is to use CRIMARIO as a template for training activities. It is difficult in such a short report with so many projects to go completely into detail on each.
48	Subchapter 2.5 (Projects' Impact)	On CRIMGO, p.36	The evaluators could take into account that CRIMGO had a major impact on the two regional maritime universities	ADDRESSED: Additional wording added to section 2.5





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	and Sustainability)		to become partners on security educational training with real ownership and some trainers already trained. The CRTs' organisation promoted by the project is well received and implies all relevant agencies. This organisation has been used in Togo during a real recent crisis.	
49	Subchapter 2.5 (Impact and Sustainability)	Section on CRIMARIO, p.38	The evaluators should consider mentioning the MDP Train the Trainer trainings, which are more demanding for the trainees, and substantially improve their maritime skills.	ADDRESSED in text in section 2.5
50	Subchapter 2.7.2 (Recommendations EU Visibility)	Recommendation on p.45: <i>An African Agency such as AMSSA could assist for project visibility by providing an internal African link and should be pursued.</i>	Some members of the Reference Group do not consider this for a credible recommendation, since the transcontinental nature of the West Indian Ocean region.	Addressed: section deleted.
51	Annex 2 (Note from the Stakeholders)	Section 3 on Regional Integrated Maritime Strategy, p.58	A "Regional Integrated Maritime Strategy" is an interesting goal. However, the evaluators should consider restricting the geographical scope to ASEAN countries.	ADDRESSED in text in Annex 2
52	Annex 2 (Note from the Stakeholders)	Section 3 on Regional Integrated Maritime Strategy, p.58 : Persistent poverty, often the result of conflict, destroys	Due to the economic development of the countries listed (especially Singapore) formulation " <i>persistent poverty</i> " should be moderated. Perhaps " <i>persistent poverty in some countries</i> ".	ADDRESSED in text in Annex 2



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		the stability on which economic growth and investment depend; these factors have denied many of the regional communities' confidence and aspirations for a better future.		
53	Annex 2 (Note from the Stakeholders)	p.58	Under Section 3 of the Annex, Sri Lanka is listed as a SE Asian country, although it's a South Asian country. Kindly revise.	ADDRESSED in text in Annex 2
54	Annex 3 (Methodology)	Section on target groups, p.67	Although the Report has the International Maritime Bureau among its target group, it does not mention the Asia Regional Office of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur.	ADDRESSED in text in Annex 2

Ref. No	Position in the draft Report	Comment	Response of the Evaluators
1	Executive Summary	<u>COMMENT DEVCO D2:</u> The executive summary cannot be understood without reading through the entire document. However, that is not the purpose of such a summary which should be drafted as a stand-alone document. The author might want to have another look at it, making sure that it can be understood by itself without the need to go and read all the rest.	The Executive Summary has been rewritten to reflect the revised text and required stylistic amendments to ensure it can be read as a stand-alone summary.
2	Executive	<u>COMMENTS BY DG MOVE:</u> to what extent is the changing	The Executive Summary has been



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	Summary	<p>phenomenon of piracy taken into consideration in the report both geographically and thematically? How do you discuss the way forward?</p> <p>Moreover, the executive summary needs to be rewritten as it does not convey the message an executive summary is supposed to.</p>	<p>rewritten to reflect the revised text and required stylistic amendments to ensure it can be read as a stand-alone summary.</p> <p>The changing nature and focus on piracy as a priority regionally in comparison to other issues such as the blue economy and organised crime at sea has been addressed throughout the text.</p>
3	Chapter 4	<p><u>COMMENT BY DG MOVE</u>: this need to be translated into a recommendation. It is understandable that the EUDs might not be aware of the presence of some projects but this is because there is lack of communication between Brussels and the EUD. Communication on actions in the field should come at a very early stage (recommendation).</p>	<p>This has been inserted as a recommendation in Chapter 4.</p>
4	Section 3.6 (removed from Executive Summary)	<p><u>COMMENT BY DG MOVE</u>: the use of the word “enforcement” should be handled with care as there is the risk of losing the sight on the security perspective.</p>	<p>This has been addressed in Section 3.6. It has been removed from the Executive Summary as this is not one of the main points of the report.</p>
5	Sections 1.1.3 and 3.6	<p><u>COMMENTS BY DG MOVE</u>: it could be interesting to add parallels between the approach in the HoA and in the GoG. Important to put something on Nigeria as well when speaking about the GoG</p>	<p>Nigeria is now mentioned in the relevant sections.</p>
6	Introduction: The CMR Programme	<p><u>COMMENTS BY ATALANTA</u>: Fine that there is mention of ATALANTA’s success as contributing to the political fall in</p>	



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		interest. But the point is that dedicated military counter-piracy forces would not have succeeded without equal intervention from the commercial shipping industry.	Addressed in paragraph beginning ‘The Combination of EU programmes and initiatives...’
7	Introduction	<p><u>COMMENT BY INTERPOL:</u> This is inaccurate. CRIMLEA has nothing to do with the “money laundering” issue which is exclusively an activity launched within the framework of MASE/COMESA. INTERPOL Maritime Security sub-directorate, which was responsible for both Projects, wanted to ensure complementarity between the two different EU-funded initiatives and therefore some lectures were provided as an eye-opener under the umbrella of CRIMLEA and only till the start of MASE/COMESA.</p> <p>The whole AML /CTF trainings, as a follow up activity to the maritime piracy phenomenon off the coast of Somalia, are being delivered into 6 different countries exclusively by our MASE/COMESA team.</p>	Addressed and amended throughout the document, with all references removed
8	Introduction	<u>COMMENT BY INTERPOL:</u> Again, this applies to MASE/COMESA Project only and not to CRIMLEA which had a different but always complementing scope	Addressed by emphasising different but complementary scope
9	Introduction	<u>COMMENT BY DEVCO D2:</u> Reference is made to an IcSP strategy. It is unclear (at least to me) what is meant. IcSP is a financing instrument, not a strategy. Has a strategy been funded under the IcSP? Which would that then be?	Clarified to reflect that the IcSP is a funding instrument and should be engaged with on this basis – although all project’s will have to fit within the parameters of the strategic outlook of the IcSP’s approach to security.
10	1.2 Western Indian Ocean: Landscape	<u>COMMENT FROM ATALANTA:</u> Jeddah Amendment follow-on meeting in May 2018: EU NAVFOR was the only EU representative at that meeting.	Addressed in the section text



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	Analysis		
	1.2.1 Western Indian Ocean Regional Maritime Security Initiatives	<u>COMMENT FROM DEVCO: COMMENT BY DEVCO D2:</u> A third bullet point could be added on the IOC. Indeed, there is an Indian Ocean Region Memorandum of Understanding which is the official document by which participating maritime authorities agreed to implement a harmonised system on Port State Control (PSC), inspection procedures, operational procedures for investigations and the exchange of information. When vessels are not found in substantial compliance with law or related convention requirements, the PSC system imposes that they are brought into compliance. IOC's Strategic Development Programme for the period 2015-2017, endorsed by the IOC Council of Ministers in 2015, proposes areas of intervention which include maritime security.	Third bullet added in section 1.2.1.
11	1.2.2 EU Regional Actions	<u>COMMENT FROM ATALANTA:</u> we are the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) <u>Operation</u> ATALANTA. And we are an operation, not a mission, in EU parlance (the difference being the level at which it is commanded and the fact that it has executive rather than non-executive powers). I suggest: The European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA was launched across the Western Indian Ocean in December 2008, in response to European concerns as to the impact of Somali-based piracy on the freedom of navigation of commercial and humanitarian shipping. Its operational mandate derives from UNSCR 1816 and subsequent revisions, but also the written agreement of the Federal Government of Somalia, which	Addressed in the section text and in the accompanying footnote



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	<p>permits EU NAVFOR unique access into Somali internal waters. Although devised as a short-term crisis management intervention, the Council of the European Union is now due to extend the mandate of Operation ATALANTA until December 2020, thereby ensuring that EU NAVFOR continues its role in protecting World Food Programme and other vulnerable shipping in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean; deterring, preventing and repressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; monitoring fishing activities within the Somali EEZ; and supporting other EU missions (and specifically MASE and CRIMARIO) within means and capability. Within EU NAVFOR’s operational headquarters sits the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), to which 85% of ships still register when transiting the High Risk Area, and from which data, ship vulnerability assessments are calculated. MSCHOA runs the only online forum (MERCURY) for counter-piracy responders, which now reaches 112 coast guards, navies and law enforcement bodies across 38 nations. MSCHOA is also responsible for EU NAVFOR’s liaison with commercial shipping and thus the guidance issued in Best Management Practice 5 (released on 28 June 2018); organises international convoy protection in the Internationally-Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC); issues (jointly with CMF) the Industry-Releasable Threat Assessments and Bulletins that advise the global shipping industry of current maritime threats; and plays a leading role in SHADE, the biannual Shared Awareness and Deconfliction forum for all military counter-piracy forces operating in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. It is as a direct result of EU NAVFOR’s military presence over the last 10 years,</p>	
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		coupled with the EU’s civilian-led initiatives, that the EU is now recognised internationally as playing a valuable part in the maritime security architecture of this region (the EU’s own Near Abroad).	
12	<i>Introduction, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)</i>	<u>COMMENT BY INTERPOL:</u> This is not accurate as CRIMLEA was delivered by INTERPOL which is the only LEA implementing EU-funded Projects. Contrary to peoples’ misunderstanding, INTERPOL and UNODC are not one and the same either in the mandate or in the know-how, expertise and implementation methodology and maybe this is something that needs to be clarified once again so that in the future the EU will assign different Organisations to deliver different products based on their actual mandate. CRIMLEA was compatible and complementary to all other activities provided by INTERPOL in the region such as EVEXI and MASE/COMESA while it also functioned as the forerunner for the activities of MASE/EAC.	Addressed and clarified that the project was led by INTERPOL
13	1.3 South East Asia: Landscape Analysis	<u>COMMENT EU ISS:</u> Careful not to mistake “Asia” and the “South China Sea”!!! Asia, or even better Southeast Asia, has always been a theatre of multitude of maritime security challenges, ranging from territorial disputes to piracy, transnational seaborne crime (smuggling, IUU fishing) or environmental degradation – to cite just a few. The South China Sea is indeed the most burning current security hotspot (escalating since 2009) from the geopolitical point of view, as it brings together not only big power competition, but also generates regional arms build-up and puts global trade at stake (SEA and the SCS is home to some of the world’s busiest SLOCs). In general, I believe a “landscape analysis” should mention the vital	Mis-use of “Asia” addressed throughout text and standardised as SEA. Importance to global economy included in 1.3.



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		importance of the region’s maritime security environment and its sea routes to global trade – which also justifies international (and European!) interest and involvement in the area.	
14	1.3 South East Asia: Landscape Analysis	<u>COMMENT EU ISS</u> ” Ok, but not sure what it has to do with Maritime Security. ASEAN has been dealing with various MarSec challenges in the region, notably piracy, smuggling, IUU fisheries and environmental problems – but that has been happening before and regardless the AEC. Cooperation between law enforcement agencies is constantly promoted, but as with most security issues, problems persists due to unequal capacities of member states, lack of trust, fear of loss of sovereignty and reluctance to any sort of intervention. That said, cooperation in various ad hoc functional maritime security issues (border control, piracy, etc.) occurs between littoral states (bilateral, trilateral basis).	Commentary on unequal capacity, loss of sovereignty etc inserted as a caveat on the significance of establishing the AEC.
15	1.3.1 South East Asia Regional Maritime Security Initiatives	<u>COMMENT EUISS</u> : The MSP and the TCA are the two regional initiatives worth highlighting, as they are used as examples of effective indigenous MarSec efforts. Otherwise ASEAN deals with various MarSec issues as mentioned earlier, treated separately (fisheries – SEAFDEC, or the Asia Head of Coast Guards Meeting, etc.), but I guess that is not the aim of the mapping?	Projects added and explained in section 1.3.1
16	2.1.2 <i>Relevance of Individual Projects, CRIMLEA I and II</i>	<u>COMMENT BY INTERPOL</u> : Please refer to comments on Page 8 about CRIMLEA and AML aspect	Addressed throughout text. See comment above.





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	2.1.2	<u>COMMENTS made during meeting placed on the document by CRIMSON II regarding the limited number of countries visited and delays encountered prior to CRIMARIO launch.</u>	Addressed in a paragraph in section 2.1.2
	2.3.1	<u>COMMENTS made during meeting placed on the document by CRIMSON II regarding the efficiency of the GoGIN project as well as expectation management</u>	Paragraph inserted in section 2.3.1
17	2.3.1 Efficiency of Individual Projects, Western Indian Ocean	<u>COMMENT BY INTERPOL:</u> Setbacks were very minimal and were only encountered in Yemen where instability was high so no activities could be carried out safely and effectively. None of the stakeholders expressed any frustration with CRIMLEA’s implementation.	Addressed in paragraph beginning ‘Whilst the project was appears to have been efficient in the activities it was able to complete’ and then caveated with Yemen circumstance beyond the project’s control
	2.3.3	<u>COMMENT BY EUD DAKAR:</u> This is correct but not enough. If there is no staff appointed in delegations to really implement those projects on a daily basis it will remain very challenging to improve the situation with new projects. It goes without saying that those staff with a mandate focused on maritime security should have some expertise or at least some experience in this field. We could then articulate our activities with the member states active in Western Africa (France, Spain not least)	Point inserted in 2.3.3 to the effect that it is necessary to appoint trained and experienced staff.
18	2.4.2 Overall effectiveness of the CMR programme	<u>COMMENT BY INTERPOL:</u> There was no overlap or duplication between CRIMLEA and MASE/COMESA whatsoever. Initial financial investigations combined with other specialist investigation training concerning piracy and organised crime investigations were delivered to give a holistic approach to tackling a range of transnational organised crimes from inception to prosecution and to ensure a smooth transition to MASE/COMESA as this	Section revised to demonstrate complementarity between the two projects



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		action started later than expected.	
19	2.5.1 Impact and sustainability of the individual projects	<p><u>COMMENT BY INTERPOL:</u> No three Day training courses were delivered in financial investigations. In fact initial financial investigations combined with other specialist investigation training concerning piracy and organised crime investigations were delivered to give a holistic approach to tackling a range of transnational organised crimes from inception to prosecution. The comments by Police Chiefs and DCI's in the region at the last East African Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation EAPCCO in Uganda were that CRIMLEA was doing a fantastic job and the project should be extended and enlarged as Maritime Law Enforcement projects were too few.</p> <p>CRIMLEA did not primarily focus on the financial aspect of transnational organised crime but giving training on specific aspects of organised crime from Maritime Forensics to maritime drug detection training giving law enforcement officers specialist skills in key crime areas for the region. Working with Police chiefs from the beneficiary countries to satisfy specific needs of the countries according to the officers doing the work on the ground.</p> <p>CRIMLEA complimented the work of MASE to ensure a smooth transition as the MASE/COMESA action started later than expected.</p>	<p>Section revised to remove reference to financial investigations and reflect activities undertaken by CRIMLEA in preparation for MASE/COMESA,</p> <p>Reference to three day training courses removed.</p>
20	2.5.1 Impact and sustainability of the individual	<p><u>COMMENT BY INTERPOL:</u> Wrong statement. Financial intelligence units (FIUs) are government departments and are established by national governments. FIUs in all the</p>	<p>Clarifications made about FIUs established separately to CMR programming, where necessary</p>



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	projects	CRIMLEA beneficiary countries (except for Somalia) were established between 2002-2007 i.e. much earlier than the first phase of CRIMLEA started in 2010.	references removed entirely.
21	2.6.1 Coherence and Synergies of the Individual Projects	<u>COMMENT BY INTERPOL:</u> SWAIMS project which will be implemented by INTERPOL, is complementary to Project Agwé. INTERPOL units work together on this projects to ensure the most effective and efficient way of implementing them in concert	Comment left to one side since SWAIMS is not yet operational.
22	2.6.1 Coherence and Synergies of the Individual Projects, West Indian Ocean	<u>COMMENT BY DEVCO D2:</u> It would be good to develop this a bit further. In which areas overlap was noted? Does this mean the same activity has been funded twice, e.g. maritime officials received twice the same training from different programmes?	As we do not have further information on exactly what the details of this overlap were, this has been removed.
23	2.6.1 Coherence and Synergies of the Individual Projects, West Indian Ocean	<u>COMMENT BY DEVCO D2:</u> Is that really so? I have been informed that CRIMLEA and MASE coordinated their activities regarding the MASE's component on investigation and law enforcement ...? Perhaps this was not the case at the start but it certainly is now.	This text has been adjusted to acknowledge the coordination that does take place between the two.
24	2.6.1 Coherence and Synergies of the Individual Projects, West Indian Ocean	<u>COMMENT BY INTERPOL:</u> Totally wrong statement. CRIMLEA held regular meetings with all partners from the CMR family; these were held in the region on a regular basis. CRIMLEA was also represented at all regional maritime meetings also regular meetings held with EUNAVFOR, CGPCS, IOC, EAC, EAPCCO UNODC, EUCAP NESTOR, AMISOM, IMO, IOC, FBI, NCA, NCIS, embassies. This was done specifically to ensure complementarity with other projects in the region and to avoid duplication	As above, text has been adjusted to acknowledge the coordination that does take place between the two.



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		of work.	
25	2.6.1 Coherence and Synergies of the Individual Projects, West Indian Ocean	<u>COMMENT BY DEVCO D2:</u> It would be good to spell out what is actually meant here.	This sentence has been rephrased, and it is believed that the following sentences explain its meaning in greater detail. These have been heavily edited to improve clarity.
	2.6.2	<u>Recommendation provided by EUD Dakar</u>	Recommendation included both here and in chapter 4.
	2.7 EU Project Visibility	<u>COMMENT BY CRIMSON:</u> This section is insufficiently detailed and does not match the other sections. There is a lot to say here.	CRIMSON has redrafted this section, including sub sections for each project and an overview to match the structure of the other sections. Key details have been included on the visibility efforts made by each project.
26	- Now section 2.2.2	<u>COMMENT BY EU-ACT:</u> I'm not convinced that true SMART objectives would necessarily work - we have specifically avoided them in our project on purpose, in order to get away from a "tick-box" mentality of "X number of people trained in Y months" ... "M amounts of drugs / arrests in N timeframe". I also feel the "demand-driven" approach to planning ensures greater engagement and alignment with the beneficiaries, rather than them feeling like these things are being imposed without their full agreement. Whilst the EU-ACT Project framework makes it challenging (but not impossible) to monitor and evaluate, the use of broadly worded objectives and deliverables provides a huge amount of flexibility.	Comment included to the effect that some projects felt that SMART objectives would impose too great a level of rigidity.
27	4.2	<u>COMMENT EU ACT:</u> I do see benefit in a regular (6	Agree with this point, but believe this is



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	Recommendations for improving the process at the EU level	monthly) coordination meeting between relevant heads of projects, but the reality will always be that coordination is down to personal contacts and relationships. However, a better tasking and coordination structure within the EU would lessen the need for things to reply on individual personalities, and instead provide a clear institutional framework.	logical and doesn't need to be highlighted explicitly.
28	4.2 Recommendations for improving the process at the EU level	<u>COMMENT EU ACT:</u> I'm not certain if you want or expect suggestions for solutions to some of these issues? I do have some, but I think that they're beyond the scope / remit of what this report is meant to address, as it goes beyond the formulation of future actions and is more about the strategic structures of the EC.	Agreed that this is beyond the remit of this report
		<b><u>Comments received from DG DEVCO 14/08/2018:</u></b>	
	Executive Summary, p. 9	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> May be we should make reference that the countries were selected by the Reference Group. May be a liner foot note making reference and the day of the meeting of the were the countries were selected.	Footnote added to this effect in the Executive Summary, p. 9
	Executive Summary, p. 10	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> Clarify external: outside EU or CMR or maritime domain?	Addressed with edits on p. 10 to clarify that the meaning is actions by actors beyond the EU in the maritime domain
	Executive Summary, p. 10	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> This is not the appropriate wording. The logframe is a set of indicators and objectives against which the project will be measured, but it is not a management tool. <u>PROPOSAL:</u> Each of the CMR projects reviewed for this report utilised too rigid log-frames, resulting in delays where project	Proposal accepted, with minor language amendments proposed. Footnote added to explain what a logframe is, as suggested.



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		adaptation was required. (Add footnote explaining what the logframe is)	
	Executive Summary, p. 10	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> Not only threat but also political instability etc. better delete it	Wording 'or developing threats' deleted as suggested.
	Executive Summary, p. 10	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> May be you want to say here that project changes need to be driven by an evolving analysis cycle where risk matrix's input is provided by regional stakeholders. Because in my understanding the risk matrix is purely process and the input is what make a difference, so discussing the matrix with regional stakeholder wouldn't make much sense and the matrix needs to work for the project not for them.	Addressed by incorporating wording to this effect on p. 10 of the Executive Summary
	Executive Summary, p. 10-11	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> The is an inconsistency here. You speak about efficiency across the CMR in the first sentence and then you compare it with a regional project. I understand what you want to say but there is not consistency between the two sentences as one is about the CMR and CMR individual projects and the you use swaims as an example.	The example of SWAIMS has been deleted and the paragraph clarified and made more consistent.
	Executive Summary, p. 11	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> This was never the role of CRIMSON. CRIMSON is just a M&E mechanism and was never meant to have coordinating or oversighting role. On top of it the sentence is incorrect. The oversight mechanism is specified in the project consisting of a series of activities (steering committees periodical reporting, audits...) where CRIMSON is assisting the project manager. The whole paragraph is very unfortunate. I propose: Identified disparities between CMR and EDF funded	Paragraph deleted and replaced with proposed text (with minor linguistic suggestions)



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		projects suggest that more robust in-house (EU) Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms coupled with stronger oversight and coordination mechanisms are needed.	
	Executive Summary, p. 11	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> Isn't this the same as we said for efficiency?	Comment – yes, it is repeated in the efficiency section, but it is relevant to effectiveness as well. However, deleted from the effectiveness section to avoid repetition.
	Executive Summary, p. 11	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> I might have the tendency to think that this is being done by the projects. GoGIN provide training to maritime law enforcement, provide legal assessment to ministerial level, works closely with universities. As it stands I would have the tendency to disagree despite knowing that what the paragraph means is that the project should be able to articulate mechanism on the side of the partner countries to build interagency relations in the framework of the project to enhance project's efficiency.	Addressed by incorporating text to this effect and editing the original sentence.
	Executive Summary, p. 11	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> 'And national???'	'and national' added on p. 11.
	Executive Summary, p. 12	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> I believe this needs to be further explain.	Agreed, further explanation would be useful. However, there is a risk that the Executive Summary is becoming too long; instead, we propose deletion of this section of the sentence.
	Executive Summary, p. 12	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> What the organisational challenges? If yes what are they? At least an example? The organisational challenges of the project or of the beneficiary states?	As per previous comment. Following the deletion, it is much clearer what 'This' refers to.



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Executive Summary, p. 12	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> Is it mechanisms or culture? For me these are not the same.	'Culture' changed to 'mechanism' as suggested.
Executive Summary, p. 12	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> The CMR programme is an EU thing.	'Programme' changed to 'legacy' as suggested by DEVCO through direct edits in the text.
Executive Summary, p. 12	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> I see this "external projects" more and more, but some times is leading to confusion can't we use another one (non-CMR or simply other projects	'External projects' changed to 'other projects'
Executive Summary, p. 12	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> what external support	Addressed to clarify that we are not describing external support that has already been obtained, it's more about the building of trust to allow the potential for future actions.
Executive Summary, p. 12	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> Shouldn't this be in a different paragraph. To me it is a complete different thing unless this is the external support you refer before	Addressed through clarification of the previous sentence, and through detaching the two concepts by making them into separate paragraphs.
Executive Summary, p. 12	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> Only by CRIMSON? All the project have a visibility plan, are they inefficient? Does all rely on CRIMSON?	CRIMSON IS THE ONLY PROJECT THAT TRIES TO PRESENT THE CMR AS AN ENSEMBLE OF PROJECTS. INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS HAVE THEIR OWN VISIBILITY STRATEGIES BUT THIS DOES NOT ALWAYS FOCUS ON THE CMR AS A WHOLE. HOWEVER, THE SENTENCE HAS BEEN REPHRASED TO MAKE IT CLEARER THAT ACTIONS ARE RUN BOTH BY CRIMSON AND THE OTHER PROJECTS.
Executive	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> In all honesty I would not	Mention of the videos deleted.





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	Summary, p. 13	mention the videos here and mostly when if one looks at the number of “views” does not go beyond 15 per project, me and Jesper being two of them!	
	Executive Summary, p. 13	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> You provide recommendations throughout the executive summary!	Addressed by clarifying that recommendations have been made throughout the Executive Summary, but that a full list can be found in Sections 2 and 4.
	Introduction, p. 16	<p><u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> This section of the introduction focusses mostly on organised crime. 1<sup>st</sup> OC is not a maritime threat, it is a threat such Terrorism, conflict, etc. 2<sup>nd</sup> you cannot speak about OC and leave (almost) behind IUU for instance which is on the top of the national and regional agendas of the beneficiary countries. 3<sup>rd</sup> what happens with the cases are still being reported of bunkering, highjacks (in Nigeria)... etc.</p> <p>I propose to shorten this section making reference to all type of threats (OC being an important one) and emphasise the holistic approach of CMR projects for everything not only for trafficking.</p>	Addressed. Firstly, two references to bunkering and hijacking have been inserted into the section. Secondly, a number of cuts have been made as suggested to reduce the imbalance in this paragraph, by cutting detail on the organised crime threat.
	Introduction, p. 16	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> This is not correct, bunkering and highjackings are still of very big concern in the GoG. Conclusions of the 2017 G7++Friends of GoG.	It is agreed that bunkering and hijackings are of major concern, but this is not the same thing as piracy. Sentence amended to this effect, by the inclusion of specific reference to bunkering and hijacking. To clarify this further, a footnote has been added with a definition of what is meant by piracy.
	Introduction, p.	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> Not only for the EU	Addressed by deleting ‘for the EU’



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	16		
	Introduction, p. 16	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> They didn't emerge, there were always there	Addressed by changing 'emerged' to 'become more relevant'
	Section 1.1, p. 21	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> Isn't this a recommendation?	Addressed: sentence deleted from here and added to the recommendations for 'coherence and synergies'
	Section 2.1.3, p. 47	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> This paragraph needs a bit of thinking. Sustainable fisheries is entirely for DG mare, helping fight IUU could be more into maritime security. Human resource and infrastructure development is a nice thing to do but, for IcSP? Are all those domains here purely security or maritime security related??? Nice things to do but I think really out of the context.	Addressed by deleting the parts of this recommendation that refer to IUU fishing, and restricting this only to reference to the blue economy.
	Section 2.1.3, p. 47	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> Need reformulation, some of them are even implementers of our projects, the recommendation does not make much sense as it stands.	Addressed by deleting reference only to those implementing CMR projects and inserting reference to broader actors, including the UN, RECAAP, World Bank, regional organisations and other actors.
	Section 2.1.3, p. 47	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> A very nice recommendation, but can't we not be more concrete (through a forum? Donor coordination? Nature? Topics? (only maritime security or more globally maritime issues)	A more concrete sentence has been added, reading: 'Online platforms and forums accessible to multiple stakeholders across all regions (law enforcement agencies, ministries, regional organisations, etc.) could be set up to discuss gaps, needs and opportunities for the development of relevant activities under the framework of these projects'
	Section 2.2.3, p.	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> This only applies to GoG???	Perhaps some confusion, it does not say



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	51		anywhere that this applies only to GoG.
	Section 2.2.3, p. 51	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO: I spoke about this before</u>	Text used in response to previous comment on this issue has been incorporated into this recommendation.
	Section 2.2.3, p. 51	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO: Isn't this a repetition</u>	Addressed through deletion
	Section 2.2.3, p. 51	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO: I don't necessarily agree and the report is inconsistent throughout. (1) smart is one of the methodologies as valid as any other (2) if we have the logframe (which are place there with the same function and we speak about improving logframes all along the report, what is this then, do we make the logframs SMART????</u>	Addressed through deletion
	Section 2.3.2, p. 54	<u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO: Isn't this a recommendation?</u>	Addressed by deletion from here and insertion in the recommendations section on coherence and synergies (section 2.6.3). Reformulated such that it fits with the style of the other recommendations in this section.
	Section 2.7.1, p. 71	<u>CRIMSON: figures for CRIMARIO social media outreach need updating to the most recenct numbers.</u>	Figures updated as of 13 August 2018.
	Section 3.4, p. 76	CRIMSON INPUT FROM THE CMR MEETING 200618: Legal frameworks established by the EC tend not to take into careful consideration the legal frameworks established by regional organisations.	Inserted with minor linguistic amendments proposed.
	Section 3.4, p. 76	INPUT FROM THE CMR MEETING 200618: THE INCLUSION OF NIGERIA WAS AN IMPORTANT INPUT FROM THE MEETING ON 20 JUNE – PLEASE INSERT	Reference to Nigeria inserted through two paragraphs.
	Section 3.5, p. 77	CRIMSON INPUT FROM THE CMR MEETING 200618:	Text inserted with minor linguistic



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		Dysfunctions in Brussels provoke problems among projects and stakeholders in the field	amendments proposed.
Section 3.8, p. 78		CRIMSON INPUT FROM THE CMR MEETING 200618: Part of the problem is the lack of interaction between different bodies in the EU. Concerted EC-EEAS action is needed. Cooperation within the EU, and coherence regarding EU MS initiatives (for instance among the IcSP, CSDP, etc) is paramount	Text inserted with minor linguistic amendments proposed.
Section 4.2, p. 85		<u>COMMENT EU ACT:</u> I do see benefit in a regular (6 monthly) coordination meeting between relevant heads of projects, but the reality will always be that coordination is down to personal contacts and relationships. However, a better tasking and coordination structure within the EU would lessen the need for things to rely on individual personalities, and instead provide a clear institutional framework.	Addressed through addition of a further recommendation: 'An improved tasking and coordination structure within the EU is required to create a clear institutional framework to guide actions. As part of this, a coordinator should be selected by the EU who will have oversight of all projects and the power to influence project design.'
Section 4.2, p. 85		<u>COMMENT EU ACT:</u> I'm not certain if you want or expect suggestions for solutions to some of these issues? I do have some, but I think that they're beyond the scope / remit of what this report is meant to address, as it goes beyond the formulation of future actions and is more about the strategic structures of the EC.	Agreed that this is going beyond the scope of the report. Edits made to the relevant sentence such that it is more solution focused, in line with the previous suggestion (See box above).
Section 4.2, p. 85		CRIMSON INPUT FROM MEETING 200618: Addition of two recommendations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The EU (namely the EEAS) should increase its support to the projects on a political and</li> </ul>	Recommendations amalgamated into a single one with linguistic adjustments made to increase readability.



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		<p>diplomatic level to understand what the beneficiaries want;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased political support should come from the EC. Nevertheless, projects should work better to get in touch and interact with actors in the field;</li> </ul>	
	Section 4.2, p. 86	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Part of the problems is the lack of interaction between different bodies in the EU. Concerted EC-EEAS action is needed;</li> <li>• It is important to better align EU actions to the expectations/requests of the countries in the regions and to AIMS</li> <li>• The disparity between IcSP and EDF actions in terms of in-house and external non-biased Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms could be addressed by the EU by standardising monitoring tools. A two-level monitoring system comprised of a project advisory committee with all partners involved and an internal EU steering committee could be an efficient way of improving project M&amp;E.</li> </ul>	Recommendations inserted, but linguistic adjustments made to increase readability.
		<p><u>COMMENT FROM DG DEVCO:</u> Recommendations are repeated several times (copied throughout several sections). Why?</p>	It was thought that it would be useful to collate all previous recommendations in one place in Chapter 4. Instead, the comment has been addressed: new text has been added at the start of Chapter 4 to refer back to the recommendations throughout Chapter 2, while noting that further recommendations will be



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			<p>presented in Chapter 4 that apply at the EU level:</p> <p>‘Recommendations have been made throughout the report in relation to each of the seven evaluation criteria. These recommendations apply at project level, as well as a number of other levels, and can be found throughout Chapter 2. This chapter will not repeat these recommendations; instead, it will present a series of recommendations for consideration at the EU level. In addition, a number of key points are laid out for consideration when establishing future projects.’</p>
		CRIMSON INPUT FROM MEETING 200618: Addition of a comment in the list of ‘Comments of Relevance to Future Initiatives’:	Comment added, with linguistic adjustments made to improve readability.
		<b><u>Comments received from CRIMARIO and GoGIN 22/08/18</u></b>	
	Throughout the report (namely in the sections related to MARSIC and CRIMARIO)	<u>COMMENT FROM CRIMARIO:</u> inaccuracies and confusion and merging of MARSIC/CRIMARIO in respect to Yemen	Issue clarified with CRIMARIO team and inaccuracies amended throughout the text
	Section 2.1.1 p.41	<u>COMMENT FROM GoGIN:</u> May be CRIMGO was piracy-oriented, but it is false (even if it was said during	Agreed with the GoGIN team and sentence reformulated



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		interviews) to write that GoGIN is too piracy-oriented (see thematic of CRT for example);	
	Section 2.1.2	<u>COMMENT FROM GoGIN:</u> it would be more exact to write that GoGIN do not succeed in designation of relevant national POC (relevant POC were officially requested by GoGIN but were designated by the countries, sometimes irrelevant...);	Issue clarified with the GoGIN team and text amended accordingly
	Section 2.3.1	<u>COMMENT FROM GoGIN:</u> OK for the strategic approach by EDF project, but GoGIN has to work with ICC which is also in charge of coordination for pooling and harmonization of technical solutions;	Discussed with the GoGIN team and text reformulated
	Section 2.6.3	<u>COMMENT FROM GoGIN:</u> OK for the necessary coordination between EU project, but not only through half-yearly meetings between coordinators and managers (also on the ground, more often if necessary).	Agreed with the GoGIN team and sentence reformulated
<b>Deleted/inserted – substantive changes made by RUSI editor prior to resubmission to DG DEVCO on 7 August 2018</b>			
	Introduction, CMR Programme: Implementing the IcSP to Counter Maritime Threats	Footnote on deleted and replaced by paragraph starting ‘The combination of’. Page extensively rewritten to reflect comments.	
	Introduction, CMR Programme: Implementing the IcSP to Counter Maritime Threats	Conclusion updated to synthesis sub-section	
	1.1.3 Non-EU Action/Multidonnors	Update on project AGWE added	



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	1.2 Western Indian Ocean: landscape analysis	Information updated/moved about the Jeddah follow on meeting.
	1.2.2 Eu Regional Actions	Clarified and amended to reflect comments, see footnote
	1.3 South East Asia: landscape analysis	Extensively rewritten to reflect comments. Information on AEC added.
	1.3.1 South East Asia Regional Maritime Security Initiatives	Information about MSP and TCA added to reflect comments
	2.1.2 Relevance of the Individual Projects	Rewritten extensively with some changes and restructuring to reflect comments on the DcoC Information Sharing Network
	2.2.1 Quality of Design of the Individual Projects	Rewritten extensively with some changes to reflect comments and improve structure
	2.4.1 Effectiveness of the Individual Projects	Rewritten extensively to improve structure.
	2.5.1 Impact and sustainability of the individual projects	Rewritten extensively to improve structure and reflect comments.





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